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ABSTRACT 
Détente or Razryadka? 
The Kissinger-Dobrynin Telephone Transcripts and Relaxing American-Soviet Tensions,  
1969-1977 
by 
Daniel S. Stackhouse, Jr. 
Claremont Graduate University: 2013 
 The 1970s witnessed improved relations between the United States and the Soviet 
Union.  After twenty-five years of the Cold War, President Nixon made a historic visit to 
Moscow in May, 1972, to sign both the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I) and 
the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) with Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev.  
SALT I froze the offensive nuclear arsenals of both sides at then-current levels for five 
years, while the ABM treaty limited defensive nuclear weapons permanently.  The 
leaders of the two superpowers also concluded agreements on trade, sharing scientific 
and communication technology, as well as cultural exchanges.  Several more US-Soviet 
summits followed throughout the decade. 
The Americans used a French word, détente, for this thaw in the Cold War.  
Meanwhile, the Russians preferred razryadka.  While both can be translated as “relaxing 
tensions,” the difference in terms was indicative of a difference in understanding of what 
“relaxing tensions” actually meant.  For the Americans, détente meant peace through 
arms control, trade, and various forms of scientific, technical, and cultural exchanges.  
However, it also included an anticipated change in Soviet behavior, both domestically by 
respecting Western notions of human rights and internationally by refraining from 
interference in nations of the developing world.  For the Soviets, razryadka referred 
strictly to those subjects they considered appropriate topics of state-to-state relations: 
arms control to prevent nuclear war, trade, and earning respect as a co-equal superpower.   
One of the principle means of conducting US-Soviet detente was through a 
private “backchannel” between US National Security Adviser and later Secretary of State 
Henry Kissinger and Soviet Ambassador to the US Anatoly Dobrynin.  This dissertation 
argues that transcripts of their telephone conversations from 1969-1977 reveal that the 
backchannel enabled Kissinger and Dobrynin to establish a relationship which provided 
the empathy needed to bridge many of the ideological differences between their two 
countries.  Consequently, the Kissinger-Dobrynin backchannel serves as a case study of 
the effectiveness of back channels in international diplomacy.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Détente, Razryadka, and the Kissinger-Dobrynin Special Relationship 
 
“Now, what it all gets down to is how two great powers, the two major powers in the 
world, are going to be able to talk about their differences rather than fight about them?  
You’ve got to set up a relationship [italics mine] on a personal basis or in some fashion 
whereby the differences can be discussed and the areas of self-interest can be discovered, 
worked out, and then increased.  And that is what détente is all about.”1 
-Richard Nixon 
 
 The 1970s witnessed improved relations between the United States and the Soviet 
Union, known today as the period of “détente.”  One of the most noteworthy events of 
this era occurred when US President Richard Nixon made a historic visit to Moscow in 
May, 1972, to sign the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I) with Soviet General 
Secretary Leonid Brezhnev.  The treaty had two components: the Interim Agreement 
which froze offensive nuclear missiles at then-current levels for five years, and the Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) permanently limiting defensive nuclear weapons.  Nixon 
and Brezhnev also concluded agreements on trade, sharing scientific and communication 
technology, as well as cultural exchanges.  Several more US-Soviet summits followed 
throughout the decade. 
 Originating in the late 1960s, détente was an effort to relax tensions after more 
than twenty years of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, two 
nations with competing social systems – democratic capitalism and communism, 
respectively.  The overriding concern was that the two superpowers might allow their 
differences to spiral out of control and lead to a nuclear war.  Several factors precipitated 
the change from confrontation to negotiation including the development of nuclear parity 
between the United States and Soviet Union, the emergence of powerful economic rivals 
                                               
1 Frost/Nixon – The Complete Interviews, 400 min., Paradine Television Inc., 1977, DVD. 
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in Western Europe and Japan, as well as the emergence of newly independent former 
European colonies in the developing world where both Washington and Moscow 
competed for influence. 
 However, by the end of the 1970s détente – the relaxing of tensions which had 
brought so much hope and progress to efforts of avoiding confrontation and even a 
potential nuclear war – was dead.  While many believed that the immediate cause 
stemmed from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the subsequent withdrawal 
of a second treaty known as SALT II from Senate consideration, a deeper examination 
revealed fissures in the rapprochement almost from the very beginning.  Accusations by 
both sides of violating agreed upon limits in nuclear weapons plagued the period.  In 
addition, disagreements on the subjects of human rights and foreign interventions in the 
developing world further endangered progress.   
The Americans used a French word, détente, for this thaw in the Cold War, while 
the Russians preferred razryadka.  While both can be translated as “relaxing tensions,” 
the difference in terms indicated a fundamental difference in understanding of what 
“relaxing tensions” actually meant.  For the Americans, détente meant peace through 
arms control, trade, and various forms of scientific, technical, and cultural exchanges.  
However, it also included an anticipated change in Soviet behavior, both domestically in 
terms of respecting Western notions of human rights and internationally by refraining 
from interference in the affairs of newly formed nations in the developing world.  For the 
Soviets, razryadka referred strictly to those subjects they considered appropriate topics of 
state-to-state relations: arms control to prevent nuclear war, trade, and earning respect as 
a co-equal superpower.   
3 
 
Despite these differences, there were numerous successes during détente’s early 
period from 1969-1975.  Accomplishments including the Interim Agreement and ABM 
Treaty, dramatically increasing emigration for Jews wishing to leave the Soviet Union, as 
well as ending American involvement in the Vietnam War and bringing about a ceasefire 
during the October, 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict attest to this.  In this dissertation I will 
argue that where progress was possible in US-Soviet relations, it was largely attributable 
to an empathetic relationship which developed between American National Security 
Adviser and later Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Soviet Ambassador to the 
United States Anatoly Dobrynin.   
Through a “backchannel” method of conducting diplomacy characterized by 
private meetings and telephone calls, Kissinger and Dobrynin crafted détente away from 
the State Department bureaucracy, the media, and the public.  After their meetings face-
to-face or over the telephone, Kissinger provided memoranda to Nixon summarizing the 
discussions while Dobrynin did the same in telegrams to Brezhnev, Soviet Foreign 
Minister Andrei Gromyko, and other members of the Politburo in Moscow.  However, 
transcripts of their telephone conversations provide an as-it-happened sense of their 
discussions.  They also reveal that over time Kissinger and Dobrynin formed a 
relationship as well as established empathy and trust, thereby enabling them to make 
progress in US-Soviet relations in spite of vast ideological differences between their two 
countries.  Through a comprehensive study of the transcripts, this dissertation ultimately 
provides a case study of the effectiveness of backchannels in international diplomacy. 
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Historiography of Detente 
The confusion over the meaning of détente which existed for years between the 
American and Soviet governments and in the public has continued amongst scholars ever 
since.  In an early post-detente literature review, Brian White argued that observers had 
not even been able to agree on whether détente described a condition or a policy.
2
  As a 
condition, some viewed detente as simply a new historical period following twenty-five 
years of Cold War; others used the term to mean an intermediate location on a continuum 
ranging from Cold War on one side, to entente, meaning “much closer ties,” on the 
other.
3
  To some, détente was merely a “delusion,” and scarcely more than 
“appeasement” of the Soviet Union.4  According to White, this represented the view of 
“those merely skeptical of the achievements of détente, together with the growing 
transnational lobby of critics, like [US] Senator Jackson, [Soviet dissident] Solzhenitsyn 
and [Chinese] Vice-Chairman Deng.”5   
As a policy, White continued, détente represented “an historical process evolving 
piecemeal through dialogue towards stability and peace,” with scholars disagreeing as to 
whether a relaxation of tensions began with Stalin’s death in 1953, the Nixon 
administration and West German Chancellor Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik in 1969, or the 
Helsinki Accords in 1975.
6
  White concluded: “it is difficult not to be impressed by the 
lack of specification in the literature; overlap and confusion abound.”7   
                                               
2
 Brian White, “The Concept of Détente,” Review of International Studies Vol. 7, No. 3, (Jul., 1981): 165. 
3 Ibid., 165, 166. 
4 Ibid., 166. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid., 167. 
7 Ibid., 169. 
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The disagreement over détente extended to competing American and Soviet 
definitions of relaxing tensions.  Robert G. Kaiser wrote that the Americans “decided to 
grant the Soviets at least the symbolic status of superpower,” by adopting détente.8  He 
explained that the change of course occurred because dealing with the USSR from a 
“position of strength” had led to an unsatisfactory relationship built upon military 
conflicts and increased defense spending.
9
  While the United States had almost certainly 
viewed the Soviet Union as a superpower since the 1950s, it may have taken the arrival 
of détente to convince the Soviets that the Americans truly viewed them as equals.  
Consequently, Kaiser explained that for Moscow détente was proof of a “correlation of 
forces” in its favor.10  It was “a vital stage in the evolution of Soviet power – the moment 
when no other nation could claim decisive superiority over the U.S.S.R.,” he added.11   
The Americans and Soviets also had dramatically different reasons for engaging 
in a rapprochement according to Dimitri K. Simes.  He asked if the Americans had been 
looking for “a convenient excuse to withdraw from a rough game of geopolit ical 
maneuvering for influence and resources.”12  However, Simes wrote that for the Soviets 
détente “simultaneously reflected new strengths and weaknesses.”13  On the one hand, 
“the basis of détente was a change in the correlation of forces in the USSR’s favor.”14  On 
the other, Moscow had a “growing recognition of a need for developing economic ties 
with America.”15   
                                               
8 Robert G. Kaiser, “U.S.-Soviet Relations: Goodbye to Détente,” Foreign Affairs Vol. 59, No. 3, America 
and the World 1980 (1980): 500. 
9 Ibid. 
10
 Ibid., 501. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Dimitri K. Simes, “The Death of Détente?” International Security Vol. 5, No. 1 (Summer 1980): 3. 
13 Ibid., 4. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
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Raymond L. Garthoff defined détente as simply “the shorthand description for the 
policies subscribed to by both powers in the 1970s,” and stressed that the word “was not 
a clearly defined concept held in common.”16  Part of the problem, wrote Garthoff, was 
that the Americans seemed to have confused “détente” with “entente.”17  Although both 
were French terms, the former meant a relaxation of tension “as with the release of a 
bowstring,” while the latter referred to “a positive development of close and cooperative 
relations.”18  However, the Russian term razryadka only meant “a relaxation of 
tension.”19  The American concept seemed to imply almost a kind of friendship, while the 
Soviets considered the two sides to still be engaged in an ideological struggle, but to be 
doing so in a more peaceful manner.   
As the 1970s receded further into the background and historians had more time to 
reflect, two main camps of scholarship emerged in the 1980s and 1990s.  The first 
equated détente with a distinct break from the past – a new era.  Scholars in this group 
cited the replacement of confrontation with negotiation, as well as the ability of both the 
United States and the Soviet Union to turn their main focus away from foreign policy and 
concentrate on domestic concerns.  A second school of thought suggested that détente 
merely represented a continuation of the Cold War by different means.  Observers in this 
category pointed towards the global chess game for influence which Washington and 
Moscow continued to play via various proxies in the developing world.  Several others 
argued that détente was not a change in outlook by the superpowers, but simply the result 
of diminished resources on both sides. 
                                               
16 Raymond L. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation – American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan 
(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1985), 24. 
17 Ibid., 25. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
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Whether détente represented a new era or a continuation of the Cold War matters 
because if superpower détente truly ushered in an era of change, it could be considered as 
one of the turning points in ending the Cold War.  However, if relaxing tensions was just 
an example of great power posturing, it would indicate that other factors such as the 
leadership of Ronald Reagan, Mikhail Gorbachev, and others, activism by organizations 
including Poland’s Solidarity trade union and Czechoslovakia’s Charter 77, and inherent 
flaws in the communist system itself brought about the Cold War’s end. 
Among those who viewed relaxing tensions as inaugurating a new era was 
Nicholas O. Berry, who described détente as “end[ing] a period of crisis foreign policy 
that began with the Second World War and that, after a short interlude, continued with 
the cold war.”20  This led to “a novel condition in American politics,” as the adoption of 
détente caused foreign affairs to recede and domestic issues to assert themselves as 
preeminent, leading Congress to assume greater control of the agenda in Washington.
21
   
Likewise, former Soviet General and Director of the Institute of Military History 
Dmitri Volkogonov asserted that the time between the Soviet invasions of 
Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Afghanistan in 1979, an era closely associated with détente, 
amounted to “the most peaceful time in Soviet history.”22  At the same time however, the 
USSR’s “long pursuit of the USA in the build-up of nuclear weapons and the 
development of rockets to deliver them culminated in the 1970s in an unstable military 
                                               
20 Nicholas O. Berry, “Détente and the Troubled Presidency of the 1970s,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 
Vol. 15, No. 2 (Spring, 1985): 271. 
21 Ibid., 271, 273. 
22 Dmitri Volkogonov, Autopsy for an Empire, trans. Harold Shukman (New York: The Free Press, 1998), 
276. 
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balance,” he added.23  Both superpowers eventually realized that a nuclear war would be 
“tantamount to the destruction of the planet,” leading to a political and military détente.24   
The notion that détente represented a new era could be seen in the scholarship of 
the first few years of the 21
st
 century as well.  Richard C. Thornton explained that the 
conflict in Vietnam caused changes in the US military relationship with the Soviet Union 
and in the American economic relationship with West Germany and Japan.
25
  These 
developments “produced a prolonged, but carefully veiled, internal debate within the 
American leadership which spanned four administrations and transcended party labels,” 
wrote Thornton.
26
  The US sought to draw back its security commitments and have its 
allies assume greater responsibility for their protection, but this required improved US-
Soviet relations to ensure that Moscow would not take advantage during the transition 
period.
27
  Therefore Thornton defined détente as “a precondition to orderly 
disengagement and the construction of a new global order.”28  Likewise, Chen Jian 
explained that although China had previously acted as a “’buffer’” between the United 
States and Soviet Union, in the early 1970s détente “redefine[d] the rules of the US-
Soviet confrontation,” and dramatically reduced the chances of nuclear war.29  William 
Tompson agreed that US-Soviet détente was part of “a new phase” in overall East-West 
relations, but ascribed it mainly to the actions of several European leaders beginning in 
                                               
23 Ibid. 
24
 Ibid., 276-277. 
25
 Richard C. Thornton, The Nixon-Kissinger Years – The Reshaping of American Foreign Policy, 2nd ed. 
(St. Paul, Minnesota: Paragon House, 2001), xi. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid., xii, xiv. 
28 Ibid., xiv. 
29 Chen Jian, Mao’s China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 
3. 
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the mid-1960s.
30
  Tompson explained that French President Charles de Gaulle’s efforts at 
creating “a special Franco-Russian relationship” and West German Chancellor Willy 
Brandt’s Ostpolitik, or new policy towards the Eastern bloc demonstrated Western 
Europe’s concerns regarding “where the superpowers’ own management of their 
relationship might lead.”31 
More recently, Melvin P. Leffler, Vladislav Zubok, and Jeremi Suri portrayed 
détente as driven by various American and Soviet leaders desirous of breaking away from 
the Cold War status quo.  According to Leffler, relaxing tensions permitted Carter and 
Brezhnev to turn their focus away from foreign affairs and concentrate on the home front: 
“Détente was a respite to lessen the burdens of the arms race while Soviet and American 
leaders tackled domestic priorities and insured their countries against the dangers of 
nuclear war.”32  Leffler added that the policy offered both leaders “glimpses of a more 
rational world where their two nations could compete peacefully and progress 
economically.
33
  Meanwhile Zubok argued that World War II had been “a major life-
changing experience” for Brezhnev, who firmly believed any future conflicts “must be 
avoided at all costs.”34  Nevertheless, the Soviet General Secretary also presided over a 
military build-up initiated shortly after his ascension to power in 1964, pleasing Marxist-
Leninist hard-liners who were suspicious of détente and remained a majority on the 
Soviet Politburo.
35
  The ability to advocate for détente and yet not alienate his more 
                                               
30
 William Tompson, The Soviet Union under Brezhnev (London: Pearson Education Limited, 2003), 40. 
31 Ibid., 40, 41. 
32
 Melvyn P. Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind – The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War 
(New York: Hill and Wang, 2007), 337. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Vladislav Zubok, A Failed Empire – The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev 
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 202. 
35 Ibid., 204. 
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traditional colleagues caused Zubok to conclude: “It was Brezhnev’s personal and 
increasingly emotional involvement and his talents as a domestic consensus builder that 
proved to be the most important factor in securing the policy of détente in the period from 
1968 to 1972.”36  However, Jeremi Suri emphasized Kissinger’s role, explaining that 
Nixon’s National Security Advisor thought previous leaders had avoided “the hard work 
of compromise with adversaries,” but by establishing personal relationships with each 
other, diplomats from the United States and the Soviet Union “could integrate key issues 
confronting their societies, build mutual trust, and insulate frank exchanges from political 
exploitation in the public sphere.”37  Thus détente was “an attempt to use superpower 
cooperation, rather than conflict, to manage the multiplying centers of power around the 
world.”38   
Other scholars argued that détente was really nothing new.  However, even within 
this group there was disagreement.  Some contended that détente was an ingenious way 
for the US to continue containing the Soviet Union, but by other means due to reduced 
resources, some viewed it as an effort by the Soviet Union to lull the West into a sense of 
security while continuing its policy of expansion, while others saw nothing but a charade 
where both sides engaged in symbolic summitry and treaties without truly confronting 
their differences and considering how they might behave more peacefully. 
John Lewis Gaddis argued in 1983 that détente did not represent a break from past 
practice, but only a change in tactics in response to changed circumstances.  Gaddis 
                                               
36 Ibid., 223. 
37 Jeremi Suri, Henry Kissinger and the American Century (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press 
of Harvard University, 2007), 223. 
38 Ibid., 226. 
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defined strategy as “the calculated relationship of ends and means.”39  A good strategy 
understands that there is a connection between what you are hoping to accomplish and 
the tools you have at your disposal.
40
  Therefore, governments must decide “shall 
interests be restricted to keep them in line with available resources; or shall resources be 
expanded to bring them into line with proclaimed interests?”41  According to Gaddis, 
when the Nixon Administration came into office in January, 1969, it had to find a way to 
continue the US policy of containment, but with fewer resources due to expenses being 
incurred from the Vietnam War and a stagnant economy.
42
  It was for this reason that 
Nixon and Kissinger “embraced ‘détente’ as a means of updating and reinvigorating 
containment,” argued Gaddis (italics in original).43     
Jussi Hanhimaki and Robert Dallek agreed with Gaddis.  Hanhimaki wrote: 
“Kissinger effectively argued that America had overstretched and needed to cut back its 
commitments without jeopardizing its central goal of containing Soviet power.”44  
Détente thus replaced “military interventions and nation-building” with “creative 
diplomacy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and China” and a “search for strong regional 
allies.”45  Similarly, Dallek argued that détente amounted to “foreign policy realism 
which guarded against national devastation and any sort of major Soviet victory in the 
Cold War.”46  He credited Nixon and Kissinger for attempting to make the case to 
                                               
39 John Lewis Gaddis, “The Rise, Fall and Future of Détente,” Foreign Affairs Vol. 62, No. 2 (Winter, 
1983), 355. 
40 Ibid., 356. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid., 358, 359. 
43 Ibid., 359. 
44 Jussi Hanhimaki, The Flawed Architect – Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2004), 486. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Robert Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger – Partners in Power (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2007), 
305. 
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conservatives that policies such as improving relations with China did not represent 
surrender in the Cold War, but “fresh means of containing Soviet power.47   
Several scholars were much more cynical about détente.  Among them was 
George F. Kennan, who wrote in 1977 that the early SALT successes as well as press 
coverage of summits created an impression in the minds of numerous Americans that 
détente had birthed a new “structure of peace.”48  Many in the US therefore expressed 
shock when the Soviet government continued suppressing its political opponents as well 
as encouraging revolutionary national liberation movements around the world.
49
  “’The 
atmosphere of détente’” was supposed to have precluded such actions.50  On the contrary, 
the Soviets had agreed to cooperate only in “specific and limited areas,” explained 
Kennan.
51
   
Adam B. Ulam conceded that détente had originally been based upon “restraint,” 
“reciprocity,” and “rhetoric.”52   However, the Soviets failed to show restraint when 
supporting the Marxist faction in the Angolan Civil War, while American efforts to lure 
both Egypt and China away from the Soviet Union were “hardly in line with the spirit of 
Soviet-American rapprochement.”53  Ulam argued that by 1975 reciprocity had likewise 
vanished as “the USSR continued the pursuit of ‘unilateral advantages’” internationally.54  
Thus, according to Ulam, by the middle of the 1970s détente was mostly based upon just 
                                               
47
 Ibid. 
48 George F. Kennan, The Cloud of Danger: Current Realities of American Foreign Policy, (Boston: Little, 
Brown and Company, 1977), 152. 
49
 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Adam B. Ulam, Dangerous Relations – The Soviet Union in World Politics, 1970-1982 (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1983), 140. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid. 
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“rhetoric.”55  Similarly, Rand scholar Harry Gelman argued that “throughout the 
Brezhnev era a profound sense of vulnerability – over both the legitimacy of party rule 
and the stability of Soviet gains – powerfully reinforced the leadership’s felt need to keep 
pressing for incremental gains…”56  He added that détente did not significantly change 
these beliefs.
57
  Furthermore, Washington’s reactions to Moscow’s actions “combined to 
put an end to any sense that the two superpowers were probing for mutuality of 
interest.”58  Perhaps most cynically of all, Robert Conquest described détente as an effort 
“to persuade the West not to match the Soviet armament drive.”59  By creating the 
illusion of relaxed tensions, the Soviets would enable “appeasers and pro-Soviet elements 
to come to power” in the West.60   
Richard Ned Lebow, Janice Gross Stein, and Keith L. Nelson were equally 
dismissive of both superpowers.  Lebow and Stein viewed détente as merely a strategy 
used by both the Americans and the Soviets to try and rein in the other.
61
  “Each side saw 
the other’s gain as its loss and its gain as the other’s loss,” they wrote.62  For the Soviet 
Union, détente was “an opportunity to preserve and promote its influence and constrain 
the United States,” while the United States “treated détente as a cover in the search for 
unilateral gain in the Middle East and as a constraint on Soviet behavior.”63  Meanwhile 
Nelson asserted that if Washington and Moscow had had the means, they would have 
                                               
55 Ibid. 
56
 Harry Gelman, The Brezhnev Politburo and the Decline of Détente (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1984), 16. 
57 Ibid. 
58
 Ibid. 
59 Robert Conquest, Reflections on a Ravaged Century (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2000), 169. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, We All Lost the Cold War (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1994), 180, 181. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid. 
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continued with the same domestic and foreign policies as before “even if these had meant 
perpetuation of the Cold War” (italics mine).64  However, after its experience in Vietnam, 
the US concluded that it could not continue spending on both the military and social 
programs at the same levels.  Likewise, the USSR realized that it needed trade with the 
Americans in order to meet the needs of its population.  Since the superpowers had 
“realistically conservative leaders,” meaning they were uninterested in wide-ranging 
domestic changes, they decided on a new approach to foreign policy.
65
  In short, 
Washington and Moscow chose to lessen their expenses abroad so as not to ask their 
populations to make significant sacrifices at home.   
Those arguing that detente marked a distinct change in US-Soviet relations were 
correct to point out that the period was marked by less confrontation and more 
negotiation.  Undoubtedly, this eased the minds of many on both sides who were 
concerned about military spending, the conflict in Vietnam, and even nuclear war.  
However, one of the themes of this dissertation is that the Americans and Soviets 
continued to hold the strongly conflicting ideologies which had helped to initiate the Cold 
War in the first place.  Because these differences were never adequately addressed during 
the détente period, particularly US fears (rightly or wrongly) about what it viewed as the 
destabilizing effects of Soviet support for national liberation movements, there was 
always a limit to what could be accomplished via diplomacy.  Consequently, détente was 
merely a continuation of the Cold War, but by other means.  Ultimately, the only thing 
both sides truly agreed upon was the imperative of avoiding nuclear war.   
 
                                               
64
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Kissinger’s and Dobrynin’s Views of Detente 
Few individuals were more closely associated with US-Soviet détente than Henry 
Kissinger and Anatoly Dobrynin.  Kissinger served as National Security Advisor and 
later also Secretary of State under Presidents Nixon and Ford from 1969-1977.  
Meanwhile Dobrynin held the post of Soviet Ambassador to the United States from 1962-
1986, a period spanning all or part of the administrations of Presidents Kennedy, 
Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Reagan.     
Kissinger had a decidedly negative view of détente while in academia in the 
1950s and 1960s.  According to Steven F. Hayward, a scholar at the conservative Pacific 
Research Institute for Public Policy in San Francisco, in the 1950s when Kissinger was a 
professor at Harvard he had warned that the Soviet Union would use “détente and ‘peace 
offensives’” in order to “divide and weaken domestic opposition in the West.”66  Then in 
1965 he added that for the Soviets “’peaceful coexistence…is justified primarily as a 
tactical device to overthrow the West at minimum risk.’”67   
After arriving in Washington, however, Kissinger modified his views of détente 
several times, according to Walter Isaacson.
68
  One of Kissinger’s biographers, Isaacson 
noted that in 1974 detente was “’the search for a more productive relationship with the 
Soviet Union;’” in July, 1975, several months after the fall of Saigon to the North 
Vietnamese, it had morphed into “’a means to regulate a competitive relationship;’” and 
finally in 1976 it was simply “’designed to prevent Soviet expansion.’”69  Clearly the 
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changing definitions represented Kissinger’s effort to scale back expectations as the US-
Soviet relationship deteriorated.   
Writing in 1982 after leaving office, Kissinger described détente as an adaptation 
to a time when Congress and the American people were war-weary from Vietnam and 
less inclined to endorse military interventions and big defense budgets.  He seemed to 
believe relaxing tensions was a necessity based upon the realities of the 1970s: 
For the statesman in any event, a foreign policy issue does not present 
itself as a theory but as a series of realities.  And the realities of Nixon’s 
first term were stark.  We had to end a war in Indochina in the midst of a 
virulent domestic assault on all the sinews of a strong foreign policy.  It 
was followed by the impotence of the Presidency as a result of Watergate.  
Détente was not the cause of these conditions but one of the necessities for 
mastering them.
70
 
 
Kissinger argued that despite what many conservatives believed, détente was not 
surrender to the Soviets in the Cold War, but an effort to wage the ideological struggle 
more efficiently and more in tune with national interests due to limited resources.
71
  
However, he also accused liberals of not assuming responsibility for driving America 
towards isolationism through their resistance to military involvement and military 
expenditures after Vietnam and Watergate.
72
 
 In general, Kissinger did not believe that Americans were prepared for détente.  In 
1994 he wrote, “[t]he combination of adversarial and cooperative conduct implicit in 
détente with the Soviet Union,” did not conform to the American “black-and-white 
assumption” that the world was divided into friends and enemies.73  The reality, he 
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argued, was that every country was “a combination of both.”74  Kissinger concluded that 
détente “challenged American exceptionalism and its imperative that policy be based on 
the affirmation of transcendent values.”75    
 Like Kissinger, Anatoly Dobrynin had a distinguished academic background.  His 
doctoral thesis on the Russo-Japanese War of 1905 and U.S. President Theodore 
Roosevelt led him to studying American diplomatic history.
76
  After graduating from the 
Higher Diplomatic School, he then began his long career in the Soviet Foreign Ministry 
in the late 1940s.
77
  In his 1995 memoirs Dobrynin identified détente for the Soviet Union 
as first and foremost a reaction to the danger of nuclear war.  For Brezhnev and other 
high officials of the Communist Party, a nuclear confrontation was “utterly 
unacceptable.”78  Military costs, improving relations with Western Europe, preventing a 
US-Chinese alliance, and enhancing Brezhnev’s profile in the Soviet Union were other 
motivating factors.
79
   
On the other hand, Dobrynin believed that the American shift to détente resulted 
from a “painful reassessment of the political maxims of the Cold War.”80  US policy-
makers faced Soviet missile parity and witnessed traditional allies including West 
Germany and France independently establishing improved relations with the Soviet 
Union.
81
  Consequently, Washington felt compelled to abandon containment and take 
another tack.  Dobrynin also noted “social and economic problems” which had been 
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“seriously aggravated by the national gamble in Vietnam,” causing the US to realize it 
could no longer pay for both guns and butter – military spending to wage the Cold War 
and social spending to fund President Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society programs from the 
1960s.
82
 
Kissinger described detente as a practical necessity due to political, economic, 
and social changes in America, but not as surrender in the Cold War.  He sought to 
appease both the left and the right.  By suggesting that détente was merely a change in 
tactics, Kissinger believed that he could appeal to conservatives who wanted to give no 
quarter to communism.  Likewise, by reducing America’s global commitments he hoped 
to convince liberals that there would be no more Vietnams. 
Meanwhile, Dobrynin thought US acceptance of détente demonstrated America’s 
acknowledgement that it could no longer rely on military strength to get its way in the 
world.  For him, the American experience in Vietnam was a classic case of imperial 
overreach.  He believed that the United States had realized that it could no longer block 
national liberation movements in the developing world, particularly when backed by the 
strengthened Soviet military.  This interpretation implied American acceptance of the 
new status quo where the Soviet Union was an equal superpower and here to stay.   
Thus Kissinger and Dobrynin were working from different premises while 
working to relax international tensions.  Reconciling these differences as well as other 
distinctions between the wide-ranging American concept of détente and the Soviets’ 
more limited notion of razryadka was the central task of the Kissinger-Dobrynin 
relationship.  Although both continued to be self-interested advocates for their respective 
                                               
82 Ibid. 
19 
 
nations, they nevertheless forged a partnership which enabled them to overcome daunting 
challenges while negotiating arms control, human rights, and foreign interventions. 
 
The Backchannel 
According to Nixon, Kissinger had suggested having a private dialogue with 
Dobrynin even before they first met with the Soviet Ambassador on February 17, 1969, at 
the White House.
83
  Nixon agreed, believing that such an arrangement might lead the 
ambassador to “be more forthcoming.”84  It began simply with Dobrynin arriving through 
the East Wing door of the White House for weekly lunches.
85
  In 1979 Kissinger 
described the meetings as “a series of intimate exchanges that continued over eight 
years.”86  He added, “Increasingly, the most sensitive business in US-Soviet relations 
came to be handled between Dobrynin and me.”87  The private meetings provided a 
forum to express points of view as well as test the reactions of each side to proposals.  As 
Kissinger put it,  
We would, informally, clarify the basic purposes of our governments and 
when our talks gave hope of specific agreements, the subject was moved 
to conventional diplomatic channels.  If formal negotiations there reached 
a deadlock, the Channel would open up again.  We developed some 
procedures to avoid the sort of deadlock that can only be resolved as a test 
of strength.
88
   
 
He described how both he and Dobrynin could raise an issue and get a response in a 
completely “non-committal” manner, thereby enabling them to “explore the terrain,” and 
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“avoid major roadblocks.”89  In 1994 Kissinger elaborated, explaining the circumstances 
surrounding the creation of what became known as “the backchannel” or simply “the 
channel”:  
During his first term, Nixon had shifted much of the conduct of diplomacy 
into the White House, as he had announced he would during his 
presidential campaign.  Once the Soviet leaders had grasped that Nixon 
would never delegate the key foreign policy decisions, a back-channel of 
direct contact developed between Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin 
and the White House.  In this manner, the President and the top leadership 
in the Kremlin were able to deal directly with the most important issues.
90
 
 
In 1995 Dobrynin described the backchannel as part of a “two-tier 
arrangement.”91  Although he continued to make “official contacts” with Secretary of 
State William Rogers, Dobrynin explained that Nixon also sought “to exchange views 
urgently and privately with the Soviet leadership.”92  He called the backchannel with 
Kissinger, “unprecedented in my experience and perhaps in the annals of diplomacy,” 
due to its “extensive use.”93  Furthermore, its role “should not be underestimated.”94  He 
summed up its value in the following way: 
Looking back, I can say with certainty that had it not been for that 
channel, many key agreements on complicated and controversial issues 
would have never been reached, and dangerous tension would not have 
been eased… That was the beginning of our unique relations with the 
administration of Nixon and Kissinger.  We were on many issues both 
opponents and partners in the preservation of peace.
95
 
 
 In 2007 Kissinger and Dobrynin elaborated on how the backchannel operated.  
Their meetings could be face-to-face or over the telephone.  When they met in person, it 
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was usually in the Map Room on the first floor of the White House, which Kissinger 
described as “sheltered from the outside world by verdant bushes, creating an atmosphere 
of seclusion, which removes the time pressures from the conversations – insofar as the 
pace of White House business allows it.”96  The purpose of their conversations could be 
to pass along communications from Nixon to Brezhnev and vice versa, or to break a 
deadlock in official negotiations between the traditional American and Soviet 
bureaucracies.
97
  Dobrynin explained that previously he had conducted backchannels 
with members of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, but only sporadically.
98
  In 
contrast, the backchannel with Kissinger functioned as a direct conduit between the 
White House and the Kremlin on a permanent basis throughout Nixon’s presidency.99  
Secrecy was the defining characteristic of the backchannel.  Its existence was only 
known to a relative few both in Washington and Moscow.
100
  Furthermore, the 
conversations in person or over the phone were conducted without secretaries, translators, 
or note-takers.  Afterwards Kissinger would compose a memorandum of conversation 
(memcon) for Nixon while Dobrynin would transmit a telegram to Moscow.
101
  In 2007 
these were collected in Soviet-American Relations: The Détente Years, 1969-1972 by the 
Historian of the U.S. Department of State and the History and Records Department of the 
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  However, Kissinger explained that in order to truly 
get a sense of how the backchannel functioned, it was also necessary to read the 
transcripts of his telephone conversations (telcons) with Dobrynin which were only 
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printed in fragments for that collection.
102
  This dissertation provides a comprehensive 
study of those transcripts.   
 Kissinger and Dobrynin did not invent backchannels, but the Nixon 
administration probably surpassed any of its predecessors in the degree to which it relied 
upon this form of diplomacy.  Kissinger also conducted backchannels with West German 
State Secretary Egon Bahr, US Ambassador to South Vietnam Ellsworth Bunker, US 
Ambassador William Porter at the Vietnam talks in Paris, and US Ambassador to 
Pakistan Joseph Farland.
103
  This should not be surprising in light of Nixon’s well-
documented disdain for those whom he considered “east coast liberals” within the various 
federal government bureaucracies.  Nixon provided a blunt explanation for why he and 
Kissinger were so secretive: “”[T]here have been more backchannel games played in this 
administration than any in history because we couldn’t trust the God damned State 
Department[!]’”104  However, the backchannel with Dobrynin was probably unique in 
terms of the frequency and ease of its use due to the close proximity of the White House 
and the Soviet embassy in Washington, as well as the installation of a direct “hotline” 
between Kissinger’s White House office and Dobrynin’s embassy office. 
Backchannel diplomacy necessarily entailed secrecy, something for which the 
Nixon administration was often criticized.  Liberals feared that Nixon and Kissinger were 
placing too much emphasis on geostrategic interests and balance of power theory while 
neglecting human rights concerns.  Meanwhile, conservatives argued that the 
administration was endangering American national security by making arms control 
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agreements which they believed favored the Soviet side.  Additionally, Kissinger 
conceded that the administration was “cavalier” in its treatment of the regular civil 
service bureaucracy.
105
  “Hell hath no fury like a bureaucrat scorned, and the Nixon 
White House compounded the problem by the insensitivity with which it overrode 
established procedure,” he wrote.106  In particular, Secretary of State William Rogers was 
cast aside.  Such domestic pressures eventually combined with the conflicting American 
and Soviet views of relaxing tensions, ending détente and reigniting fears of nuclear war. 
Most scholars seemed conflicted about the Nixon administration’s use of 
backchannels.  In general they acknowledged its success in improving US-Soviet 
relations, but also pointed out how undemocratic it was by leaving many important voices 
out of policymaking.  Isaacson argued that each of the various backchannels “on its own, 
could probably have been justified as necessary for creative diplomacy.”107  However, 
they also “complicated American foreign policy,” “wasted the time and creativity of 
Kissinger’s staff,” and were utilized more to ensure that the White House got credit for 
diplomatic breakthroughs than they were for reasons of national security.
108
  Hanhimaki 
admitted that the Kissinger-Dobrynin backchannel “unquestionably, yielded important 
results,” but added that it also curtailed constitutional checks and balances because 
decision-making was kept away from Congress and the public.
109
  Suri stated that the 
backchannel “facilitated” what he called “Kissinger’s détente strategy,” specifically “to 
use superpower cooperation, rather than conflict, to manage multiplying centers of power 
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around the world.”110  However, like Hanhimaki, he emphasized that the public, 
Congress, and expert members of the Foreign Service were left out of the process.
111
  
Dallek was less inclined to see the positive side of backchannels.  He explained 
that Nixon and Kissinger endorsed their use because they “feared a loss of control” if 
policy making was left in the traditional channels.
112
  However, he considered such 
concerns to be “overblown” and suggested that back channels were also intended “to 
guard against sharing accolades for administration successes.”113   
Alistair Horne appeared to be the most approving of backchannel diplomacy.  He 
described the Kissinger-Dobrynin relationship as “remarkable” and “unlike anything 
similar known under other U.S. and Soviet administrations during the Cold War.”114  He 
wrote that Kissinger and Dobrynin “were astonishingly open with each other, with 
Kissinger giving the Russian classified material that another U.S. statesman would have 
jibbed at.”115  However, even Horne questioned the effectiveness of the backchannel 
because although Dobrynin was “superbly in the loop” in Washington, it was not clear if 
he was similarly “kept in the loop with candor” in Moscow.116 
Two recent dissertations expressed similarly mixed views of the backchannel.  
Richard A. Moss argued that the backchannel functioned as a kind of “safety valve” to air 
views and gave its participants “a personal stake” in détente’s success.117  Furthermore, 
he asserted that his study of the US-Soviet backchannel “mitigate[d] some of [the] 
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criticisms levied against Nixon and Kissinger in their secretive conduct of diplomacy.”118  
Nevertheless, he viewed it as “a weak foundation for long-term détente.”119  Meanwhile, 
Michael V. Paulauskas argued that Kissinger and Dobrynin forged a friendship via 
backchannel communications, which either could then use as “leverage” in 
negotiations.
120
  However, he noted that one of the backchannel’s drawbacks was that 
Dobrynin often suffered from the Kremlin’s “repeated unwillingness to fully disclose 
information to him.”121  This manifested itself most dangerously when conflicts arose in 
the developing world in places like Angola and Afghanistan.
122
   
 For some, back channel diplomacy is tainted due to its association with the 
scandal-ridden Nixon administration.  Nevertheless, recent literature on back channel 
negotiations (BCN) has documented its numerous positive effects on resolving 
international conflicts.  The literature cited the private nature of BCN as essential for 
allowing representatives of hostile nations to begin negotiations amidst heated rhetoric 
from politicians and the public on both sides.  Furthermore, the shared project of 
maintaining secrecy helped the negotiators to establish a relationship based upon trust.   
For example, Anthony Wanis-St. John, who focused on the Israeli-Palestinian 
dispute, claimed that all of the major signed agreements between Israel and the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) resulted from the use of back channels “alone 
or in combination with front channels.”123 This included the 1993 Oslo Peace Accords 
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where Israel and the PLO attained mutual recognition and the Palestinians acquired self-
rule.  Privacy was particularly necessary in cases such as this one where the two sides did 
not recognize the legitimacy of the other.  According to Wanis-St. John, back channels 
enabled leaders to isolate negotiations from “internal opponents (those most likely to 
oppose peace talks),” but this also caused difficulty “creating a broad consensus” to 
implement an agreement.
124
  On the other hand traditional “front channel negotiations” 
often encountered problems attaining an agreement in the first place.
125
  The answer, 
explained Wanis-St. John, was to “combine early but diminishing use of secrecy with 
gradually increasing public efforts to expand the central coalition on each side.”126   
Niall O’Dochartaigh contended that back channels resulted in the development of 
cooperative relationships between negotiators for the British government and the Irish 
Republican Army (IRA), helping lead to a historic 1998 settlement in Northern Ireland.
127
  
He argued that back channels “can contribute to a strong sense of joint enterprise and a 
common project” including keeping the negotiations secret.128  This in turn helps lead to 
“a surprisingly robust negotiating relationship built on trust, continuity of personnel and a 
relationship of reciprocal exchange and limited compromise.”129   
Mikael Weissmann analyzed China’s role in establishing back channels between 
North Korea and other countries including the United States which are concerned about 
Pyongyang’s nuclear program.130  He explained that “Personal networks and BCN [back 
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channel negotiations] have been crucial ingredients for China’s success in breaking 
escalation spirals, and in initiating cooperation, communication, and agreements, which 
has mitigated and de-escalated the conflict (at least temporarily).”131  One method Beijing 
used in negotiations was “informal pressure and signaling,” including expressing support 
for United Nations sanctions whenever it believed that Pyongyang had exceeded proper 
boundaries.
132
 Weismann concluded that from the time of the first trilateral meetings held 
in Beijing in 2003, Chinese involvement was indispensable and “most probably” 
prevented military action against North Korea.
133
 
The notion of using a “back door” or making “backroom deals” can 
understandably connote underhandedness and seem counter to expectations of honesty 
and openness in negotiations.  However, similar to the cases cited above, the US-Soviet 
backchannel enabled Kissinger and Dobrynin to establish a relationship, and over time, 
fostered the empathy required to provide both with a sense of what was possible in 
negotiations and what would be “non-starters.”  Both understood the domestic political 
restraints that the other would face when it came time to “sell” an agreement.   
Based upon my study of the transcripts I have identified four characteristics of the 
Kissinger-Dobrynin backchannel which help to explain its success: privacy, durability, 
ease and frequency of communication, and personality, the last of which I believe is too 
often overlooked in history, which is after all the study of human beings and their actions 
individually or collectively.  Hence a second theme of this dissertation is the vital role of 
personal relationships in conducting diplomacy. 
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Sources 
According to Dobrynin, during his face-to-face meetings with Kissinger there 
were neither interpreters nor secretaries present.
134
  “This meant there was no official 
record of our meetings except what we kept ourselves,” he added.135  Nevertheless, he 
claimed there were never any disagreements about what had been said.
136
  After those 
meetings, Kissinger typically prepared a memorandum of conversation (memcon) for 
Nixon while Dobrynin usually transmitted a telegram to Moscow.  Obviously both would 
have had the opportunity to summarize their meetings in a way which they believed 
would please their respective superiors. 
However, Kissinger explained that his secretaries transcribed “the overwhelming 
majority” of all his telephone conversations during his tenure as National Security 
Advisor and Secretary of State.
137
  At first, the secretaries listened to the conversations on 
a “dead key” extension and drafted summaries, but eventually they began typing 
unedited, verbatim transcripts from shorthand notes or tape recordings.
138
  It is not known 
what happened to the secretarial notes, but the tapes were immediately destroyed after 
being transcribed.
139
  Kissinger described the purpose of the telephone conversation 
transcripts or telcons as “to enable me to follow up on promises made or understandings 
reached and to incorporate them into memoranda to the President or other records.”140  
These private phone conversations with various leaders took place when Kissinger was at 
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the White House, the State Department, San Clemente, Key Biscayne, Paris, New York, 
his home, and during airplane flights.
141
   
However, most of the phone conversations between Kissinger and Dobrynin 
probably occurred when Kissinger was in his White House office and Dobrynin was in 
his office at the Soviet embassy in Washington.  Dobrynin explained how secrecy was 
ensured by the installation of a “hot line” in 1972: 
Later, as our contacts became more frequent and we met almost daily, the 
president ordered the installation of a direct and secure telephone line 
between the White House and the Soviet embassy for the exclusive use of 
Kissinger and me; we would just lift our receivers and talk, without 
dialing.
142
   
 
Consequently, the telcons between Kissinger and Dobrynin provide a previously 
unavailable, as-it happened, and behind-the-scenes account of American-Soviet 
diplomacy during the extremely consequential years of the 1970s.  It is not known if 
Dobrynin also recorded the phone conversations, so the telcons are probably the only 
such source available to historians of the period.   
When Kissinger left office in 1977, he had the telcons placed temporarily at 
David Rockefeller’s estate before giving them to the Library of Congress.143  They were 
not to be seen by the public until five years after Kissinger’s death and even then only if 
the people with whom he was speaking were deceased or had given their approval.
144
  
According to Bruce P. Montgomery, associate professor and faculty director of archives 
at the University of Colorado at Boulder, Kissinger had first obtained an opinion from a 
State Department legal advisor (who served under him) that the transcripts were his 
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personal property.
145
  Kissinger’s opponents argued that the transcripts from January, 
1969, to August, 1974, were covered by the Presidential Records and Materials 
Preservation Act (1974), a statute passed specifically to enable Congress to acquire 
Nixon’s tapes and records about the Watergate affair.146  Meanwhile, State Department 
transcripts were said to be covered by the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).
147
  
In the late 1970s the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press fought to 
obtain access to the telcons in federal district court and the US court of appeals, both of 
which ruled that the transcripts were government records and should be released under 
FOIA.
148
  Nevertheless, in 1980 the Supreme Court in Kissinger v. Reporters Committee 
for Freedom of the Press overturned the lower courts and claimed that the telcons were 
not part of the Executive branch and therefore not covered by FOIA.
149
  However, the 
Court added that the Federal Records Act gave the Archivist of the United States as well 
as the Attorney General the power to retrieve records if they had not been removed 
properly.
150
  Consequently the National Archives requested and Secretary of State 
Edmund Muskie agreed in 1980 to review the telcons at the Library of Congress so they 
could potentially be returned to the State department, but no further steps were taken.
151
  
For the next dozen years, Republican administrations under Ronald Reagan and then 
George H.W. Bush held the White House.  Kissinger clearly benefitted from the presence 
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of friendly administrations in his efforts to keep the telcons unavailable at the Library of 
Congress.  
This period also coincided with when Kissinger was using memoranda of 
conversations based upon the transcripts to write his memoirs from the Nixon era, White 
House Years (1979) and Years of Upheaval (1982).
152
  The two volumes were “a work 
evidently written with great care to his [Kissinger’s] place in history and to perpetuating 
his image as the consummate strategic thinker who executed sweeping and highly 
successful radical shifts in American foreign policy,” wrote Montgomery.153  However, if 
the transcripts were released they might “support an alternative assessment.”154  
Nevertheless, Montgomery concluded that Kissinger did not seek to permanently keep 
the transcripts from the historical record.  Based upon the terms of Kissinger’s donation 
to the Library of Congress, “[h]e appeared more intent on sealing the documents until the 
extraordinary passions of the Watergate and Vietnam years had subsided and until after 
his death,” wrote Montgomery.155    
The telcons became known to the wider public during the Democratic 
administration of Bill Clinton, which was much more open to reviewing and releasing the 
transcripts which had long been dormant at the Library of Congress.  After Nixon’s death 
in 1994, many of his presidential materials were released by the National Archives, 
including Kissinger’s National Security office files which contained copies of a small 
portion of the transcripts.
156
  Then in 1997 the State Department began publishing some 
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of its copies of the telcons in its Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series.
157
  
Repeated FOIA requests to release more of Nixon’s documents by William Burr and 
others at the private National Security Archive housed at George Washington University 
led to the publication of The Kissinger Transcripts: The Top Secret Talks with Beijing 
and Moscow (1999).
158
  However, this volume did not include any of the telephone 
conversation transcripts with Dobrynin, only a summary of one of their face-to-face 
meetings prepared by Kissinger for a memorandum.
159
  Finally, in January, 2001, the 
National Security Archive threatened to go to court if the National Archives did not take 
steps to retrieve Kissinger’s originals.160  Having published the final volume of his 
memoirs, Years of Renewal in 1999, Kissinger may have been more inclined to release 
his papers since his version of history was now complete.  Hence, State Department legal 
advisor William H. Taft IV was able to convince Kissinger to acquiesce and in August, 
2001, release 10,000 pages of copies of the telephone conversation transcripts held at the 
Library of Congress from his tenure as Secretary of State, 1973-1977.
161
  The following 
February he consented to 20,000 more pages pertaining to his years as Nixon’s National 
Security Advisor from 1969-1973.
162
   
After review, the 20,000 pages of the Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation 
Transcripts (Telcons) were released by the National Archives and Records 
Administration (NARA) on May 26, 2004.
163
  That collection is housed at the Richard M. 
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Nixon Presidential Library in Yorba Linda, California and covers January 21, 1969, to 
August 8, 1974, (from Nixon’s first inauguration until his resignation) in thirty archival 
boxes.
164
  Boxes 27 and 28 comprise the Anatoly Dobrynin file.
165
  The State 
Department’s collection is on-line and spans from August 9, 1974, until the end of the 
Ford Administration on January 20, 1977.
166
  A few transcripts were withheld and some 
were redacted.
167
  
Burr argued that the transcripts revealed Kissinger had committed several “’sins 
of omission’” in writing his memoirs, among them “the extraordinary degree to which 
Nixon and Kissinger tilted U.S. policy toward Beijing.”168  He even accused Kissinger of 
seeking to “deceive and manipulate” the Soviets, including Dobrynin.169  Thus Burr 
viewed Nixon and Kissinger as favoring the Chinese against the Soviets, rather than 
simply playing them both against each other as readers of Kissinger’s memoirs might 
have been led to believe.  Matthew Jones agreed.  He concluded that Nixon and Kissinger 
viewed the Soviets as a greater threat than the Chinese, and “rather than developing a 
subtle ‘triangular diplomacy,’” the administration gravitated towards “an implicit Sino-
American condominium.”170  With specific regard to the US-Soviet relationship, I will 
argue that the transcripts reveal that the historiography on détente which described it as 
“a new era” failed to recognize the continued ideological differences complicating US-
Soviet diplomacy in three main areas: arms control, human rights, and especially foreign 
interventions in the developing world. 
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Although the transcripts were the main primary source for this dissertation, I also 
utilized the writings of various leading American and Soviet figures of the détente era.  
Henry Kissinger’s massive three volume memoirs were particularly crucial to filling in 
gaps between conversation transcripts.  Anatoly Dobrynin’s memoirs, while not as 
comprehensive, filled in other gaps.  Additionally, the 1994 conference report of Brown 
University’s Carter-Brezhnev Project provided a first-hand account of a pivotal March, 
1977, US-Soviet summit in Moscow.  The conference, entitled “SALT II and the Growth 
of Mistrust,” featured former members of the Carter administration, former Soviet 
officials, and scholars who met from May 6-9, 1994, at Musgrove Plantation, St. Simons 
Island, Georgia.  
Secondary sources including scholarly articles and monographs on the détente 
years by John Lewis Gaddis, Adam B. Ulam, Harry Gelman, and Raymond L. Garthoff, 
general histories of the Cold War by Gaddis, Vladislav Zubok, and Melvin Leffler, as 
well as biographies of Nixon, Kissinger, Brezhnev, KGB head Yuri Andropov, and 
Politburo member Mikhail Suslov were invaluable for providing a historical context to 
the discussions in the transcripts.  I also consulted several dissertations and video 
recordings including David Frost’s extensive 1977 interviews with Richard Nixon. 
 
Organization and Focus 
 This dissertation examines the Kissinger-Dobrynin relationship as it developed in 
the backchannel through a study of transcripts of their telephone conversations.  Each 
chapter begins with an overview of the scholarship analyzing the conflicting American 
and Soviet views on a particular issue, and then provides three examples of how 
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Kissinger and Dobrynin negotiated their way through various challenges.  Chapter 1 
focuses on arms control, contrasting American balance of power theory with the Soviet 
correlation of forces doctrine before demonstrating how Kissinger and Dobrynin 
negotiated the two main components of SALT I – the Interim Agreement on offensive 
nuclear weapons and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, as well as made substantial 
progress towards SALT II.  Chapter 2 juxtaposes the Western notion of “inalienable” 
human rights with the Soviet concept of “conditional” or “contingent” rights.  The 
majority of the chapter then examines the efforts of Kissinger and Dobrynin to salvage a 
US-Soviet trade bill after an amendment was added tying the Soviets’ Most Favored 
Nation trading status to increases in Jewish emigration.  This is followed by backchannel 
discussions on the Helsinki Accords as well as several individual cases involving family 
reunification and dissidents.  The third chapter examines US-Soviet conflicts in the 
developing world and to what extent these were based upon security and economic 
interests or reflected ideological considerations.  The Kissinger-Dobrynin discussions 
here are on Vietnam, the October, 1973 Arab-Israeli War, and the civil war in Angola 
from 1975-1976.  The dissertation’s conclusion argues that the Kissinger-Dobrynin 
backchannel led to the creation of a relationship due to its privacy, durability, frequency 
and ease of communication, and the personalities of its participants.  Furthermore, this 
relationship helped to establish empathy which facilitated many of détente’s successes 
from 1969-1975.  The Kissinger-Dobrynin backchannel therefore serves as a case study 
of the effectiveness of back channels in international diplomacy. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
Arms Control: A Balance of Power or the Correlation of Forces? 
 
“…the ABM treaty and the offensive freeze,.…were either a turning point or another 
impulse to the superpower arms race, either an augury of a more peaceful international 
order or a pause before a new set of crises.”1  
-Henry Kissinger 
 
“The first summit allowed both sides to overcome strong mutual suspicions and become 
engaged in more constructive relationships, though they continued to pursue their own 
goals in the international arena.”2  
-Anatoly Dobrynin 
 
In the 1970s the United States and the Soviet Union, the world’s two 
superpowers, sought to control the growth of the world’s deadliest weapons.  During the 
preceding twenty-five years, both nations had built massive nuclear arsenals.  The fear 
that the Cold War could turn nuclear overrode every other aspect of US-Soviet relations. 
In this chapter I will argue that Kissinger and Dobrynin bridged their respective 
governments’ competing visions of the superpower relationship as well as overcame 
Washington’s and Moscow’s differing goals for arms control to produce the Interim 
Agreement on Offensive Weapons and the Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty (collectively 
known as the first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty or SALT I).  They also made 
substantial progress towards a second treaty culminating in the 1974 Vladivostok 
Accords.  However, SALT II was not signed until after Kissinger left office.  The 
telephone transcripts showed that Kissinger and Dobrynin were successful in reaching 
arms control agreements because each perceived that the other was well-intentioned and 
truly committed to preventing nuclear war.   
                                               
1 Henry Kissinger, White House Years, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1979), 1244. 
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After discussing the American balance of power and Soviet correlation of forces 
theories of international relations which undergirded Washington’s and Moscow’s 
conflicting views of superpower diplomacy, I will present a third interpretation – 
Organski’s and Kugler’s power transition theory – as an alternative which better 
illustrates the nature of the American-Soviet strategic relationship as it developed in the 
1970s.  Next, I will provide extensive excerpts of discussions between Kissinger and 
Dobrynin demonstrating how they successfully negotiated SALT I, ABM, and made 
great gains towards SALT II. 
 
Arms Control and Detente 
After the Americans exploded atomic bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki to end 
the Second World War in 1945, from the mid-1950s to mid-1960s they developed 
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and intermediate-range ballistic missiles 
(IRBMs).
3
  The Atlas and Titan I ICBMs had ranges of 5,000 miles, and were succeeded 
by the Minuteman and Titan II.
4
  The US also produced the Thor and Jupiter IRBMs 
(stationed in Great Britain, Italy, and Turkey and therefore surrounding the Soviet 
Union), as well as the submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) Polaris.
5
   
In 1949 the Soviet Union detonated its first atomic weapon.  By 1957 it had tested 
an ICBM, with mass production under way two years later.
6
  In the summer of 1962 the 
Soviets began constructing sites in Cuba for the installation of intermediate range nuclear 
                                               
3 James M. Morris, America’s Armed Forces – A History, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 
1991), 324. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Bevin Alexander, How America Got It Right – The U.S. March To Military and Political Supremacy, 
(New York: Crown Forum, 2005), 167. 
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missiles capable of travelling 2,000 miles and hitting the Panama Canal as well as most 
American cities, leading to the Cuban Missile Crisis.
7
  After the crisis passed, Moscow 
initiated an arms buildup under Leonid Brezhnev in 1964.  For the next twenty years, 
Soviet defense spending increased by an average of 4-5 percent in real terms.
8
   
By considering arms control, both Democratic and Republican administrations in 
the United States tacitly acknowledged that the Soviets had significantly narrowed the 
gap in strategic weapons.  There would have been little reason for the United States to 
limit its nuclear arsenal and allow the Soviet Union to catch up if Washington still held a 
significant advantage.  Consequently, the Johnson administration first proposed arms 
control in 1966, but Moscow did not commit until 1968 as they approached parity.
9
  
However, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia that year delayed negotiations until the 
administration of Richard Nixon.
10
  According to Lawrence Freedman, Professor of War 
Studies at London’s King’s College, by 1970 the Soviets had matched the Americans in 
ICBMs and also made great gains in SLBMs.
11
  He added that the USSR maintained 
superiority in both throughout much of the decade, while the US retained a large edge in 
bombers and overall missile quality.
12
  At the time of the first summit between Nixon and 
Brezhnev in May, 1972, the totals for each in ICBMs, SLBMs and bombers were: United 
States –1054, 656, and 450; Soviet Union –1607, 740, and 200.13 
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US-Soviet Strategic Weapons Totals at the time of SALT I (1972) 
 
For the Americans arms control was a practical response to the reality that a 
balance of power existed between the United States and the Soviet Union.  A rough 
equivalence in strategic weapons required a change in strategy for Washington.  The US 
could no longer rely upon its overwhelming nuclear superiority to prevent a Soviet attack 
on itself or its allies in Western Europe.  Nuclear parity ensured mutually assured 
destruction (MAD) – the certainty that if either nation attacked the other, retaliation and 
millions of dead on both sides would result.  Nixon and Kissinger believed that despite no 
longer having a nuclear preponderance, they could maintain international stability by 
agreeing with Moscow to limit their respective nuclear arsenals.  
Rather than a balance of power, for the Soviet Union arms control negotiations 
provided further evidence that the long-awaited and inevitable “correlation of forces” was 
occurring.  According to Marxist-Leninist theory, these political and economic forces 
would propel socialism to worldwide preeminence.  The Soviets viewed the attainment of 
nuclear parity as an important step in this process.  Thus while balance of power theory 
implied that the two superpowers had achieved a stabilization in international relations, 
the correlation of forces doctrine suggested a changing of the guard in world politics. 
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Balance of Power 
Balance of power – a classic theory of international relations – grew out of the 
European great power politics of the nineteenth century.  According to Kenneth Waltz, 
the theory assumed that states were individual actors in an international system of nations 
struggling for survival.
14
  The states used the methods they had available for self-
preservation or even domination.
15
  These could be internal, such as increasing economic 
or military strength, or external by forming relationships with another nation or group of 
nations.
16
  Balance of power also presumed that states would act rationally, that is they 
would never initiate a conflict in which they were certain to lose or even face 
annihilation.   
A.F.K. Organski and Jacek Kugler explained that according to balance of power 
theory, when power was relatively balanced between states or groups of states there 
would be peace.
17
  In contrast, when power became unevenly distributed, the chances of 
war increased.
18
  In such a case the stronger nation or group of nations which always 
sought to maximize its power would attack the weaker.
19
   
The balance of power and relative stability of post-World War II Europe was not 
the intentional creation of either of the superpowers in the view of John J. Mearsheimer.  
In fact, self-interested nations often created stability inadvertently through actions 
designed to ensure their security, but not necessarily peace.
20
  The Americans supported 
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Western Europe with economic and military resources to lessen the chances of a 
successful Soviet attack which could alter the balance of power.
21
  Likewise, the Soviets’ 
occupation of Eastern Europe could be viewed as an effort to preserve their security. 
Of course, the Cold War introduced a new component to balance of power 
politics: nuclear weapons.  Despite the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union 
had reached a level of mutually assured destruction by the 1970s, this did not rule out the 
possibility of a conventional war as long as both sides believed such a conflict would not 
escalate into a nuclear one, according to Mearsheimer.
22
  The answer is not certain 
because as he pointed out, “(thankfully) there is not much history to draw on.”23   
Nevertheless, even in the age of MAD both nations continued to have security concerns 
and desired a balance in conventional as well as nuclear forces.
24
   
 
The Correlation of Forces 
Another theory of international relations, the Soviet doctrine of the correlation of 
forces, differed from balance of power theory in both its origins and policy implications.  
Julian Lider explained that Soviet scholars rejected balance of power because it was 
“traditional,” “bourgeois,” and an example of “political realism,” a philosophy associated 
with the leading capitalist countries.
25
  On the other hand, the idea of a correlation of 
forces derived from Marxist-Leninist theory that objective, scientifically provable laws 
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governed the unfolding of history.
26
  These laws dictated that socialism would eventually 
replace capitalism around the world, and the correlation of forces demonstrated these 
historical laws in action.
27
  Finally, while Nixon and Kissinger applied balance of power 
theory to a world they saw as multi-polar due to the rise of China, Western Europe, and 
Japan, the Soviet correlation of forces concept implied two blocs of nations with 
irreconcilable differences.
28
   
According to William B. Husband, Moscow believed that Washington’s foreign 
policy was based purely on military strength, particularly as demonstrated by American 
reliance on “nuclear intimidation” to advance its interests just after the end of World War 
II.
29
  The Soviets believed this approach to international affairs was terribly misguided 
because it ignored or undervalued the importance of “political and economic processes as 
vital historical forces,” wrote Husband.30  These included the withering of the old 
European colonial empires, the spread of socialism to many newly independent nations in 
Africa, Asia, and Latin America, and the economic resurgence of capitalist nations like 
West Germany and Japan.  From Moscow’s perspective, Washington had only changed 
course and sought arms control after “international setbacks” resulting from these 
political and economic changes around the globe.
31
   
The Soviets believed that capitalism faced a crisis around the globe “as a system,” 
wrote Lider (emphasis in original).
32
  With the ability to blunt the power of America’s 
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reactionary impulses, Soviet military parity would allow the laws of social development 
to unfold naturally.  Thus the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the inevitability of war 
between socialism and capitalism was “replaced by the assumption of the inevitability of 
the ideological struggle” between rival blocs of nations led by the United States and the 
Soviet Union, according to Lider.
33
  Consequently, Husband explained that the Soviets 
were genuinely interested in arms limitations and lessening the dangers of nuclear war.
34
  
Indeed, they welcomed peace due to their certainty that in a long-term and non-military 
ideological struggle, their eventual triumph was preordained by the laws of history.
35
   
 
Power Transition Theory 
Rather than a balance of power or the correlation of forces, another theory of 
international relations may provide a better explanation for what was taking place in the 
US-Soviet strategic relationship during the 1960s and 1970s.  Organski and Kugler 
rejected balance of power theory, espousing power transition theory instead.  It originated 
in the 1950s and held assumptions directly at odds with the balance of power 
interpretation.
36
  It argued that nations were more likely to go to war when they had 
similar political, economic, and military strength if one was seeking to surpass the other, 
and in case of war the initiator of conflict would come from the weaker side, not the one 
holding greater power.
37
  This was because under power transition theory it was not the 
stronger nation, or the defender, which acted in order to maximize its strength and 
influence, but the weaker nation, called the challenger, which behaved aggressively due 
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to its dissatisfaction with the international status quo.
38
  The chances of war increased 
when the challenger reached a level of strength equal to eighty percent or higher of the 
dominant nation’s GNP.39  Therefore, unlike balance of power theory which stated that 
changes in alliances caused a redistribution of power, power transition theory assumed 
that changes in power resulted from developments within nations.
40
  The Soviet military 
buildup in the years after the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 could be interpreted as an 
example of such an internal development. 
Did the Soviet Union in the 1960s and 1970s meet the description of an 
unsatisfied challenger seeking to make a power transition and surpass the dominant 
nation – the United States?  It seems plausible in light of a cursory overview of US-
Soviet relations during the post-World War II period.  Ronald L. Tammen explained how 
a cold war develops whenever a nation is dissatisfied with its status in the international 
arena, yet lacks the means to do anything about it.
41
  During times such as these, there 
may be relative stability between states, but not without animosity.
42
  The Soviet 
withdrawal behind the Iron Curtain at the start of the Cold War could be seen as an 
unsatisfied state refusing to participate in the US-engineered post-war international order, 
suggested Tammen.
43
  However, over the course of the next twenty-five years the Soviet 
Union grew into a potential challenger, mostly on the strength of nuclear weapons.
44
  
Although they had attained a rough nuclear parity, Tammen stipulated that the Soviets 
                                               
38 Ibid. 
39
 Ibid., 49. 
40 Ibid., 24. 
41 Ronald L. Tammen, et al., Power Transitions: Strategies for the 21st Century, (New York: Chatham 
House Publishers, 2000), 12. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid., 47, 55. 
45 
 
remained behind the Americans in overall power due to “deficiencies in political, 
economic, and social resources.”45    
Nevertheless, it is difficult to overlook the dramatic increase in Soviet military 
spending in the 1960s and 1970s.  Douglas Lemke and Suzanne Werner defined a 
challenger to the status quo as dissatisfied “if the prospective rules of the system that it 
would like to impose are different ‘enough’ from those already established by the current 
dominant country.”46  Certainly the contrast between Soviet socialism and American 
capitalism seemed to meet this description.  In addition, Lemke and Werner argued that 
an increase in military spending by the challenger relative to that spent by the dominant 
nation could signal a willingness to wage war.
47
  However, if the dominant nation built 
up at a faster rate than the challenger, it could indicate that it was more dedicated to 
preserving the status quo than the challenger was to upsetting it.
48
  Thus the US military 
buildup under Ronald Reagan during the 1980s could be viewed as an attempt to offset 
Soviet efforts at completing a power transition. 
Lemke and Werner used two factors to determine if a nation was committed to 
changing the status quo.  First, a country had to undergo an extraordinary military 
buildup, defined as “[w]henever the average annual military increase within a decade is 
greater than the cumulative annual average for all previous years.”49  Second, the nation’s 
“extraordinary military expenditure increase for the decade in question minus the 
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dominant country’s military expenditure increase for the decade” had to exceed zero.50  
In other words, the challenger had to be building up faster than it had ever done 
previously, and at a greater rate than the dominant nation.  By this standard, the Soviet 
Union was committed to change during the 1970s because its extraordinary military 
buildup was greater than US military expenditures.
51
  However, it should be noted that 
using these metrics, the Soviet Union could be identified as committed to change 
throughout much of its existence, particularly during Stalin’s forced rapid 
industrialization program in the 1930s.
52
  
The differential in military expenditures is reflective of the Soviet buildup, but 
also of the American build-down as the US sought to disengage from the Vietnam War.  
In 1970, US defense spending represented 40.8% of the total federal budget.
53
  By 1978 it 
had fallen to 23.8%, the lowest since the Second World War.
54
  Although the USSR did 
not surpass the United States in total power by the end of the détente period, the 
difference narrowed, and according to Organski and Kugler it was “precisely, the 
relationship between the challenger and the dominant country that, in the transition 
model, [was] likely to occasion a major war.”55  Furthermore, “the model insist[ed] that 
attempts to arrest the gains of the faster-growing nation [would] fail.”56  The challenger’s 
eventual completion of the power transition past the dominant nation was all but 
certain.
57
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Because it was the nuclear age, however, the Soviets and Americans never 
confronted each other directly.  According to power transition theory, throughout the 
1970s the US desired to remain the dominant power and sought to preserve the 
international status quo, while the USSR attempted to disrupt it in Asia, Africa, and Latin 
America.
58
  The purpose behind destabilization was to effect “a more pro-Soviet 
alignment,” and eventually “abet an open challenge to the United States at the global 
level,” wrote Tammen.59  Consequently, the US and the USSR found themselves on 
opposite sides of revolutionary national liberation movements around the world.   
 
SALT I 
SALT I represented an effort to preserve the US-Soviet strategic equilibrium.  
Signed by Nixon and Brezhnev on May 26, 1972, at the first Moscow summit, the treaty 
embodied a rough balance between each arsenal.
60
  The Interim Offensive Agreement 
froze the number of each side’s ICBMs and SLBMs for five years.61  At the moment of 
signing, the Soviets outnumbered the Americans in total missile launchers (ICBMs and 
SLBMs) 2,348 to 1,710.
62
  The addition of Soviet ICBMS under construction at the time 
eventually raised the total to 2,359.
63
  However, the US had developed the technology to 
equip missiles with multiple independently-targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) or 
multiple nuclear warheads on a single missile – something the Soviets had not yet even 
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tested.
64
  Additionally, SALT I did not apply to strategic bombers where the US held a 
significant advantage.
65
  
Although the agreement only enacted temporary limits, Dobrynin explained that 
the five-year interim period was to allow time for further negotiations leading to actual 
reductions in the numbers of weapons.
66
  Kissinger called the treaty, “a snapshot, as of 
the moment of signature, of the strategic relationship as it had evolved over the previous 
decade.”67  He asserted that that the Soviets had dramatically increased ICBM 
construction after the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962.
68
  According to Adam Ulam, while 
the American ICBM total had held at 1,054 since 1965, the Soviet force increased from 
570 in 1967, to 900 in 1968, to 1050 in 1969.
69
  Kissinger explained that by the time of 
the SALT signing, Moscow had long surpassed Washington in ICBMs.
70
   
 Although SALT I was limited, it is difficult to overstate the importance of at least 
initiating arm control negotiations due to the completely unprecedented and 
unimaginably destructive power of nuclear weapons.  The US atom bomb dropped on 
Nagasaki at the end of World War II, “Fat Man,” as well as the first Soviet atomic 
weapon detonated in 1949 each released about 20 kilotons or 20,000 tons of TNT.
71
  In 
1952 the US detonated the first thermonuclear weapon, which yielded 10,000 kilotons or 
10,000,000 tons of TNT – the equivalent of five-hundred Nagasakis!72  In the years 
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leading up to détente and throughout the end of the Cold War, both nations built more of 
these devastatingly powerful “megaton” bombs with the explosive power of a million or 
more tons of TNT.
73
 
Structural differences in the American and Soviet nuclear arsenals greatly 
complicated arms control.  Usually the best that negotiators could agree upon was a 
rough equivalence, and so both nations had to be willing to allow the other numerical 
superiority in some areas in order to achieve an approximate overall balance.  For 
example, the Soviet Union based their force structure primarily on large, ground-
launched ICBMs.  Geographical proximity to Europe, the original Cold War battlefield, 
as well as a lack of ports dictated that Soviet reliance on air and submarine-launched 
weapons would be secondary.  In contrast, the distance of the United States from Europe 
as well as America’s dual coastlines necessitated a more diversified arsenal – the nuclear 
“triad”:  ground-based ICBMs, submarines, and perhaps most significantly to Moscow – 
bombers.  US aircraft in Europe and on aircraft carriers in the surrounding waters deeply 
concerned the Soviets, but the Americans never wanted to include these forward-based 
systems in negotiations.
74
  This probably reflected American concerns that if its allies in 
Western Europe went unprotected, the Soviets might take military action with their large 
conventional forces.  Meanwhile, the Americans were worried about Soviet superiority in 
both the number of ICBMs and in total “throw weight” (total lifting power of missiles – 
this issue grew in importance as the practice of equipping missiles with multiple 
warheads became prevalent).  Additionally, as talks dragged on both sides continued to 
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conduct research and improve their arsenals, leading Dobrynin to observe that “military 
technology was running ahead of the protracted negotiations.”75   
Differences between the American and Soviet government bureaucracies added to 
the confusion.  Kissinger had far more knowledge about American military planning and 
weaponry than Dobrynin did of Soviet military matters.  As a member of the National 
Security Council, Kissinger had access to the Secretary of Defense and the President.  
After adding the title of Secretary of State, Kissinger had his feet in both the military and 
diplomatic realms of the federal government.  Ultimately, however, Kissinger answered 
exclusively to Nixon. 
In contrast, Dobrynin had many bosses, but less access to information.  Any 
message that he passed to Kissinger had to first be approved by the Politburo 
membership.
76
  Furthermore, Dobrynin claimed that he and other members of the Foreign 
Ministry communicated only sparingly with the Defense Ministry.  He gave the 
impression that he learned more about the Soviet arsenal from Americans like Kissinger 
than from his own military.  In 1994 while at a conference attended by former Soviet and 
US officials entitled “SALT II and the Growth of Mistrust,” Dobrynin explained: 
“Military planning in Russia was top secret.  It’s unbelievable: in your country, it’s a 
loose cannon.  You discuss all military things, rightly or wrongly.”77  He added that 
Moscow would give him instructions such as: “’Do not compromise on this issue; merely 
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inform the Americans of our position on this issue.’”78  Since diplomacy and defense 
were kept separate, Dobrynin asserted that he never really knew what his government’s 
long term military plans were.
79
  Perhaps most surprisingly, Dobrynin claimed that he 
and others in the Foreign Ministry did not even know the names of their weapons, so they 
used American names for Soviet weapons instead.
80
   For example, when discussing the 
Soviet bomber called Backfire by the Americans, participants at the aforementioned 
conference erupted in laughter when Dobrynin asked:  “By the way, why is it Backfire 
and not Forwardfire?”81   
Under Nixon, American nuclear strategy diverged from that of his Cold War 
predecessors.  Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson had all maintained 
varying degrees of US nuclear superiority over the USSR.
82
  However, at his first 
presidential press conference on January 27, 1969, Nixon declared that his administration 
would pursue “’sufficiency not superiority’” in nuclear weapons.83  This strategy shaped 
Nixon’s vision of arms control, which did not require both sides to have identical 
arsenals.  First, Nixon viewed the Soviets as a land power and the U.S. as a sea power.
84
  
Second, he argued that while the Soviet Union had larger weapons, America had better 
weapons.
85
  Third, even if it was possible politically and financially to counter the Soviet 
buildup and reach superiority in each and every category of weaponry, it would be long 
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after both nations had already acquired the means to destroy each other.
86
  Additionally, 
from the time of their first meeting with Dobrynin on February 17, 1969, Nixon and 
Kissinger made it clear that progress on arms control would have to be connected to 
Soviet cooperation in resolving various international problems including Vietnam and 
West German access to Berlin.
87
  The policy became known as linkage. 
The SALT negotiations took place on two levels: the official talks and through the 
backchannel.  For almost three years the official negotiations alternated between Helsinki 
and Vienna, with Gerard Smith and Vladimir Semenov leading the American and Soviet 
delegations respectively.
88
  The backchannel discussions between Kissinger and 
Dobrynin took over if the two sides reached an impasse.
89
  As Kissinger explained, 
“[w]henever a deadlock persisted in these formal talks,” he and Dobrynin “would work 
out an agreement in principle on the stalemated issue,” leaving technical details as well as 
language to the formal delegations.
90
  Likewise, Dobrynin explained how the 
backchannel served as “a more convenient means for both governments to compromise a 
deadlock and reach a final decision at the crucial moments of negotiation.”91  Both 
lamented that members of the official negotiating teams did not receive enough credit for 
their work.  
Establishing nuclear equivalence between arsenals with different force structures 
was perhaps the most significant obstacle in the earliest discussions.  For example, in a 
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conversation from July 28, 1970, Kissinger referenced the Soviet SS-9s, 300 extra-large 
ICBMs of which the United States had no equivalent:   
K: I am sitting on [the] back patio thinking about peaceful coexistence. 
 
D: Good for you, Henry.  I am living with the same thought.  I will be in 
Moscow thinking in the same way. 
 
Then later: 
 
K: When are you leaving? 
 
D: Tomorrow night. 
 
K: When are you coming back? 
 
D: I hope by four weeks—just enough to gain strength to conduct 
discussions. 
 
K: That will give you an unfair advantage. 
 
D: What about you? 
 
K: I am working on the budget.  You are building so many SS-9’s.  You 
are upsetting the balance.
92
 
 
Despite the playful tone, Kissinger had raised a potentially significant issue for the SALT 
negotiations.  As he explained, the Nixon administration’s predecessors had based 
American strategic forces on small, accurate missiles such as the Minuteman ICBM and 
the Poseidon SLBM, both of which were designed to carry MIRVs.
93
  On the other hand, 
the Soviet arsenal featured less accurate, but larger missiles capable of carrying greater 
payloads, meaning that once the Soviets developed MIRVs, they could potentially deliver 
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more of them in a single launch.
94
  Kissinger believed that American technology could 
mute the Soviet edge in size and strength of missiles, but not indefinitely.
95
   
 The backchannel did not always run smoothly at first.  During arms control 
discussions the Soviets were chiefly interested in an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) treaty to 
limit American defensive weapons.  The Soviets feared that an American ABM system 
could protect the United States from a missile attack, thereby mitigating the effect of 
Moscow’s superior ICBM arsenal.  Thus the Americans would be in a position to launch 
a possible first-strike while remaining confident that their ABM system would protect 
them from the ensuing Soviet retaliatory second strike.  On the other hand, the Americans 
were concerned about the massive build-up of Soviet offensive nuclear weapons since the 
1960s.  Eventually, the White House made a proposal through the backchannel to link an 
antiballistic missile treaty with a second agreement to temporarily freeze offensive 
weapons.  Before the Kremlin responded however, Soviet arms control negotiator 
Vladimir Semenov began discussing a strikingly similar proposal with his American 
counterpart in the regular diplomatic negotiations in Vienna, Ambassador Gerard 
Smith.
96
  This led to the following conversation between Kissinger and Dobrynin on May 
11, 1971: 
K: I just had a talk with Gerry Smith and apparently our channel in not 
working properly.  Semonov is going along accepting my proposition to 
you which Gerry Smith doesn’t know about… 
  
D: Semenov didn’t have instructions and I have a telegram that says it. 
 
K: Semenov on a boat trip went into great detail and Smith is so surprised 
that he has propositions we didn’t make to him.  Proposed ABM 
agreement, a freeze on offensive missiles—Smith never heard of it… 
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D: He has no authority. 
 
K: We are in the position now that as far as Smith is concerned a Soviet 
proposition exists and the President doesn’t have a response to his 
proposal. 
 
D: They haven’t discussed it in the govt.  I know what I am telling you.  
The [Foreign] Minister [Andrei Gromyko] directed him and he is not 
authorized.  Gromyko is not deceiving me. 
 
K: The President can only conclude one of two things.  Either there’s 
confusion in Moscow which we don’t believe or a deliberate attempt to 
mobilize his people against him or by-pass him. 
 
D: It’s not so.  On this matter Semonov has no authority.  What [sic] he 
makes a hint—I don’t know. 
 
K: In order to keep our channel intact and avoid on either side a 
refusal…Now we are in a position that as far as I am concerned it has to 
be treated formally.  [outside of the backchannel]  Smith is telling 
everyone what Semenov said…97 
 
If the White House had made a proposal through the backchannel and not 
received a response via the same route, this could present several problems.  First of all, 
as Kissinger told Dobrynin, Nixon would take it “as a personal affront,” adding “What 
would Brezhnev think if he proposed to us through a channel and we went to a 
subordinate official and made a reply,[?]”98  Secondly, if diplomatic subordinates were in 
discussions on a proposal before there was an agreement at the top, it could create 
bureaucratic momentum resulting in one side or the other feeling pressured into making a 
decision they had not intended to, simply because they did not want to appear as being 
obstructionist.  Needless to say, this was not an auspicious beginning to the relationship. 
 The conversation became heated as both men attempted to determine what had 
gone wrong:  
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K: We have a serious problem now— 
 
D: ??? reply. [sic] 
 
K: We have to construct a reply from Smith to Semonov and I can’t say 
it’s not the Soviet position because no one knows I have talked with you. 
 
D: I know the story and you must way [say] what you will to the 
President.  Semonov when I was in Moscow he was told not to talk. 
 
K: I don’t understand it.  You can reject the proposal but why when we are 
trying to do so many things… 
 
D: Only two days ago I __________ that emphasized the same point.  If 
you do not believe it— 
 
K: There’s no sense in your lying.  I just want to be sure you want to work 
with me. 
 
D: This case they discuss through you and me.  [The Kremlin has] No 
reason for misleading me. 
 
Then later:  
 
K: You can argue with me but the fact is our government believes you 
have made a formal proposition to which we have to reply and the 
President believes he made a proposition to you and you are replying in a 
bureaucratic channel and he will think you are trying to box him in.  It’s 
not going to be considered a friendly gesture. 
 
D: What can I say when I tell you it was not an intention?  What else can I 
tell you?
99
 
 
Despite his anger, Kissinger eventually calmed down and was willing to give Dobrynin 
the benefit of the doubt.  “I will grant that this was done in good faith on your side,” he 
said.
100
  Even at this early point in their relationship, Kissinger seems to have begun to 
trust Dobrynin – a little.  Dobrynin then asked if Semenov’s proposal to Smith had been 
official, adding “Semenov can discuss many things for 5 hours and you can construe 
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what you want and he will say he said nothing.  Was it formal?”101  Kissinger replied that 
Semenov had made the same proposal that Deputy National Security Advisor Alexander 
Haig had given Dobrynin through the channel.
102
  Dobrynin then assured Kissinger: 
“[Semenov] has his instructions.  I don’t know whether—I don’t know.  Semonov has to 
follow instructions or he will lose his job.”103 
After reviewing a memo from Smith and a telegram from Semenov, Kissinger and 
Dobrynin were able to reconstruct what had happened.
104
  Apparently Semenov had put 
forward a previous Soviet proposal, already rejected by Kissinger, stating that any freeze 
of offensive weapons would only take place after an ABM deal had been reached. 
105
  
The distinction was not insignificant.  If an ABM treaty was signed first and subsequently 
the SALT talks broke down, it would put the United States in the position of having 
agreed to limit its defensive weapons while leaving the Soviets with a substantial edge in 
offensive missiles and with no restrictions on continuing their buildup. 
Having allowed the dust to settle, Kissinger and Dobrynin agreed to what would 
become the golden rule of their relationship:  Nothing would ever be discussed with 
either “bureaucracy” until there was an agreement “in principle” in the backchannel.106  
“It’s not in the good of our relationship that while you and I are discussing something, 
subordinates are discussing the same thing,” said Kissinger.107  “The crucial point is after 
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2 and a half years and months of discussions with you and me, we will get something 
important,” he added.108 
The Soviets eventually accepted the White House proposal.  At the 1972 Moscow 
summit Nixon and Brezhnev signed SALT I, which included both a five-year interim 
agreement limiting the deployment of offensive nuclear weapons and an anti-ballistic 
missile treaty (ABM) permanently restricting defensive missiles.  A misunderstanding 
that could have easily led to a breakdown in talks (as would occur during the initial trip to 
Moscow by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance in 1977) instead resulted in one of the signal 
achievements of the détente era.  It also served to remind both Dobrynin and Kissinger 
that during times of great stress and even frustration with each other that they could reach 
agreements and make progress in improving relations.  
Critics of SALT I in the United States believed that by freezing the status quo, the 
treaty conceded numerical superiority to the Soviets and endangered US security.  
Kissinger’s response to such charges amounted to: “if there was an imbalance, SALT did 
not create it; it reflected self-limiting decisions made over a decade.”109  Of course, this 
subtle attempt at criticizing previous administrations was just one of many instances 
where Kissinger portrayed himself as a kind of victim of political and historical 
circumstances.  Nevertheless, he was hopeful that the mood of both the public and 
Congress would change during the Interim Agreement’s five years and the United States 
could then begin “to catch up.”110  Furthermore, SALT I did not prevent either side from 
modernizing or improving their current stockpiles.
111
  The US could proceed with 
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research and development on new programs including the B-1 bomber, the MX missile, 
the cruise missile, and the Trident submarine-missile system.
112
  As Kissinger put it, “We 
were determined to avoid ever again being in a situation where only the Soviets had 
strategic programs under way.”113  
SALT I faced criticism in the Soviet Union as well.  According to Georgi 
Arbatov, a member of both the Soviet Academy of Sciences and the Central Committee 
of the Communist Party, Brezhnev “treated the military as a very important power base,” 
and gave it “virtually anything it asked for.”114  However, arms control was an anathema 
to many in the Soviet military who viewed the weapons buildup with great pride.   
During one Politburo debate over SALT I, Defense Minister Marshall Andrei Grechko 
claimed that he was responsible for the nation’s security and could not support the 
treaty.
115
  Nevertheless, Brezhnev “insisted on approval of the text,” wrote Arbatov.116  
Furthermore, the Soviet General Secretary argued that as commander-in-chief he was the 
rightful guardian of Soviet national security, and “ripped into Grechko,” for implying 
anything to the contrary.
117
   
Such interchanges help to illustrate an important point made by the former 
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Robert M. Gates.  As an intelligence advisor 
for SALT, Gates observed that “internal negotiations in both our government and the 
Soviets’ were probably tougher and dirtier than between the two countries.”118   Thus as 
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supporters of detente and SALT, Dobrynin and Kissinger both faced domestic opposition 
to their diplomatic endeavors and undoubtedly could relate to each other’s predicament.   
After the signing in Moscow, there awaited another challenge for SALT I in the 
Senate, where the Constitution required the treaty to be ratified by a two-thirds vote.  Led 
by Senators Henry “Scoop” Jackson (D-Washington) and Barry Goldwater (R-Arizona), 
a coalition of conservatives expressed alarm at the rough equivalence formulation.
119
  
According to Freedman, SALT I implied “a trade of Soviet numerical superiority in 
missiles for US superiority in technology and bombers.”120  However, Jackson and others 
sought an exact equivalence in total weapons or “’equal aggregates,’” something 
Kissinger believed was financially impossible at a time of defense cuts.
121
  Jackson and 
his colleagues had to settle for an amendment to the treaty which required parity in future 
SALT treaties and specified that SALT I was in no way to be construed as allowing the 
United States to ever fall behind the Soviet Union in strategic security.
122
    
The notion of amending a treaty after it had already been negotiated and signed 
must have been extremely concerning to the Soviets.  On August 7, 1972, Kissinger 
spoke with Dobrynin and attempted to assuage Moscow’s fears that Jackson’s 
amendment would substantively alter the SALT I agreement: 
K: Now, Anatol, I wanted to talk to you about the Jackson Amendment. 
 
D: Yes. 
 
K: Here is what we have decided to do.  We’ve been working with him 
[Jackson] all weekend. 
 
D: Yes. 
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K: And it has now become a matter of prestige and so forth.  So what we 
have done is to try to get his agreement to a formulation which is 
essentially meaningless. 
 
Then later: 
 
K: …What we are saying [in a White House statement] - - the Jackson 
amendment does not constitute a reservation or interpretation to the 
agreement in any legal sense. 
 
D: Yeah.  Will it be statement by the White House, yes? 
 
K: After it is transmitted, yes. 
 
D: Yeah, it will be statement by the White House. 
 
K: Yes. 
 
D: Okay. 
 
K: But we have also gotten him to change the amendment that you have 
seen.  It has been totally emasculated now.  
 
D: I would like to see if possible the text really.  
 
K:  Well, you will get it.  I am sending it over to you. 
 
D: Okay.
123
 
 
This exchange implied that Kissinger either thought he had manipulated Jackson into 
watering down the language of the amendment, or that Jackson was not entirely sincere 
and merely wanted to sound hawkish on national security.  However, it was Jackson’s 
own assistant, Richard Perle, who wrote the amendment and later worked tirelessly in 
consultation with twenty-five senators to get it passed.
124
 
 After reviewing the proposed amendment, Dobrynin remained confused.  He and 
Kissinger spoke again about an hour and a half later to clarify the situation: 
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K: Did you get that material? 
 
D: Yes, I’m just reading it.  You see, one question I would like to ask you 
really here.  It was there before and it is now again in this one…you 
should request the President to seek a future treat[y] and that inter alia 
would not limit the United States to levels of intercontinental strategic 
forces inferior to the [levels] provided for the Soviet Union.  What do you 
really mean exactly because - -  
 
Then later… 
 
K: Well, it doesn’t mean one for one in each category.  It means, you 
know, that the total strategic impact of these categories - - all of this is 
drawn from things which we’ve already publicly said. 
 
D: No, no; I know.  This is rather a matter of interpretation for my own 
and for Moscow.  It doesn’t really mean one for one. 
 
K: It means the principle of equal security. 
 
D: The principle of equal security; not really one by one because - - 
 
K: Not one by one in each category. 
 
D: Oh, I see.  So it doesn’t really change what we signed upon? 
 
K: No.
125
 
 
As they wrapped up the conversation, Dobrynin thanked Kissinger for his explanation 
and said that he thought the White House statement and the amendment would be 
acceptable to Moscow.
126
  “Of course, you understand, Henry, that we have discussed 
with you on very informal basis,” said Dobrynin.127  Kissinger understood that Dobrynin 
could not unilaterally give his approval and that their conversation had just been “in a 
spirit of what we can do to help relations.”128  Kissinger added, “See how easy I am to get 
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along with.”129  Dobrynin laughed as he thanked him again and said goodbye.130  They 
had successfully maneuvered around a potential minefield.  Arms control – one of the 
foremost goals of détente – had nearly been derailed by American domestic politics.   
Another ratification-related conversation on September 18, 1972, was 
simultaneously revealing and potentially embarrassing.  Dobrynin inquired as to how 
things were proceeding in the Senate: 
D: First, maybe you will tell me about SALT - - Not SALT, but about 
ratification. 
 
K: Yeah, I’ll have a definite answer by tomorrow evening. 
 
D: Oh, I see. 
 
K: But I think we can manage it by the end of the week but I’ll give you a 
definite date tomorrow. 
 
D: Because this is really for our ratification.  [italics mine] 
 
K: Yeah, I understand that.
131
 
 
It is apparent from this exchange that for Dobrynin and Kissinger much more than the 
SALT agreement was at stake.  They had both spent a great deal of time and energy as 
well as faced a substantial amount of skepticism about détente back home, particularly so 
in Kissinger’s case.  Both viewed ratification as validating them and their diplomacy.  
Such a mutual investment in relaxing tensions was essential for détente’s success.  
Kissinger then continued: 
K: I’m calling you about something else which is slightly embarrassing to 
me in the light of my discussions in Moscow. 
 
D: What about? 
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K: It’s the following - - whenever they pass something through the 
Congress, our Congressional liaison people just type up a note for the 
President and get him to make a phone call to the sponsor saying, you 
know, he’s glad it passed and I found out to my horror that the people did 
that with the Jackson Amendment and so he called Jackson today. 
 
D: Uh-ooh! 
 
K: And I, you know, hope it won’t come out but if it does come out, I 
want you to know how it happened. 
 
D: Yeah. 
 
And later: 
 
K: Well, I want to express my apologies. 
 
D: Yeah, I understand 
 
K: And it is no indication - - it is so stupid that I don’t know how to 
express it but it may not come out publicly but I wanted you to hear it 
from me. 
 
D: Yeah, I understand.  It is better not to come but if it comes, what could 
you do?  Nothing really.
132
 
 
Kissinger understood that the Jackson Amendment had been a tough pill for the Soviet 
leadership to swallow.  The White House reluctantly acquiesced in the amendment’s 
attachment to the SALT I treaty in order to garner enough votes in the Senate for 
ratification.  Still, the Soviets had been forced to sit by while it must have seemed like the 
Americans were changing the deal reached in Moscow merely three months before.  If 
the White House appeared to be celebrating by congratulating Jackson on passing his 
amendment it could have seemed underhanded and two-faced to the Kremlin.  
Kissinger’s apology as well as Dobrynin’s understanding of this standard political 
procedure further indicated the developing empathy in their relationship. 
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ABM 
Along with the Interim Agreement on offensive weapons, SALT I also included 
the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM).  The United States and the Soviet Union each 
agreed that any missile defense system would not exceed a maximum of 200 launchers.
133
  
According to Garthoff, by limiting themselves to this “strategically insignificant” level of 
anti-ballistic missiles, the superpowers “contributed to containing one important area of 
arms competition.”134   
Instead of deploying extensive anti-ballistic missile systems to defend themselves 
from a nuclear attack, the superpowers relied on mutually assured destruction (MAD) in 
order to deter one another.  Richard K. Betts defined deterrence as “a strategy for 
combining two competing goals: countering an enemy and avoiding war.”135  It grew 
naturally from balance of power theory.
136
  Prior to MAD, there had been various other 
theories of deterrence, particularly those of RAND’s Bernard Brodie.  However, MAD 
was probably first associated with President Kennedy’s Secretary of Defense Robert 
McNamara, and contended that a nation needed only enough nuclear weapons to deter an 
attack.
137
  Nuclear stability would prevail as long as each side had the means to deter a 
first-strike by possessing enough weapons to destroy the other with a retaliatory second-
strike.
138
  The deployment of an extensive ABM system by either side would have 
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threatened the delicate nuclear balance between the superpowers by insulating a potential 
aggressor from retaliation, thereby making the risks of launching a first-strike less 
costly.
139
   
 From the beginning of the Nixon administration, Kissinger believed that one of 
the most attractive features of developing an anti-ballistic missile system would be the 
ability to offer to limit it in exchange for an offensive arms agreement.
140
  Nixon agreed, 
stating “I felt that tactically we needed the ABM as a bargaining chip” because the 
Soviets already possessed such a system around Moscow.
141
  Nixon reasoned that if the 
US entered SALT discussions without one, something else more valuable might have to 
be given up: “we had to have it in order to be able to agree to forgo it.”142  However, the 
development of an anti-ballistic missile system sparked great controversy in Washington.  
Some feared that it would be destabilizing and inaugurate a brand new arms race.  When 
the Senate approved funding on August 6, 1969, it did so by the single tie-breaking vote 
of Vice-President Spiro Agnew.
143
   
The linking of the ABM agreement to an offensive freeze proved to be a 
watershed moment for détente.  It not only culminated in SALT I – arguably the greatest 
achievement in US-Soviet diplomacy up to that time – but also broke the Cold War ice 
after twenty-five years.  In this conversation from March 26, 1971, Kissinger and 
Dobrynin brought up several remaining issues including how many ABM sites each side 
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would be permitted to have, where they would be located, and when to initiate 
negotiations for the offensive freeze: 
K: You and I are going steady.  We should exchange telephone numbers. 
 
D: That is right.  I will give you my Moscow number.  290-2520. 
 
K: I will not ask you what the area code is. 
 
D: It is in Moscow. 
 
K: I have talked to the President about it [your proposal] and do not 
completely understand it.  Is this in response to our letter? 
 
D: You do not?  It is in connection with our last talk and your draft. 
 
K: I will tell you how we are prepared to work it.  We are prepared to 
agree in principle to separate ABM agreement.  Then negotiators would 
begin discussion of what it would be like – [M]oscow versus Washington, 
Washington versus –  
 
D: Only involved the place?  How many _____ etc? 
 
K: At that point they would begin discussing what sort of agreement.  
Then when they know what sort of agreement would discuss radars and so 
forth.  Simultaneously would discuss freeze.  If that is possible agreement 
would be immediate. 
 
D: I have to check but – 
 
K: When they begin drafting agreement they should talk about freeze. 
 
D: They would discuss how many, etc.  I don’t know.  It seems to be a 
little bit in the later stage.  The will argue about (how many radars and all 
the little things.) 
 
K: Not crucial to us.  After you say agreement on ABM – agreement has 
been reached. 
 
D: What is your position? 
 
K: Certain start on ABM but also discuss freeze. 
 
D: Simultaneously concluded on separate agreement and freezing at the 
same time. 
68 
 
K: Exactly.
144
 
 
 Differences in the American and Soviet force structures complicated ABM 
negotiations just as they had the rest of the SALT talks.  Consequently, just a week before 
the official May 20, 1971, announcement that the superpowers had reached an agreement 
on an offensive freeze and an ABM deal, Kissinger and Dobrynin still had a few details 
to work out.  Dobrynin pushed for including the phrase “equal limitations” in the 
announcement while Kissinger objected, arguing that it made more sense to use 
“equitable limitations” since each side had different radars and weapons.  Dobrynin was 
extremely anxious about agreeing to any wording which could potentially upset Moscow.  
As he explained, the terminology that the Politburo decided upon was the result of 
numerous meetings involving the entire Soviet bureaucracy: 
K: What do you want? 
 
D: I would like to put it in terms of limitation of this agreement should be 
equal. 
 
K: We aimed at drawing up the text of an agreement limiting ABMs; that 
such an agreement should be equitable. 
 
D: It’s not a question of both sides on an equal basis. 
 
K: What do you mean by “equal.” [?]  
 
D: When I mentioned this to you… 
 
K: What you propose is your problem. 
 
D: I understand.  Terms of limitation should be equal… 
 
K: Except “equal” doesn’t have any precise meaning in these terms. 
 
D: What you pur, “…terms of limitation will be the same.”  I think 
“equal” but maybe “the same” or some other word.  I am only trying to be 
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close to what we said, whether terms should be “the same” or “close” or 
maybe something else. 
 
K: The trouble with “equal” is that since our weapons and radars are so 
different I am not in position to say this has to be the same numbers.  
There has to be some flexibility.  “equitable” seems to me to be a good 
word. 
 
Then later… 
 
D: I hope some day [sic] you will be an ambassador and be sitting in a 
capital not so close to your source of power. 
 
K: I understand. 
 
D: If it was my proposal… But they [the Kremlin] gave me the text.  To 
prepare a letter is one thing, but in drafting this letter there were six 
meetings of the whole government. 
 
K: You haven’t changed the text.  I think “equitable” means much more 
than “just”.  Will you accept “should be based on the principle of 
equality?” 
 
D: On equality?  All right. 
 
K: On the principle of equality. 
 
D: Can’t you say it without “principle?” 
 
K: It just doesn’t make any sense. 
 
D: “Principle of equality”….. “principle of equality”.  All right.  You are 
taking advantage of me.  It’s your native language. 
 
K: [sarcastically] You see, I want to tell you as a friend, what we want to 
propose is an arrangement so that we can keep 20 radars and you can keep 
one – we have to keep some flexibility for that.  Now, I have had another 
long session with the President…are we through; have you any other 
complaints? 
 
D: No. 
 
K: You were easier to deal with when we bought Alaska. 
 
D: We didn’t have Kissinger then.145  
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Even when conversations became heated and they grew frustrated, neither Kissinger nor 
Dobrynin were above a little good-natured kidding.     
 ABM did not completely prohibit defensive weapons – each side was permitted to 
defend a few sites.  The Soviets particularly wanted to defend Moscow, while the 
Americans focused more on their ICBM fields.
146
  During a preliminary meeting in 
Moscow, Brezhnev proposed to Kissinger that each side protect its capital and one 
field.
147
  On May 17, 1972, just days before the first summit, Kissinger told Dobrynin 
that Nixon had agreed to Brezhnev’s idea.148  Nevertheless, Dobrynin still hoped to cajole 
Kissinger into dropping the number of sites down to just one: 
D: Yes, I understand.  But one ABM [is] just as good as two. 
 
K: Just stick with the formula which we discussed in Moscow. 
 
D: Moscow, yeah.  Okay. 
 
K: Good. 
 
D: Thank you. 
 
K: In other words, we insist on accepting your proposals; that’s a tough 
position for you to be in. 
 
D: (laughter)
149
 
 
When the ABM treaty finally achieved ratification, it allowed both nations to deploy just 
two sites – one for each country’s capital and a second for an ICBM field.150  Each site 
could have a maximum of one hundred land-based, stationary anti-ballistic missile 
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launchers.
151
  Dobrynin later called this “a grave mistake on both sides,” and suggested 
that if the superpowers had agreed on a “zero option,” the entire Strategic Defense 
Initiative (SDI) or “Star Wars” controversy of the 1980s could have been avoided.152   
In 1974 by mutual agreement both the United States and the Soviet Union 
reduced the number of ABM sites to one, with the Soviets maintaining their system 
around Moscow and the Americans planning to protect a single missile field in Grand 
Forks, North Dakota.
153
  Theoretically, having only one ABM location each strengthened 
deterrence even further.  However, in 1975 and perhaps indicative of the general 
Congressional view of defense spending at the time, the US unilaterally cancelled plans 
for any ABM sites at all.
154
  The remaining Soviet site at Moscow may have been more 
intended for protection against China than anyone else.
155
  Furthermore, the ongoing 
development of MIRV technology threatened to make a realistic anti-ballistic missile 
defense system less likely anyway.
156
 
Kissinger did not view the demise of an American ABM system as a total loss.  
For him ABM’s prime purpose had been to motivate the Soviets to agree to a freeze in 
offensive strategic forces, which they did.
157
  Nevertheless, he expressed regret at the 
Congressional decision to do away with an anti-ballistic missile defense system despite 
claiming that he had only reluctantly agreed to it at the time.
158
 
                                               
151
 Ibid. 
152 Dobrynin, In Confidence, 219. 
153 Kissinger, White House Years, 210; Years of Upheaval, 1166. 
154 Kissinger, White House Years, 210. 
155 Freedman, 338. 
156
 Ulam, 77. 
157 Kissinger, White House Years, 210. 
158 Ibid. 
72 
 
The ABM Treaty became an issue once again in the 1980s during the Reagan 
administration.  In 1983 satellite photographs identified a radar station at Krasnoyarsk in 
Siberia.
159
  The construction of a second anti-ballistic missile site violated the ABM 
agreement as it had been revised by Nixon and Brezhnev in 1974 at the third summit.     
After years of denials, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze admitted in 1989 
that “’the construction of this station, equal in size to the Egyptian pyramids, constituted 
an open violation of the ABM treaty.’”160 
One of the original provisions of the ABM treaty was the right of either party to 
withdraw from the agreement after providing six months’ notice.161  Thus, when 
President George W. Bush announced his intention to resume research on President 
Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative, the US pulled out of the ABM agreement in 2002. 
 
SALT II 
The Vietnam experience as well as Watergate cast a pall over the SALT II 
negotiations.  Although the Vietnam War ended for the United States as Nixon’s second 
term began in 1973, that conflict had already done significant damage to the American 
psyche.  While the US continued to engage in strategic arms limitations talks, Kissinger 
hoped to compensate for this by simultaneously increasing America’s conventional 
forces.  He portrayed himself as stuck between Congressional liberals resisting defense 
spending and conservatives opposing arms control due to its “ideological ambiguity.”162  
Kissinger seemed to view the left as wanting surrender while the right wanted a crusade.  
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The combination of this struggle with Congress as well as the Watergate scandal led him 
to conclude that by the beginning of the President’s second term, “the political and moral 
authority he [Nixon] needed to pursue simultaneously the military balance and a 
sophisticated policy of arms control was beginning to erode.”163   
Nevertheless, SALT continued.  In the backchannel Kissinger began kidding 
Dobrynin about the possibility of completely eliminating the SS-9s, the Soviets’ largest 
missiles.  This served as a running joke between the two, with Dobrynin usually 
humoring his counterpart and then politely moving on to another subject.  For example, 
on March 6, 1973, as part of the early discussions for SALT II, Dobrynin told Kissinger 
that Brezhnev had invited him to Moscow: 
K: When does he want me to come?  I hope not before the second half of 
April. 
 
D: When will you be ready to come? 
 
K: Well, that depends on you.  You’re agreeing to all our propositions? 
 
D: Well, this is the point we’re going to discuss with you.  (laughter) 
 
K: Well, what would make a good impression, Anatol, - - I don’t want to 
suggest to you but I think it would speed the SALT discussions if you 
proposed that you will dismantle all SS-9s in the next phase of SALT, we 
would make very rapid progress. 
 
D: Yeah. 
 
K: Just the big ones as a sign of good will. 
 
D: Yeah. 
 
K: (laughter) 
 
D: (laughter) I think it’s a good idea.164 
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Of course the 300 powerful Soviet SS-9s represented one of the principle areas of 
imbalance between the superpower arsenals, and undoubtedly drew the ire of Nixon’s 
and Kissinger’s conservative critics who demanded “perfect symmetry.”165  However, 
Kissinger remained unworried about an exact numerical equivalence in every weapons 
category, preferring to concern himself with overall strategic security. 
 By this time Kissinger and Dobrynin had been working together for well over 
four years.  A conversation on May 26, 1973, while planning for the second summit 
demonstrated awareness on the part of both that they had started to build a shared history: 
HK: Do you know today is the anniversary of our agreeing to the SALT 
Agreement? 
 
AD: Yes, I know.  You are an exception because usually Americans do 
not remember for a long time in their foreign policy, but you do. 
 
HK: Now Anatol... 
 
AD: (laughing)
166
 
 
The discussion and the ability to poke fun at one another demonstrated a growing level of 
comfort and familiarity between two tough and experienced diplomats.  They knew that 
they had accomplished a great deal and were optimistic about their chances for further 
success with SALT II and beyond. 
The emerging capability to place multiple nuclear warheads upon a single missile 
presented one of the foremost challenges in the SALT II talks.  These MIRVs (multiple 
independently-targeted re-entry vehicles) gave each side the potential to magnify its 
arsenal without violating SALT I’s limits on missile construction.  One missile could be 
used to launch multiple warheads, each of which could then hit a separate target.  In this 
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context, the presence of the 300 heavy Soviet SS-9s with greater throw weight and hence 
an ability to carry more warheads than anything the Americans possessed was no joking 
matter.  However, Nixon believed one of the reasons the second summit in June, 1973, 
did not produce a SALT II agreement was that the Soviets were not far enough along in 
their MIRV program to be comfortable talking about limits.
167
  A conversation from July 
11, 1973, between Kissinger and Dobrynin helped to illustrate this point.  First, Kissinger 
expressed frustration that the Soviets had not responded to an American MIRV proposal: 
K: What we would like are some observations from you on the MIRV 
question.  Not that you agree with us, but something that enables us to get 
a discussion started. 
 
D: Well you see on MIRV question, really, it looks to me my reaction, and 
this is not official reaction, but I think this one for us it looks to us just one 
to stop our development. 
 
K: Well, that… 
 
D: One sided and… 
 
K: No, no, but another possibility is that you destroy 60 SS-9s the first 
year and then we go from there.  We take that very seriously. 
 
D: Well, Henry, let’s put it… 
 
K: …the trouble is we’ve made a proposal to you.  You think it’s one-
sided.  I understand that, because it is one-sided.  So then, could you – I’m 
not even asking for a counterproposal, I’m just asking for something that 
enables me to react to it.
168
 
 
To illustrate his point, Kissinger referenced their shared history.  He reminded Dobrynin 
of how their previous negotiations on SALT I evolved: “You see in ’71 you said you 
must have only defense [referring to ABM] and then we said no it has to include offense 
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[the Interim Agreement].”169  Kissinger correctly recalled that although he and Dobrynin 
had originally been far apart on SALT I, they had at least put forward their initial 
positions when negotiations began.  However in the current case, Kissinger argued 
“we’re in no position to make a compromise because we don’t really know what you 
have in mind.”170  Dobrynin stated that he understood, but he needed to refer to Moscow, 
particularly in the case of something as technically complex as MIRVs.
171
  The appeal to 
their past negotiations apparently worked, because a few days later on July 17 Dobrynin 
got back to Kissinger with news that the Soviets were indeed ready to begin discussing 
MIRV limits.
172
 
 Nixon appointed Kissinger to be his Secretary of State in 1973 as well as continue 
as National Security Advisor.  According to Dobrynin, Kissinger called him from San 
Clemente, California (location of Nixon’s “western White House”) on August 22, and let 
him know about the appointment.
173
  Kissinger assured Dobrynin that things would 
continue as before, “including lunches and dinners,” after he replaced outgoing Secretary 
William Rogers: 
D: Well I send you congratulations in a letter or how.  You prefer now to 
be much more formal so to speak. 
 
K: And I won’t insist on protocol, Anatol, if you just call me Excellency 
we’ll get along fine. 
 
D: That is exactly what I will say.  So congratulations, the very best.  It is 
final I guess. 
 
K: Yeh, that’s right, but of course I don’t need to tell you that if anything 
it may make it easier to do the things you and I have been doing together. 
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D: I think it will.
174
 
 
Dobrynin opined that the change improved Soviet-American relations because it ended 
what he called “the confused and uncertain situation in which the White House kept the 
secretary of state and indeed his entire department in the dark.”175  Now it would be much 
easier to get agreements from the backchannel into the official negotiations and avoid the 
kind of problem which occurred previously between Smith and Semenov.
176
  The 
installment of Kissinger as Secretary of State in addition to maintaining his duties as 
National Security Advisor also indicated that Nixon was further tightening his grip on 
foreign policy. 
 1973 was also a significant year for the Soviet military.  According to Kissinger, 
at that time the Soviets had four new missiles in development, two of which were MIRV-
capable and in the testing stage by the summer.
177
  The SS-17, a newer and lighter ICBM 
designed to replace the SS-11, could carry three or four warheads while the SS-18, a 
potential replacement for the huge SS-9, was capable of delivering eight warheads.
178
  
The Soviets considered these modernizations of earlier missiles and technically not 
violations of SALT I’s limits.179  However some critics alleged that the Soviet Union was 
getting around the treaty’s ceilings on missiles by simply adding more warheads.180  
Although obviously a defender of the treaty, even Kissinger charged the Soviets with 
“using the quantitative freeze to engage in a qualitative race.”181  He feared a potential 
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Soviet strike on the US Minuteman land-based ICBM forces by the middle of the 
eighties.
182
  
Brezhnev’s staunch support for arms control and détente was not enough to derail 
the Soviet military’s agenda.  Especially in the late 70s and early 80s “they got away with 
a lot,” according to Arbatov.183  Even after attaining parity in conventional and nuclear 
weapons, the military was able to “develop and accumulate arms of all types,” he 
added.
184
  Arbatov claimed that Moscow outpaced Washington in long-range strategic 
delivery systems, mega-tonnage, and throw weight, as well as in medium-range 
weapons.
185
  Gates believed that the buildup “enabled the Soviets to close the strategic 
gap and establish a favorable military balance in Europe, and offered them the potential 
to gain superiority in a number of areas – depending on what the United States did.”186  
Although some asserted after the Cold War that Moscow’s nuclear and conventional 
arsenal had not posed a serious threat, “few in either political party or in the American 
government generally in 1976 or 1977…would have agreed,” wrote Gates.187  
Furthermore, he considered the “sober assessments of Soviet military power” by both the 
Ford and Carter administrations to be “quite accurate.”188     
The MIRV differential favoring the Americans as well as the Soviet potential to 
narrow the gap and ultimately overtake the US drove both sides to seek limitations.  The 
Soviets also hoped to avoid the embarrassment of signing an agreement highlighting the 
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fact that they had yet to actually deploy any MIRVed missiles.  Cognizant of this fact, on 
June 5, 1974, Kissinger presented the following proposal:   
K: One other thing that I thought about on the SALT discussion we had 
yesterday.  We have no interest in making you sign something that’s 
embarrassing for you.  I’m trying to figure out some way of expressing 
this in a way that the differential in numbers…If we expressed it for 
example in terms of each side will stop deployment as of a certain date or 
deploy up to “X” percent of its total force.  You see what I mean?  
Whichever number is higher. 
 
D: To total existence. 
 
K: Supposing we said, each side will stop deployment of MIRV missiles 
as of and let’s say March 1, 1975, let me just think out loud.  That would 
stop our program at 1100.  Or deploy up to “X” percent of its total force in 
MIRV missiles, whichever number is higher. 
 
D: “X” percent on what date? 
 
K: Well, through 1979.  You see if we said whatever number you and we 
agree on, supposing it’s 750, we could express that as a percentage of your 
total force. 
 
D: Of total force, you mean on missiles? 
 
K: Yes.  You see in that way there wouldn’t be any - - the agreement 
wouldn’t look as if any differential were put in.  If each side has the right 
to do the same thing. 
 
D: I understand. 
 
K: No, you won’t have [to] 
 
D: Mention to you about what we have now. 
 
K: No, but you have the choice either to stop on March 1975 or to build up 
to 30 or 40 percent or whatever the number is we agree on, of your total 
force.  Whichever number is higher.  We would stop in March 1975.  Or 
whenever we have 1100.  You would go up to the percentage because in 
March ’75 you won’t have anything yet. 
 
D: This is exactly the point. 
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K: I want to find a formula which sounds equivalent.
189
 
 
According to Kissinger’s plan, after a certain date the US would cease affixing MIRVs to 
its missiles.  However, recognizing that the Soviets had yet to deploy any such weapons, 
Moscow would be permitted to do so until a predetermined percentage of their force had 
MIRVs.  Kissinger was seeking to find a formula that limited both sides while avoiding 
mentioning any hard numbers.  Dobrynin could then tell his superiors back in Moscow 
that they would not have to sign a treaty expressing a numerical differential: “We can 
state it in such a way that even if a differential results it will not be expressed in such an 
embarrassing manner,” said Kissinger.190   
 Kissinger’s offer would allow Dobrynin to save face with Moscow, and the USSR 
to save face with the US.  It demonstrated Kissinger’s desire to reach an accord, his 
respect for Dobrynin, and an understanding of the Soviets’ need to be treated as a co-
equal superpower.  It epitomized the empathetic form of diplomacy necessary to bring 
about a thaw in Cold War tensions. 
 Later that month and amidst a Congressional investigation of Watergate, Nixon 
returned to Moscow for the third summit.  The fact that the Soviets had yet to deploy any 
MIRVed missiles continued to complicate arms talks.  This meant that any arrangement 
would probably result in only the US halting its MIRV program with the Soviets then 
being permitted to proceed until they had reached the agreed upon limit.
191
  Such a deal 
would face strong opposition from conservatives in Congress.  Consequently, Kissinger 
sought a freeze, but at a level which would give the United States a significant edge in 
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MIRVs due to the Soviet overall superiority in ICBMs.
192
  He reasoned that if the Soviets 
had more missiles, the US ought to be able to compensate by having more warheads.  
According to Nixon, Brezhnev did not see it that way and hence no SALT II agreement 
emerged from the third summit.
193
   
Richard Nixon’s resignation on August 9, 1974, in light of the Watergate affair 
posed several potential challenges for the Kissinger-Dobrynin relationship.  Would the 
new president, Gerald Ford, adopt the policies of his predecessor?  Would he be content 
to conduct relations with the Soviet Union through the backchannel?  Dobrynin reported 
that when he met with Ford at the Soviet embassy the previous January, the Vice-
President had said that if he became president “’by the chance of fate’” he would 
continue détente and with Kissinger as his secretary of state.
194
  Accordingly, the day 
before taking office Ford telephoned Kissinger and asked him to continue in his post at 
the State Department.
195
  On August 12 Kissinger put Dobrynin at ease about the change 
of administrations, but not before kidding him about the nomination of an old nemesis to 
head the Defense Department: 
K: I was just talking to the President and he said: When is Dobrynin 
coming back?  I said he’s supposed to come back early in September but if 
I’m any judge of him, he’ll be back long before that. 
 
D: (Laughter) 
 
K: I just got through saying it.  You’re making me a great man. 
 
D: (Laughter) Well, Brezhnev thought I would feel much better close to 
you than to being on his [dacha] on the Black Sea. 
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K: No, but unfortunately we are going to make [Senator Henry] Jackson 
Secretary of Defense so you came back too late. 
 
D: (Laughter) No, I think it’s on the contrary.  [I came back] Just to 
congratulate him on this _____ in time.  Don’t you think so? 
 
Then later: 
 
K: Well, I’m delighted you’re here.  And you know I need not tell you that 
things will continue as they were. 
 
D: Yeah.  Yes, thank you, Henry, very much.
196
 
 
Kissinger drew a stark contrast between Nixon and Ford.  Although he believed 
his former boss to be “one of the most gifted of American Presidents,” he added that 
Nixon was also “obsessively incapable of overruling an interlocutor or even disagreeing 
with him,” at least face-to-face.197  Kissinger described never knowing for sure what 
Nixon would do, even after something appeared to have been decided, but under Ford 
“what one saw was what one got.”198  A much more self-assured man, Ford felt free to 
disagree and did not seem as concerned about who received the credit.
199
   
Ford held his only summit with Brezhnev in November, 1974, at Vladivostok.  
The different concerns of each side reflected structural differences and vulnerabilities in 
their respective arsenals.  The Americans generally focused on Soviet land-based ICBMs, 
while the Soviets concentrated on American submarines and bombers.  According to 
Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, Ford and Kissinger wanted the Soviets to give 
up a large part of their “heavy” ICBMs.200  With their great throw weight, each one of 
these missiles could potentially deliver several warheads at a time.  Brezhnev responded 
                                               
196 Kissinger Transcripts.  U.S. Department of State.  Available at 
http://foia.state.gov/SearchColls/CollsSearch.asp. 
197 Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 25. 
198 Ibid. 
199 Ibid. 
200 Andrei Gromyko, Memoirs, translated by Harold Shukman, (New York: Doubleday, 1989), 284. 
83 
 
that the heavy ICBMs were essential to Soviet security because of US nuclear weapons in 
“forward position” in Europe.201  The Americans continued to insist that these missiles on 
submarines and aircraft carriers in European waters were non-negotiable.  According to 
Ford, “We maintained our position from previous negotiations that our Forward Base 
System of F-4s, F-111s and FB-111s as well as the nuclear weapons we had deployed in 
Western Europe not be counted in our agreed-upon total of strategic weapons.”202  
Brezhnev then requested that the US stop work on the Trident submarine as well as plans 
to build the B-1 bomber.
203
  Ford again refused, claiming “We simply couldn’t rely on 
our aging B-52s.”204 
Nevertheless, the two sides did reach an agreement with significant arms 
limitations.  Each superpower could have a maximum of 2,400 total strategic arms 
carriers, whether land, sea, or air-based and with a maximum of 1,320 equipped with 
MIRVs.
205
  The limits would be in force from October, 1977 to December, 1985.
206
  The 
Vladivostok Accords thereby enshrined the principle of “absolute equality” as demanded 
by Jackson’s amendment to SALT I in 1972.207  However, Dobrynin believed that the 
Americans were never truly prepared to accept this new status quo with the Soviet 
Union.
208
  
Although Ford and Brezhnev reached a tentative agreement on SALT II, domestic 
politics in both countries inhibited further progress.  According to Ford, Brezhnev 
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mentioned at Vladivostok that “some members of his Politburo didn’t believe détente was 
a good idea.”209  Although the Politburo had attained a relative level of stability after the 
purges of Stalin and reorganizations under Khrushchev, this also resulted in a 
conservative and aged oligarchy, most of whom held lifetime positions.
210
  Brezhnev was 
unquestionably the leader, but was also required to heed the opinions of his colleagues.
211
  
To complicate matters, while at the summit he suffered the first in a series of seizures 
signaling arteriosclerosis of the brain which would eventually prove fatal.
212
  From the 
mid-1970s onward, Brezhnev was little more than a figurehead for the regime in 
Moscow.
213
  His declining health played right into the hands of his more hard-line 
opponents until his death in 1982. 
 Soviet politics also posed problems for Dobrynin.  Some in the Party’s Central 
Committee, the KGB, and the Foreign Ministry, perhaps jealous of his privileged position 
as Soviet Ambassador to the United States, accused Dobrynin of becoming too 
“Americanized” due to his long tenure and numerous connections in Washington.214  The 
charge could have implied that Dobrynin had grown too cozy with Kissinger and 
therefore did not advocate sufficiently for the Soviet Union in its relations with the 
United States.   
In the US, Kissinger observed that many of the original motivations for engaging 
in détente and arms control no longer existed by the time Ford entered office.
215
  For 
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example, Soviet cooperation in international matters such as ending the Vietnam War, 
settling the question of free access to West Berlin, and restraint in the Middle East had 
already been largely accomplished.
216
  As Kissinger put it, the main driving force for 
SALT II was simply to keep détente going.
217
  Therefore reaching a deal did not carry the 
same urgency, leaving opponents less amenable to accepting a new treaty.    
And there were many opponents.  Liberals criticized the Vladivostok agreement 
because it allowed both sides to build up to the ceilings.
218
  Conservatives argued that 
even though the Soviets had agreed to numerical equality, they still possessed the large 
SS-18 missiles which had greater throw weight and could carry more warheads in a 
single launch.
219
  Furthermore, there was the question of how to verify that each side was 
adhering to the treaty’s limits in the first place.220   
Technological issues also interfered with a SALT II agreement.  SALT I 
permitted the development of new weapons, and both the US and the USSR had taken 
advantage of this.  The Americans developed cruise missiles (which Kissinger described 
as “pilotless airplanes”221) that could fly below radar and carry nuclear weapons to their 
target with great accuracy – something which the Soviets wanted counted in the 
Vladivostok limits.
222
  On the other hand, the Soviet Union possessed a new bomber 
dubbed “Backfire,” but since it could not reach American territory, the Soviets argued 
that it was not technically a strategic weapon.
223
  The Americans responded that if it was 
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refueled in the air the new plane could reach the US homeland.
224
  Kissinger conceded 
that that argument could be made for almost any plane, however.
225
  
In response to political and international developments including the fall of 
Saigon in April, Ford made several major changes to his cabinet in October, 1975.  The 
President told Vice-President Nelson Rockefeller, a moderate Republican loathed by the 
right wing of the party, that he would not be Ford’s running mate in 1976.226  White 
House Chief of Staff Donald Rumsfeld replaced James Schlesinger as Secretary of 
Defense and George H.W. Bush, the future forty-first president, replaced William Colby 
as CIA director.
227
  Most significantly for détente and the backchannel, Kissinger lost his 
post as National Security Advisor to Brent Scowcroft, but remained Secretary of State.
228
  
Kissinger no longer had as much access to the President nor did he chair several 
interdepartmental policy-making committees.
229
   The “Halloween Massacre” of the 
cabinet including Kissinger’s demotion represented Ford’s attempt to distance himself  
from détente, and thereby mute political pressure from the right so he could focus on the 
general election.
230
  
Thus 1976 began with no SALT II agreement in sight and with Ford facing the 
reality that some Americans believed détente had been an all around foreign policy 
disaster.  The President, who upon being appointed by Nixon to the vice-presidency 
humbly stated, “I’m a Ford, not a Lincoln,” encountered accusations of being an 
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accidental president who only held the office due to Nixon’s resignation.231  His need to 
be formally elected to the White House intensified the significance of the impending 
presidential election in November.  Consequently, his administration stopped using the 
word détente in its discussions of Soviet-American relations in favor of peace through 
strength.  In light of such developments from 1974-1976, Dobrynin referred to 
Vladivostok as the high point of détente, but also as the beginning of its decline.
232
 
Kissinger and Dobrynin had too much invested in détente and were determined to 
press forward with SALT II.  On January 16, 1976, they discussed plans for another 
Kissinger visit to Moscow: 
K: I am committing political suicide going to Moscow at this time. 
 
D: I would not go that far but I understand [the] political danger. 
 
K: I am doing it because we owe it to history to try and make another 
effort.  If we fail they will say he should not have gone and if we succeed 
all hell will break loose.
233
 
 
Kissinger left for Moscow on January 19, and met Brezhnev two days later.
234
  He 
believed Brezhnev poisoned the proceedings when in answer to a reporter’s question 
about the recent Marxist takeover in Angola the Soviet leader “rubb[ed] our noses in our 
defeat” and thereby “destroyed whatever sentiment was left in the United States for 
agreements with the Kremlin.”235  Nevertheless, the meetings proceeded and American 
cruise missiles and the Soviet backfire bomber remained issues of contention.
236
  After 
some haggling, Kissinger and Brezhnev compromised over maximum flight ranges and 
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numerical limitations for each.
237
  Having tentatively reached a deal, the Americans and 
Soviets predicted a SALT II treaty later in the year.
238
   
 However, after a January 21 meeting of the National Security Council the 
Pentagon rejected the agreement.
239
  Dobrynin cited the growing tension between 
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and Kissinger as making it almost impossible for the 
White House to have one articulate view on SALT.
240
  Former California Governor 
Ronald Reagan, an adamant critic of détente and arms control with the Soviet Union, 
further dampened chances for an arms control treaty by running against Ford in the 1976 
Republican primaries.
241
  In February, Ford decided that there should be no more talks on 
SALT II until after the election.
242
  American domestic politics was preventing progress 
on a second arms agreement just when a new treaty became more pressing for Brezhnev’s 
leadership due to the upcoming Communist Party Congress scheduled later that year.
243
 
 Meanwhile détente’s critics on the right had begun to organize.  The Committee 
on the Present Danger viewed the Ford administration as naïve and therefore sought to 
publicize what it perceived as the negative strategic consequences for the United States of 
the Soviet buildup.
244
  Beginning with Paul Nitze, who had helped draft the Marshall Plan 
under Truman, the organization grew to include former members of the Johnson, Nixon, 
and Ford administrations as well.
245
  On March 12, 1976, Eugene V. Rostow – Under 
Secretary of State for Johnson, David Packard – Deputy Defense Secretary under Nixon, 
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James Schlesinger – Ford’s former Defense Secretary, and many other foreign and 
defense policy experts met for an organizational meeting at the Metropolitan Club in 
Washington, D.C.
246
  Other members included anticommunist labor leaders George 
Meany, Jay Lovestone, and Lane Kirkland of the AFL-CIO, Rachelle Horowitz and 
Albert Shanker of the teachers union, John H. Lyons of the steelworkers, J.G. Turner of 
the engineers, and Martin Ward from the plumbers.
247
  In addition to the group’s 
founding document, “Common Sense and the Common Danger,” numerous other 
committee papers provided intellectual fodder for the right in general and for the 
presidential campaigns of Ronald Reagan in particular in 1976 and 1980.
248
   
 Perhaps sensing the final outcome, Kissinger and Dobrynin occasionally spoke 
nostalgically during the presidential campaign.  At one meeting in June, Dobrynin 
described Kissinger as “gloomy.”249  The Secretary of State had largely lost the 
President’s ear to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and the new National Security Advisor, 
Scowcroft.  It was an unusual position for Kissinger, and as Dobrynin put it, “enforced 
idleness…was not his natural state.”250  In a conversation on October 29, Kissinger 
blamed Congress, the North Vietnamese, and the Soviets for straining détente and Soviet-
American relations.
251
  To which Dobrynin replied, “’We are no saints, but neither are the 
Americans.’”252  Kissinger assured his colleague that his words were merely “’a short 
historical excursus,’” and not meant to start an argument.253 
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Ultimately, a Kissinger-Dobrynin engineered SALT II agreement was not to be.  
In 1976, Jimmy Carter narrowly defeated Ford to win the presidency.  The negative 
blowback from Ford’s pardon of Nixon may have been the difference.  Ford’s defeat also 
meant the end of Henry Kissinger’s tenure as Secretary of State.  Likewise, it signaled the 
end of the eight year Kissinger-Dobrynin special relationship as it had developed in the 
backchannel.  Nevertheless, Dobrynin called détente Kissinger’s “indisputable personal 
achievement as a statesman.”254 
The day after the election on November 3, Dobrynin offered his condolences to 
Kissinger and both men pondered what might have been: 
D: I just wanted to say to you that I am going to miss you - - in the future I 
mean. 
 
K: I will miss you too.  If it is possible to have a Marxist friend… 
 
D: No problem.  It was so narrow. 
 
K: If we had obtained a SALT agreement we would have won. 
 
D: That is my impression.  I think it would have changed the outcome. 
 
K: I will stand outside the government for what I have stood for inside.  
You can be sure of that. 
 
D: I know.  Perhaps we can sit down quietly sometime and talk. 
 
K: I would like that.  I owe you an apology.  Believe me I did not know 
what they were doing.  It was inexcusable. 
 
D: It is o.k. 
 
K: O.K., Anatol, thank you.
255
 
 
Kissinger’s mention of an apology to Dobrynin probably stemmed from the nature of the 
Ford campaign.  Ford felt pressure from liberals to distance himself from détente because 
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of its association with Nixon and Watergate.  Meanwhile, the charge by Reagan and other 
conservatives that détente had been nothing more than appeasement of the Soviet Union 
drove the administration to abandon even mentioning the term.  For Dobrynin and 
Kissinger, after nearly eight years of working together a repudiation of the policy must 
have felt like a repudiation of them and their relationship as well. 
 Kissinger and Dobrynin had their greatest successes in the arms control arena for 
two reasons.  First, both the United States and the Soviet Union agreed that reigning in 
the growth of nuclear weapons was a necessity and an appropriate topic for state-to-state 
relations.  Secondly, despite the competing visions of the superpower relationship 
embodied in the American balance of power and Soviet correlation of forces doctrines, 
the transcripts revealed that Kissinger and Dobrynin each perceived that the other was 
well-intentioned and sincerely committed to preventing the unthinkable – nuclear war.  
However, when the issue was human rights – touching on the relationship between a state 
and its people, or foreign interventions – involving one or the other superpower and a 
third nation, the Americans and Soviets had radically divergent opinions as to the 
appropriateness of its inclusion in bilateral negotiations.  The issues of human rights and 
foreign interventions also brought ideological differences between the Americans and 
Soviets into greater focus.  These differences would test Kissinger and Dobrynin as well 
as the fate of détente.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
Human Rights: A Diplomatic Issue or an Internal Affair? 
 
“An attempt to transform the Soviet system – not by starting an historical process of 
erosion, the means we favored, but by insisting on instant conversion – was certain to be 
fiercely resisted by the Soviet Politburo.  What are Bolsheviks if not experts in the 
seizure and holding of power?”1  
-Henry Kissinger 
 
“So the crucial difference in the Soviet and American approaches to the issue was that 
while the Americans wanted to export to the Soviet Union its free humanitarian and 
commercial values, the Soviet government simply wanted the commercial benefits of 
trade, but not the political values.”2 
- Anatoly Dobrynin 
 
As with arms control, conflicting American and Soviet views of human rights 
complicated détente.  Despite being one of the most controversial issues of the time, 
however, the topic appeared relatively infrequently in the Kissinger-Dobrynin telcons.  
While SALT, ABM, Vietnam, and the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War merited numerous 
and lengthy discussions, human rights conversations were relatively few and far between.  
Although it would be easy to conclude that neither Kissinger nor Dobrynin cared about 
the issue, that would be an oversimplification.  In their view the central purpose of 
détente was to maintain peace and preserve the greatest human right – the right to life.  
Nevertheless, human rights ended up playing a major role in American domestic 
opposition to détente as well as in the Soviet response to that opposition.   
 In this chapter I will argue that the telephone transcripts show that Kissinger and 
Dobrynin understood the domestic pressures and limitations faced by the other when 
dealing with the human rights issue.  Kissinger recognized Moscow’s sensitivity to 
discussions of internal matters, and so brought up human rights with Dobrynin somewhat 
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reluctantly and only when necessary to improve the overall political and public 
atmosphere for détente.  Likewise, Dobrynin sought concessions from his government on 
Jewish emigration and other human rights concerns due to his understanding of the 
issue’s potential effects on American public opinion and by extension upon relaxing 
tensions.  However, as the issue was taken out of the backchannel and public diplomacy 
replaced private diplomacy, it resulted in intensified repression in the short term and 
harm to détente in the long term. 
 The chapter is divided into four sections.  First, I will discuss the scholarship’s 
views regarding the effects of human rights on détente and vice versa.  Then I will 
present conversations demonstrating how Kissinger and Dobrynin dealt with three 
contentious issues: Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union, the Helsinki Accords, and 
individual cases involving family reunification, defectors, and political prisoners.   
 
Human Rights and Détente 
The Russian people had long endured oppression.  Writer and editor on Soviet 
affairs Abraham Brumberg noted that “the history of Russia [was] replete with struggles 
against tyranny – from the peasant revolts of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to 
the revolutionary outbreaks of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.”3  The Russian 
Revolution of 1917 resulted in more of the same.  “The movement for a just and classless 
society in Russia began with unbridled violence, denying millions of people all rights 
except the right to support Bolshevik policy,” wrote Volkogonov.4  Likewise, historians 
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with such divergent viewpoints as Richard Pipes, Sheila Fitzpatrick, and Martin Malia all 
agreed that the revolution leading to the birth of the Soviet state was littered with human 
rights atrocities.
5
  This continued under Stalin when all resistance was crushed.
6
   
After a period of de-Stalinization under Khrushchev, Brezhnev’s regime from 
1964-1982 resulted in a regression and the birth of the dissident movement.  According to 
Robert V. Daniels, the Soviet leadership “did everything it could short of mass 
executions to put a lid on the expression of dissident thought,” starting with the 1966 trial 
of writers Andrei Siniavsky and Yuli Daniel.
7
  Government methods of intimidation and 
punishment included “selective trials and imprisonment,” internal and external exile, and 
obstruction of educational or professional advancement, explained Robert Strayer.
8
  
Although a complete return to Stalinism was not politically possible, Volkogonov 
claimed that Brezhnev believed in returning to some aspects of it.
9
  Meanwhile Zubok 
argued that the majority of the Soviet leadership in this era favored abandoning de-
Stalinization and supported “greater suppression of cultural diversity, and the freezing of 
liberal trends in culture and art.”10  However, according to Strayer, “[h]ere and there, 
‘oases of open thinking’ permitted some original work, even in the social sciences.”11   
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By the 1970s the dissident movement stood at several thousand.
12
  Although small 
in numbers, they developed an array of tactics to combat the Soviet regime. Chief among 
these was taking advantage of increased contact with the Western press as a result of 
détente.
13
  Activists such as Aleksandr Ginzburg publicized violations of the Soviet 
Constitution and laws, as well as of international agreements like the 1948 UN 
Declaration on Human Rights and the 1975 Helsinki Accords.
14
  
The KGB under Yuri Andropov from 1967-1982 played a key role in punishing 
dissidents who engaged in such activities.  According to Zhores Medvedev, the Soviet 
security service “began to be more careful in the preparation of cases, to plant evidence, 
to infiltrate dissident organizations and to use more technical methods of surveillance.”15  
Classifying political opponents as mentally ill and using psychiatric institutions for 
punishment increased as well.
16
  Arnold Beichman and Mikhail S. Bernstam referred to 
the use of psychiatry and pharmaceuticals as “the unique achievement of the secret police 
during the Andropov era.”17  Thus when Andropov became General Secretary in 1982 it 
represented “a logical conclusion” to a period of intensified repression, according to 
British historian Paul Johnson.
18
   
However, Brezhnevism was not Stalinism.  Unlike the arbitrariness of the past, 
“most of the time, Brezhnev’s KGB arrested people for something [italics in original] – if 
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not for a genuine criminal act, then for their literary, religious, or political opposition to 
the Soviet system,” according to Anne Applebaum.19  In other words, dissidents in the 
1970s at least “knew why they had been arrested.”20  Furthermore, Amnesty International 
estimated that in the mid-1970s at most ten-thousand of the one million people held in 
Soviet prisons were there for political crimes, a low number compared to under Stalin.
21
   
The scholarship from the late 1970s and early 1980s indicated that détente may 
have led to a new emphasis on human rights in international relations, but only 
inadvertently so.  For example, Frederick C. Barghoorn explained that human rights did 
not become an issue in East-West relations until Soviet dissidents began to speak out.  
Andrei Sakharov and others, perhaps emboldened by greater contact with the West, 
argued that a government which “deprives its own citizens of elementary civil rights and 
freedoms” would not “promote humane and democratic values” in its foreign policy.22  
However, Karl E. Birnbaum asserted that détente encouraged human rights advocates in 
the West as well.  “In the United States and Western Europe a growing interest in ‘the 
human dimension’ of world politics [was] seen by many as a natural and healthy reaction 
to an overemphasis on great power diplomacy, elitist cynicism, and to excessive 
secretness during the recent past,” wrote Birnbaum.23  Predictably, with increased 
expectations came increased conflicts between communist governments and their 
citizens.
24
  Communist leaders often viewed human rights as a subversive threat and 
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activists as either “’criminal elements’” or “’foreign agents.’”25 Meanwhile, the West had 
to balance its support for individual rights and the independence of Eastern bloc nations 
with its desire to pursue détente with the Soviet Union.
26
 
Simes stipulated that neither the Soviet Union nor the United States originally 
intended for detente to address human rights.  If anything, the Kremlin increased its 
emphasis on ideology as a means to rally the domestic audience in support for the regime 
and insulate it from the effects of increased contact with the West, he explained.
27
  Nixon 
and Kissinger aided this effort by not linking détente to political reforms within the 
Soviet Union or the Eastern Bloc.
28
 Consequently, during the first summit in 1972 the 
Soviets did not hesitate to arrest Jewish activists and hold them for the duration of 
Nixon’s visit.29  
Thus President Carter’s public focus on human rights represented more than a 
change in approach.  According to Simes, Moscow saw it as a fundamental attack on 
détente because it believed the point of relaxing tensions with Washington was “to 
strengthen the Kremlin’s international positions” as well as “improve the performance of 
the troubled Soviet economy through investments, credits, and technology transfers.”30  
Demands for domestic reforms contradicted the Soviet view of détente “as a substitute 
for internal innovations” and a “’peaceful offensive’ against the West,” he added.31 
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Sandy Vogelgesang, a State Department official under President Carter, explained 
that one of the principle reasons for the injection of human rights into international 
diplomacy in the 1970s was simply greater awareness.  Vogelgesang credited global 
communications, international organizations like the United Nations, and 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) with publicizing “man’s inhumanity to man” as 
never before.
32
  Violations ranged from appalling poverty, to torture, to “death squads.”33  
Most troubling of all, prospects for improvement looked dim.  By the end of the decade 
Amnesty International claimed serious violations were occurring in over one hundred 
countries, and Freedom House noted that authoritarian governments outnumbered 
democratic ones 2:1.
34
   
 
The Role of Ideology 
Some of the initial scholarship asserted that ideology lay at the root of the conflict 
over human rights.  Mary Hawkesworth argued that from the Soviet point of view the 
United States had no credibility on the issue because “the capitalist, by definition, [was] 
the offender of human rights.”35  Therefore, American human rights advocacy amounted 
to mere “deceptive propaganda,” designed to destroy socialism.36   
Furthermore according to Hawkesworth, bourgeois liberalism and Marxism-
Leninism operated from different premises.  Western-style liberalism evolved from 
natural law theory and assumed certain moral absolutes including the inherent value of all 
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people.
37
  On the other hand, Marxism-Leninism argued that morals were relative.  The 
theory rejected Western values because it considered them to be mere creations of the 
property-owning class (bourgeoisie) as a means of protecting its dominant position in 
society.
38
  Writing of the bourgeoisie, Marx and Engels argued: 
Your very ideas are but the outgrowth of the conditions of your bourgeois 
production and bourgeois property, just as your jurisprudence is but the 
will of your class made into a law for all, a will whose essential character 
and direction are determined by the economical conditions of existence of 
your class.
39
 
 
In essence, the Marxist-Leninist viewed Western notions of human rights as illegitimate 
because they emanated from class-based societies, and as long as classes existed there 
could be neither freedom nor equality.
40
   
 In contrast to the American notion of unalienable natural rights granted from the 
Creator as expressed in the Declaration of Independence (1776), the Soviet Constitution 
of 1977 espoused what Hawkesworth called “the contingency of rights,” based upon 
whether an individual did work beneficial to all of society. 
41
  Only those who did such 
work could enjoy economic rights like food, clothing, shelter, work, rest, and education, 
which the Soviets prioritized above American political rights such as freedom of speech, 
the press, and religion.
42
  
Also citing ideological considerations was Geoffrey Edwards, rapporteur to the 
Helsinki Review Group – monitors of compliance with the 1975 Helsinki Accords on 
human rights.  He claimed that the Soviet Constitution contained “an uneasy dualism” 
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between the rights of the individual and those of the state.
43
  In general, the West believed 
that when conflicts arose between the individual and the state, the rights of the former 
must prevail, whereas the East favored the latter, he added.
44
  While the Soviet 
Constitution did list specific individual rights, it stipulated that the interests of the party 
and state took precedence.  Additionally, rights were “’inseparable’” from “’duties and 
obligations.’”45  Although the Soviet Constitution guaranteed equality for all citizens, the 
exception made for political opponents of the state rendered this provision as well as the 
human rights protections of the Helsinki Accords essentially meaningless.
46
  “In a 
people’s state, it would seem, only enemy agents, criminals and the insane could be 
opposed to the system,” wrote Edwards.47 
 
Human Rights vs. Détente? 
From the mid-1980s on the scholarship was nearly unanimous that détente led to 
increased repression behind the Iron Curtain.  With increased repression came greater 
Western demands to respect human rights norms, ultimately leading to greater conflict 
and contributing to the demise of détente.  Perhaps this result should not have been 
surprising.  The Soviets rarely if ever expressed concerns about discrimination or the 
status of civil rights in the United States, and so were baffled by the Americans’ interest 
in Moscow’s domestic policies.  As Ulam noted in 1983: “It ran against the grain for the 
Kremlin to countenance American interference and protests on matters as sensitive as the 
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official treatment of dissidents, whether and in what numbers Soviet Jews would be 
allowed to emigrate, etc.”48  Furthermore, Gelman argued that there was an inherent 
tension between Washington’s demands for human rights reforms and Moscow’s 
conception of détente.  At the same time that the Americans pressed for internal reforms 
in the Soviet Union, the Soviets actually intensified their repression against dissidents “as 
a precaution against the ideological contamination” which they anticipated from relaxed 
tensions, explained Gelman.
49
  Richard W. Stevenson claimed that although Americans 
initially accepted détente’s neutral position on human rights, as time went on many in the 
US became concerned by the Soviet “intensification of the ideological struggle” and 
“internal police measures.”50   
Joshua Muravcik credited President Jimmy Carter with permanently making 
human rights a part of American foreign policy.  Although he described this as “a good 
idea,” Muravcik also conceded, “implementing this idea [was] difficult.”51  One 
challenge was how to encourage respect for human rights in another society from the 
outside.
52
  The other was preventing this goal from interfering with other important 
foreign policy goals.
53
  The complexity of pursing détente with the Soviet Union while 
promoting human rights was a perfect illustration of this conundrum. 
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Many scholars agreed with Nelson that the Jackson-Vanik and Stevenson 
Amendments (1974) “dealt détente a stunning blow.”54  In passing these two pieces of 
legislation, Congress tied the US-Soviet Trade Act of 1975 to increased levels of 
emigration for Soviet Jews.  According to Nelson, it left Brezhnev with no choice but to 
abandon “what he most wanted and promised” – increased trade with America.55  
Thereafter, US-Soviet trade was cut nearly in half.
56
   
 According to Volkogonov, the human rights issue illustrated the contradictions in 
Soviet society at the time of détente.  “Paradoxically, at the very moment when the Soviet 
Union achieved military-strategic parity with the USA, and at the peak of its nuclear 
might, it began to experience growing spiritual uncertainty,” he wrote.57  Moscow could 
not explain away human rights abuses, citizens wishing to emigrate, or economic 
underperformance.
58
  Consequently, “Brezhnev was the leader of a state whose military 
power did not correspond to its spiritual base,” he concluded.59 
 
Dissident Intolerance 
Some Soviet citizens sought refuge in the West where they were often lionized for 
standing up to political oppression.  However, Kennan observed as early as 1972 that 
many of them, “’however such people might hate their Soviet masters, [had] ideas about 
democracy [which] were primitive and curious in the extreme.’”60  Simes noted in 1978 
                                               
54 Keith L. Nelson, The Making of Détente – Soviet American Relations in the Shadow of Vietnam 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1995), 149. 
55
 Ibid. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Volkogonov, 530-531. 
58 Ibid., 531. 
59 Ibid. 
60 George F. Kennan, Memoirs, 1950-1953, vol. 2 (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1972), 96-97; 
quoted in Simes, “Human Rights and Détente,” 137. 
103 
 
that despite their experiences many exiles “display[ed] remarkable intolerance of even 
minor disagreement.”61  In the mid-80s Stephen F. Cohen agreed, describing many 
émigrés as having a level of tolerance which “[did] not greatly exceed that of their former 
government.”62  Cohen explained that some even viewed fellow dissident and historian 
Roy Medvedev as a traitor simply because he advocated returning to what he considered 
the pure democratic socialism of Lenin, uncorrupted by Stalin.
63
   
Soviet exile and author of The Gulag Archipelago Alexander Solzhenitsyn was 
one of the most notoriously illiberal exiles.  Solzhenitsyn expressed “warm words” for 
Spain’s fascist dictator Franco, and seemed bothered by the “’surplus’ of freedom in the 
West,” wrote Simes.64  Nevertheless, Hayward called Gulag “a turning point in the 
intellectual life of the Cold War – a mortal wound to the socialist faith.”65  He credited 
Solzhenitsyn’s opus with leading French intellectual Bernard-Henri Levy, a former leader 
of the French Socialist Party, to “break with the French left.”66    
Besides shining a light on human rights abuses in the Soviet prison system, 
Solzhenitsyn aggressively attacked détente.  He urged the United States to end sales of 
food and technology and to cease signing treaties with the Soviet Union.
67
  However, 
Solzhenitsyn’s “extreme anti-liberalism…quickly alienated him from his liberal 
champions in the West,” noted Heyward.68 
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Henry Kissinger and Human Rights 
Biographies and other works focusing on Kissinger have much to say regarding 
the relationship between human rights and détente.  Hugh M. Arnold argued that much of 
the criticism of détente was directed at Kissinger personally because he placed security 
and economics ahead of all else.
69
  Kissinger acknowledged that his secretive style and 
reliance on principles like “national interest” and “balance of power” in foreign policy 
offended believers in Wilsonian liberal idealism.
70
   
One of the most notable examples occurred in Chile.  According to Horne, Nixon 
feared that just as Truman had “lost China” and Kennedy had “lost Cuba” to 
communism, he might be blamed for “losing Chile,” after Salvador Allende was 
democratically elected president in 1970.
71
  Consequently, Kissinger and CIA Director 
Richard Helms “became galvanized into action.”72  As Arnold explained, Kissinger is 
believed to have contributed to the September, 1973, military overthrow of Allende due 
to his socialist orientation, but to have disregarded accusations of torture on the part of 
Augusto Pinochet’s successor regime because it was deemed pro-American.73  
Nevertheless, Horne argued that memcons and telcons “show an exceptional paucity of 
communication between Kissinger, the White House, and security organs concerning 
Chile in the run-up to September 1973.”74  By the time of the coup, “Chile was distinctly 
off even the back burner,” he concluded.75  However, Dallek asserted that first the White 
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House sought to prevent Allende from taking office as a democratically elected president, 
and then used economic and political tools including the CIA to support his opponents 
thereafter.
76
  In doing so, Nixon and Kissinger violated “traditional U.S. claims to the 
right of national self-determination for all peoples,” he argued.77  Dallek noted that not 
even the reports of four thousand deaths prevented the White House from recognizing 
and supporting the new government in Santiago.
78
  Kissinger believed that protests 
against Pinochet were part of “a more general impulse to punish other U.S. allies for 
human rights abuses that would open the way to left-leaning regimes around the globe.”79 
However, despite his reputation for being amoral and even callous, Kissinger did 
not completely ignore human rights.  Arnold’s study of the Department of State Bulletin 
from 1969-1976 found “a marked increase in emphasis on human rights issues by 
Kissinger as time passed,” including “twice as many references to human rights concerns 
in 1976 as in all previous years combined.”80  Furthermore, “Kissinger drastically shifted 
his focus and emphasis on the issue from the expression of perfunctory, obligatory 
niceties to strong statements of condemnation…” wrote Arnold.81   
Certainly politics drove much of the change in Kissinger’s posture.  First, 
Congress bristled at the Nixon and Ford administrations’ apparent “indifference” to 
human rights and sought to gain control of foreign policy.
82
  Then in 1976 Jimmy Carter 
gave human rights a central position in his campaign for the presidency.  If not just to 
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defend his record, but to also ensure Ford’s election and protect his own position as 
Secretary of State, Kissinger spoke more frequently and intensely on human rights.   
Nevertheless, Kissinger never completely abandoned his belief that private 
diplomacy was the best way to handle human rights questions.  Countries viewed as 
strategically significant, including Iran and South Korea, continued to evade public 
condemnation for their abuses, leading Arnold to quip: “The trouble with the quiet 
diplomacy approach was that it was sometimes inaudible.”83   
Some scholars argued that Kissinger’s apparent apathy on human rights matters 
not only damaged détente, but also emboldened critics on the left and right.  For example, 
Isaacson wrote: 
One common theme expressed by conservatives, neoconservatives, and 
many liberals was that the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger approach to détente was 
too cold and calculating, too focused on a realpolitik concern with power 
balances, and thus gave short shrift to human rights and the fundamental 
ideals that should undergird American policy.
84
 
 
Jimmy Carter “embraced this human rights line of attack against détente,” said 
Isaacson.
85
  Meanwhile, conservatives led by Ronald Reagan denounced negotiations for 
a European security conference (ultimately culminating in the 1975 Helsinki Accords) 
which would grant legitimacy to the communist regimes in the Eastern bloc, and thereby 
make permanent the Soviet gains from World War II.  For the right, such talks amounted 
to “new Yalta-like sellouts of Eastern Europe and the Baltics.”86  Consequently Isaacson 
noted that attacking détente “helped propel the careers of two future presidents.”87   
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Likewise, Hanhimaki argued that Jimmy Carter used Kissinger’s human rights 
record to great effect in his presidential race against Gerald Ford.  “Morality had a 
contingent quality in his foreign policy and Kissinger could not explain it away,” wrote 
Hanhimaki.
88
  For example, Kissinger “pushed Rhodesia toward accepting a transition 
from apartheid to majority rule,” but would not “openly” pursue human rights with the 
Soviets.
89
  Kissinger denied there was a “double standard” and claimed his 
“nonconfrontational policies” with Moscow led to increased emigration from the Soviet 
Union.
90
  Kissinger also cited the Helsinki Accords where for the first time communist 
nations acknowledged human rights as an issue in international diplomacy.
91
   
Politically, the injection of human rights into détente put Kissinger “on the 
rhetorical defensive,” wrote Suri.92  Kissinger had “shaped public discussions about 
foreign policy during his first years in office,” he explained.93  However, “atrocities 
committed by American allies, combined with the images of suffering from the Vietnam 
War, raised broad international concern about the human effects of foreign policy in the 
1970s.”94  Congress intervened by forcing Kissinger to create a position later known as 
the assistant secretary of state for human rights, as well as by conducting investigations 
via the Senate Select Committee to Study Government Operations (also known as “the 
Church Committee”) which reported on CIA covert activities in Chile.95   
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Two of the newest biographies of Kissinger have emphasized his life experiences 
and worldview in an attempt to explain his stance on human rights.  For example, in 2007 
Dallek suggested that Kissinger’s contacts with Holocaust survivors deeply influenced 
him.  Himself Jewish, Kissinger learned from camp victims that “[i]mpulses to dwell on 
past horrors would produce sorrow and self-pity,” and signified weakness.96  The 
survivors who fared best after the war were those who “’applied themselves to the peace 
with the same singleness of purpose and sometimes the same disregard of accepted 
standards,’” which they had adopted in the camps.97  Additionally, Kissinger learned to 
be “sensibly suspicious of human nature and human behavior,” and therefore “distrusted 
the good intentions of others,” wrote Dallek.98  Like many survivors, Kissinger also 
questioned the purpose of religion and the existence of God.
99
   
In 2009 Horne described Kissinger’s worldview as “pessimistic,” “strongly 
influenced by his German provenance,” and “always that of the historian, concerned 
primarily with statecraft.”100  Any sacrifice of human rights to realpolitik came from a 
belief in “the overriding importance of order in an essentially anarchic world.”101  
Kissinger believed that preserving order provided “the maximum well-being of the 
majority of citizens.”102  In this regard, Horne believed that Kissinger bore a great 
similarity to nineteenth century European diplomats including Austria’s Metternich and 
Britain’s Castlereagh.103 
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 Just recently, The Blood Telegram: Nixon, Kissinger, and a Forgotten Genocide 
by Gary J. Bass documented the White House’s role in the 1970-1971 Pakistani Civil 
War.  According to Bass, when East Pakistan, now known as Bangladesh, launched a 
separatist movement from dominant West Pakistan, the military government in Islamabad 
responded in brutal fashion.
104
  Despite CIA and State Department estimates that as many 
as 200,000 Bengalis had been killed with 10,000,000 more being forced to flee to India, 
“Nixon and Kissinger stood stoutly behind Pakistan’s generals,” wrote Bass.105  Viewing 
Pakistan as a vital Cold War ally (Islamabad was helping Washington with its opening to 
Beijing) as opposed to its rival India with “pro-Soviet leanings,” the White House 
ignored the reports of Archer K. Blood, US general counsel in East Pakistan, as well as 
US Ambassador to India Kenneth B. Keating (formerly a Republican senator from New 
York) that a human rights catastrophe and even genocide was being perpetrated upon the 
Hindu minority in Bangladesh.
106
  
 
Jewish Emigration 
In the 1970s American Jewish activists began pressuring the Soviet Union to alter 
its emigration policies, which Dobrynin believed did more damage to détente than any 
other issue.
107
  According to him, “Jewish extremist groups” picketed the Soviet embassy 
on nearly a daily basis and Soviet offices in Washington and New York were exposed to 
explosions and rifle shots.
108
  Privately, Jewish leaders and the White House condemned 
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such actions by groups including Meir Kahane’s Jewish Defense League.109  Dobrynin 
also credited the US State Department for providing security and recommending Soviet 
diplomats and their families exercise extreme caution.
110
 
 Emigration embarrassed the Soviets because it suggested that communism had 
failed to create the ideal society.  Kissinger understood this well.  For his part, Dobrynin 
knew the saliency of human rights to the American public.  By opting for quiet 
diplomacy both could feel free to reply to each other’s requests on emigration and other 
issues favorably without appearing to “capitulate.”111  Kissinger described how he and 
Dobrynin handled the issue privately: 
No formal requests were made, and no formal responses were given.  
Soviet actions were noted without being acknowledged.  Indeed, the 
emigration practices of the Soviet Union were steadily improving, though 
no claim to that effect was ever made by Washington.  The Nixon 
Administration stuck to these ground rules so meticulously that it never 
claimed any credit for improving Soviet emigration practices-even during 
election campaigns-…”112 
 
As détente’s fortunes flourished via the Kissinger-Dobrynin backchannel, so did 
those of Soviet Jews wishing to emigrate.  From 1970-1973 the numbers increased 
steadily: 1,000 in 1970, 15,000 in 1971, 30,000 in 1972, and finally 35,000 in 1973.
113
  
The 65,000 emigrants from 1972-1973 corresponded to when détente was at its height.
114
  
Moscow’s change in policy probably resulted from several factors including a desire for a 
“safety valve” to release pressure from a “disaffected but homogenous” group of 
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citizens.
115
  The expectation that Washington would reciprocate with some future gesture 
of its own could have also played a part.
116
  Nevertheless, many Soviet Jews continued to 
suffer from delays, harassment, and refusals.
117
   
Jewish Emigrants from the Soviet Union, 1970-1975 
 
 However, if the issue arose outside of the backchannel then Kissinger and 
Dobrynin handled it quite differently.  When a staff member brought a letter calling 
attention to the plight of Soviet Jews directly to Nixon, Dobrynin expressed his concern 
to Kissinger.  After some investigation, the following discussion occurred on February 
15, 1972: 
K: …I have looked into this matter of the letter about the Jewish problem. 
 
D: Yes. 
 
K: There is no consolation in the result, but I can assure you it was the 
result of an overeager staff man who brought it in without explaining what 
it was about.  I can tell you privately that the President is extremely angry. 
 
D: I don’t care about the specifics of it. 
 
K: I just wanted you to know.  If we want to needle you, we will find 
another way to do it. 
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D: It creates some publicity which goes back home. 
 
K: You let your people know about this. 
 
D: I would like it not to happen in the future.  In this particular case, it 
doesn’t matter. 
 
K: It will not happen in the future without my telling you first.
118
 
 
Kissinger’s embarrassment as well as Dobrynin’s annoyance at what they both viewed as 
a violation of diplomatic etiquette was readily apparent.  They had an understanding that 
such issues would be handled privately, through the backchannel.  Kissinger assured 
Dobrynin that in the future he would notify him of anything posing such potential 
negative publicity.  However, “the Jewish problem” was not going away. 
Based upon an agreement signed by Nixon and Brezhnev at the June, 1972, 
Moscow summit, the Trade Reform Act of 1972 held numerous potential benefits for 
both superpowers.  The USSR would obtain Most Favored Nation (MFN) trading status 
and thereby benefit from lower tariffs on Russian imports including vodka, while the US 
would finally receive $722 million owed from the World War II lend-lease program.
119
   
Although MFN only provided the same trading benefits which over one hundred other 
nations enjoyed, Kissinger believed that to the Soviets it conferred legitimacy, respect, 
and above all, equality.
120
  Nixon and Kissinger also calculated that MFN could be 
offered as a quid pro quo in exchange for Soviet restraint internationally.
121
  Both 
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countries would prosper from a greater exchange of goods, with the added benefit for the 
US of increasing democracy’s influence behind the Iron Curtain.122   
However, on August 3 Moscow began charging a 25,000 exit tax on emigrants.
123
  
The Soviets justified the tax as a means to reimburse the government for educational 
expenses.
124
  Once again, Kissinger’s nemesis Senator Jackson entered the debate.  On 
October 4 he and seventy-one co-sponsors introduced an amendment to the trade bill.
125
  
What would become known as the Jackson-Vanik Amendment mandated that the United 
States would only award MFN status to countries with non-market based economies 
provided that they removed their emigration restrictions.
126
  The intent behind the 
legislation was primarily to force the Soviet Union to allow its Jewish citizens to leave 
the country.  Democratic Representative Charles Vanik of Ohio introduced his 
corresponding bill in the House on October 10.
127
   
The White House had no official comment on the tax.
128
  However, the public had 
much to say.  Special consultant to the president on Israel and Jewish affairs Leonard 
Garment told Kissinger, “The Russian issue is flooding my desk.”129  Kissinger called the 
American Jewish community “self-serving.”130  To him Jackson-Vanik represented a 
cynical attempt to “extend the conventional criticism of Nixon’s alleged moral 
                                               
122
 Mieczkowski, 278. 
123 Stevenson, 162; Dallek, 413. 
124 Nelson, 118. 
125
 Kissinger, White House Years (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1979), 1272. 
126 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 250. 
127 Ibid., 251. 
128 Dallek, 413. 
129 Ibid. 
130 Ibid. 
114 
 
insensitivity into new areas of policy, including foreign affairs, in which Nixon’s 
competence had heretofore gone unchallenged.”131   
To Dobrynin, the amendment was part of “a vitriolic but politically sophisticated 
campaign” which damaged American-Soviet relations from then on.132  However, he also 
could not understand why his government would not remove its restrictions on Jewish 
emigration.  His believed that doing so would have eliminated a persistent source of 
conflict with the West and particularly the Americans.
133
  He also claimed that the 
Politburo never gave a reasonable answer when queried privately on the issue.
134
  Some 
Soviet leaders held to Stalin’s view of emigrants as traitors, others argued that Jews had 
knowledge of state secrets due to their work in scientific fields, and some feared that 
increased Jewish emigration would alienate Moscow’s allies in the Arab world.135  
Indeed, the Kremlin was probably eager to return to the good graces of Egypt in 
particular after its president, Anwar Sadat, expelled all Soviet troops in July.
136
  
However, with remarkable candor Dobrynin opined that the real reason for restricting 
Jewish emigration derived from Moscow’s fear “of emigration in general (irrespective of 
nationality or religion) lest an escape hatch from the happy land of socialism seem to 
offer a degree of liberalization that might destabilize the domestic situation.”137   
Ultimately, the answer to the mystery of the exit tax may lie with Politburo 
member and Chief Party Ideologist Mikhail Suslov.  According to biographer Serge 
Petroff, “Suslov continued to remind the leadership that the Soviet Union had an 
                                               
131 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 251. 
132
 Dobrynin, In Confidence, 272.  
133 Ibid. 
134 Ibid. 
135 Ibid. 
136 Nelson, 118. 
137 Dobrynin, In Confidence, 273. 
115 
 
ideological rather than a national basis for its existence.”138  Consequently, even at a state 
of détente Suslov tended to advocate for an increased emphasis on the ideological 
struggle with the West in order to inoculate the Soviet Union from the corrupting effects 
of greater Western contact.
139
  Dobrynin reported that Suslov had been left in charge in 
Moscow while Brezhnev and Gromyko were vacationing on the Black Sea.
140
  He 
suspected that Suslov personally opposed both détente and relaxing emigration rules and 
so agreed to the tax.
141
   
Despite Kissinger’s and Dobrynin’s previous success in the backchannel, Senator 
Jackson would not be satisfied with quiet diplomacy when it came to human rights – he 
believed that American advocacy had to be unambiguous.
142
  Dobrynin claimed that 
Jackson sought victory over the Soviets in order to further his political career.
143
  
Meanwhile Kissinger called it a “pity” that although the White House and the Senator 
had the same goals on emigration, they could not agree upon the same “tactics.”144  
Regardless of how well-intentioned he may have been, Jackson undoubtedly had political 
motives as well for introducing his amendment.  In addition to attracting Jewish votes in 
his home state, he had plans to run for president in 1976.
145
  Likewise, co-sponsor Vanik 
served many Jewish constituents in his Cleveland, Ohio congressional district.
146
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 As the controversy intensified, Treasury Secretary George Schultz was scheduled 
to visit Moscow in the spring of 1973 for talks on expanding trade.  On March 12, 
Dobrynin and Kissinger discussed the visit as well as the need to keep talk of Jewish 
emigration quiet because of its potentially detrimental effects on détente: 
D: You know, we could discuss right now why I decided to call you, not 
because of the situation, but chiefly I received a telegram from Brezhnev 
in connection with [what] you asked about Shultz [sic]. 
 
K: Yeah. 
 
D: he just ask[ed] me to tell you that definitely he is going to receive 
Shultz. 
 
K: That’s a good idea. 
 
D: So, you may be sure that Brezhnev will receive Shultz.  And he said to 
me, I told you so, so what is the question. 
 
K: Evidently, Anatol, it might be just as well if you didn’t raise the Jewish 
question with Shultz. 
 
D: Don’t raise with Shultz. 
 
K: Don’t raise it, because, unless there is something positive you want to 
say, because if you do raise and then you see, he is not quite as devious as 
I am, he may report something honestly which causes us trouble with the 
Congress. 
 
D: I see, okay.
147
 
 
As the Treasury Secretary making an official visit, Schultz operated outside of the 
backchannel and could be called upon to comment publicly or even testify before 
Congress about the trip.  Kissinger’s concern for avoiding any public mention of Jewish 
emigration led him to ask Dobrynin to not bring up the subject with Schultz.  While one 
could question the ethics of conducting foreign policy in this manner, it demonstrated 
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how Kissinger understood Soviet sensitivity vis-à-vis their domestic policies.  It also 
showed both men’s dedication to quiet diplomacy in order to protect detente. 
 As the White House sought a compromise with the Senate on MFN, Dobrynin 
persistently inquired about its progress.  On March 17, Kissinger explained that he could 
see the light at the end of the tunnel, provided he had Dobrynin’s permission to pass on a 
letter to the senators specifying proposed Soviet compromises: 
K: Well, on the MFN I can already answer. 
 
D: Yes, what is answer. 
 
K: We think it will go through the House in the first week of August. 
 
D: I see. 
 
K: And in the Senate, oh, sometime during October we think. 
 
Then later… 
 
K: We can give them the text you gave us[?] 
 
D: I think it is better to say, not to give them the text. 
 
K: Not to give it.  Just to read it. 
 
D: I think you can give just a summary, that’s all. 
 
K: Okay, fine.
148
 
 
Although willing to deliver concessions on emigration, perhaps even tentatively agreeing 
to a certain amount of exit visas to be granted annually, Dobrynin resisted putting them in 
writing, perhaps out of fear that the information could leak.  The Soviet Union did not 
want it to appear as if thousands of its citizens desired to leave the country. 
Initially it appeared to the White House that the exit tax alone had caused the 
controversy.
149
  Remove the tax, and you removed the problem.  On March 30, Dobrynin 
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delivered a private message from the Soviet leadership to Kissinger asserting that 
emigration was an internal affair and criticizing the “’noisy campaign’” which was 
“’artificial and ill-meaning.’”150  Nevertheless, the Soviets would end the emigration tax 
except for certain circumstances related to security concerns.
151
  On April 16, Kissinger 
and Dobrynin agreed on the exact wording of a statement announcing the suspension of 
the exit tax which was then submitted to Congress.
152
   
 Two days later, Nixon announced at the White House that the Soviets had agreed 
to drop the exit tax for Soviet Jews wishing to immigrate to Israel.
153
  However, 
Kissinger alleged that due to the brewing Watergate scandal Congress was not in the 
mood for compromise.
154
  Indeed, several politicians may have already smelled blood in 
the water and been thinking ahead to the 1974 Congressional mid-term elections.  
However, the White House did not help itself by excluding Congress from negotiations 
with the Kremlin over the issue.
155
  Consequently, Jackson and numerous others 
increased their demands to include a guaranteed minimum number of exit visas and eased 
emigration restrictions for all Soviet citizens, not just Jews.
156
  According to Dobrynin, 
this suggested that the number of people wishing to leave the Soviet Union was 
endless.
157
  Such an implication could only be taken extremely negatively by Moscow.     
The White House remained undeterred.  The commitment to obtaining MFN for 
the Soviets was such that Nixon had Kissinger tell Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir to 
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stay out of the debate.
158
  On April 22 Kissinger discussed with Dobrynin a recent 
conversation he had held with the Israeli ambassador: 
D: …you said that you spoke with the Ambassador about this— 
 
K: Oh, oh, well, I told the Ambassador that we would take very serious 
measures if they obstructed MFN.  And between you and me, even going 
to airplane deliveries. 
 
D: That you mentioned him directly this way? 
 
K: Yeah.  I mean, don’t publish this. 
 
D: No, Henry.  But did you ever see anything published which we discuss 
with you? 
 
K: No.   
 
D: I don’t know anything we have. 
 
K: No, but I mean, we were very tough.  And if you could see the reaction 
of the Jewish leaders, I think that it was not uninfluenced by them. 
 
D: All right, Henry. 
 
K: We will push it through, Anatol.
159
 
 
Kissinger’s statement to the Israeli ambassador was probably not an idle threat.  When 
war broke out between the Arabs and Israelis that October, the White House did not 
respond with an airlift right away due to concern that such a move would hurt 
Washington’s role as a peacemaker thereafter.  Furthermore, when the Israelis later 
appeared to be advancing on Cairo en route to a total victory, Nixon and Kissinger 
compelled them to withdraw.  Consequently, it seems highly likely that Kissinger would 
indeed punish Tel Aviv if they interfered with MFN.  Not even the protests of America’s 
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most important strategic ally in the Middle East would stop Kissinger from coming 
through for Dobrynin on this prime carrot of détente. 
 The second Nixon-Brezhnev summit was held in May, 1973, in Washington as 
well as at Nixon’s “Western White House” in San Clemente, California.  Dobrynin 
blamed the MFN-emigration controversy in part for the failure of this second meeting to 
advance American-Soviet economic ties.
160
   
Meanwhile, negotiations continued in the backchannel.  On July 3, Kissinger 
spoke to Dobrynin from San Clemente.
161
  While in California, several prominent Jewish 
leaders had asked to visit with him, but Kissinger insisted on meeting in Washington 
instead.
162
  Kissinger sought Dobrynin’s help in obtaining emigration concessions to 
relay to Jewish leaders at a forthcoming meeting in order to rally support for MFN: 
HK: And you see frankly if there is anything…that I could tell them then it 
would be worth seeing them and it would help with the legislation. 
 
AD: I think it would be better to delay it when you will be back here. 
 
HK: Well, I’ll certainly—I tell you now I will not see them here, because I 
don’t want to create the impression that we are having a special meeting 
that requires a long trip…I’m wondering Anatol whether you could find 
out for me by the time I get back next week whether there is anything at 
all that I can say… 
 
AD: Okay, I check with him [Brezhnev] once more, but now he is in 
Moscow—I will check with him and what he really has in mind… 163 
 
About two weeks later on the 19th, Dobrynin responded to a query by Kissinger 
concerning a list of Jewish families which had been passed along to the Soviets: 
D: …this is answer about the question you raise yesterday.  First about this 
list of some Jewish families. 
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K: Yes. 
 
D: …the final decision is not yet taken because they vote one way or 
another over security restrictions. 
 
K: How many? 
 
D: More than 80.  Around 80 or 90, something like that.  They are now – 
their applications are being considered in the light of developments. 
 
K: Can I say that?  Oh, that explains the discrepancy in numbers? 
 
D: You may say, but it is not decided whether they will give them 
permission or not.  So this is the only thing I could tell, but you may say
164
 
 
The Soviets often refused visas to citizens on the basis of security restrictions.  How 
legitimate these claims were was debatable, but what is clear is that détente drove the 
Politburo to consider such requests in much greater numbers than ever before. 
 The next Congressional session brought more developments.  On September 14, 
1973, Andrei Sakharov – dissident, physicist, and father of the Soviet hydrogen bomb –
sent an impassioned letter to the US Congress urging passage of Jackson-Vanik: 
…there are tens of thousands of citizens in the Soviet Union – Jews, 
Germans, Russians, Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Armenians, Estonians 
Latvians, Turks and members of other ethnic groups – who want to leave 
the country and who have been seeking to exercise that right for years and 
for decades at the cost of endless difficulty and humiliation.  You know 
that prisons, labor camps, and mental hospitals are full of people who have 
sought to exercise this legitimate right.
165
 
 
Then in a refutation of the Kissinger-Dobrynin approach, Sakharov added that “’quiet 
diplomacy’” could only help “a few individuals in Moscow and some other cities.”166  
Finally, he called on “the Congress of the United States, reflecting the will and the 
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traditional love of freedom of the American people,” to pass the amendment.167  About 
two weeks later on the 27th, historian Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. wrote a piece for the 
Wall Street Journal explaining that although he supported increased US-Soviet trade, 
Sakharov’s endorsement of Jackson-Vanik had swayed him.168  “’Always trust the man 
on the firing line,’” wrote Schlesinger.169    
The October, 1973 Arab-Israeli War temporarily placed the trade bill on the back-
burner.  Moscow’s desire for MFN led the Soviets to continue allowing Jewish 
emigration over the objections of the Arabs.
170
  However, the Soviet role in arming the 
Egyptians and Syrians against Israel may have provided Jackson with the added 
encouragement and support from the public he needed in order to continue pushing for 
his amendment.
171
   
On December 11, the Jackson-Vanik Amendment easily passed in the House 319 
to 80.
172
  On the 26
th
 Nixon relayed to Dobrynin his “profound contempt” for the 
“liberals, Zionists, and conservatives” who had blocked MFN.173  “We must not let 
temporary setbacks, no matter how discouraging, interfere with or poison the relations 
between the two superpowers,” he added.174  The next stop was the Senate, and if it did as 
well there Congress would have more than enough votes to override a presidential veto.   
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By 1974, the controversy over Jewish emigration had held up the trade bill for 
over a year.  After being armed by Dobrynin with the latest Soviet statistics on Jewish 
emigration, Kissinger met with Jackson on March 6.
175
  Kissinger proposed a 
compromise whereby the Soviets would receive MFN, but the Senate would have the 
right to review Moscow’s emigration policies on a regular basis.176  Jackson rejected the 
idea, instead insisting on a written guarantee of dramatic increases in emigration.
177
  
After months of further negotiations, Kissinger phoned Dobrynin on June 5 to 
report that he might have a deal with Jackson as well as Democratic Senators Jacob Javits 
of New York and Abraham Ribicoff of Connecticut.  When it took several rings before 
Dobrynin answered, Kissinger could not resist one of his verbal jabs: 
K: There’s almost no sense tapping you anymore if you don’t pick it up.[!] 
I had breakfast this morning with Jackson, Javits and Ribicoff.  You know, 
it’s a little premature, but I think we will be successful. 
 
D: Along what lines? 
 
K: Along the lines we discussed yesterday. 
 
D: For trade? 
 
K: For trade and credits. 
 
D: Along what lines? 
 
K: Well, the 45,000. 
 
D: 45? 
 
K: Well, the number… 
 
D: Oh, you mean about this… 
 
K: Jewish question. 
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Then later: 
 
K: …he will modify his amendments so that MFN is possible and credits 
will not be restricted.  You know with a review maybe every year. 
 
D: I understand.  When we meet next time you are going to show me this 
letter. 
 
K: I will not send the letter without discussing it with you. 
 
D: OK.  In one way or the other it’s better to get rid of all these issues.178 
 
Dobrynin’s patience was clearly growing thin.  However, Kissinger believed he had 
finally reached a compromise with Jackson and the other senators whereby the Soviets 
would get MFN, but the senate would retain the right to an annual review based upon 
emigration statistics.  The agreement would be summarized in a letter to Jackson, which 
Kissinger would give Dobrynin an opportunity to preview.  Consequently, there would be 
no surprises or misunderstandings.   
 Despite their best efforts, circumstances continued to work against Kissinger and 
Dobrynin.  On June 30 the President’s ability to use export-import bank credits came up 
for Congressional renewal.
179
  Senators Adlai Stevenson III of Illinois, Jackson, and 
eighteen others introduced the Stevenson Amendment placing a $300 million limit on all 
US export-import bank loans to the Soviet Union with any loan over $50 million being 
subject to a possible review.
180
  The final version of the amendment prohibited the use of 
funds for development and energy as well.
181
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The Jackson and Stevenson amendments were draining Moscow’s incentive for 
cooperating on human rights issues.  Even if the Soviets met the Senate’s numbers on 
emigration and thereby obtained MFN, the amount of money they could borrow for trade 
would be tightly controlled.
182
  If the White House could deliver neither MFN nor credits 
to the Soviets, Nixon and Kissinger would be without two of their main instruments for 
conducting détente.  In Kissinger’s view, by this time “[the] carrot had for all practical 
purposes ceased to exist.”183 
 On August 9, 1974, Gerald Ford became the thirty-eighth President of the United 
States after the Watergate affair forced Nixon to resign.  According to Gates, one of the 
things the Soviets liked most about working with Nixon and Kissinger was that they 
“never tried to cause the Soviets trouble at home, to question seriously their internal 
policies or the legitimacy of their rule.”184  However, after Nixon exited Gates saw a shift 
in US policy.
185
  This probably had little to do with any changes implemented by Ford.  
Due to Vietnam and the Watergate scandal, power in Washington had been moving 
steadily away from the presidency and toward Congress for at least a year by this time 
and would continue to do so throughout the 1970s. 
On August 14, Dobrynin gave Ford an “unwritten guarantee” that 50,000 Soviet 
Jews would be permitted to emigrate every year.
186
  (Ford stated that the figure was 
55,000).
187
  Dobrynin refused to put it in writing due to fear that Jackson would use the 
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information for political propaganda.
188
  The next day, the President attempted to break 
the impasse over Jackson-Vanik and MFN by inviting Jackson, Javits, and Ribicoff to the 
Oval Office for breakfast.
189
  Ford relayed Dobrynin’s assurances and Jackson 
reciprocated by lowering his demand to 75,000 after having been as high as 100,000.
190
   
Although Javits and Ribicoff were satisfied with Dobrynin’s word, Jackson still 
insisted that any guarantee had to be in writing.
191
  According to Ford, Jackson accused 
the White House of “being too soft on the Russians.”192  Nevertheless, they finally 
reached a deal on October 18 whereby the Senator would alter his legislation based upon 
an “understanding” that the Soviets would provide 60,000 exit visas annually.193   
Jackson, who had presidential aspirations, felt compelled to make the news 
public.  When he announced the deal before the press on the White House lawn, the 
Soviets were outraged.
194
  Kissinger told Dobrynin that the President was furious with 
Jackson, even going so far as to say that the Senator had “’behaved like a swine.’”195  
Although the White House later explained that the Soviets had never agreed to an exact 
number, the damage had been done.
196
 
Things began to move quickly.  On December 3 Kissinger testified before the 
Senate Finance Committee.
197
  He stressed that the Soviets had not committed to a 
definite number of actual Jewish emigrants.
198
  Nevertheless, on the 13
th
 the Senate 
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passed the trade bill with the amendments, 77-4.
199
  After ironing out differences in the 
conference committee, on December 20 the bill went to the White House.
200
  Ford signed 
it into law on January 3, 1975, and praised it for the economic benefits to both countries, 
but also criticized the legislation for conditions and restrictions uniquely placed upon the 
Soviet Union.
201
  The President revealed that he never seriously considered a veto 
because the legislation had passed both houses comfortably.
202
   
With the passage of Jackson-Vanik, for the first time the United States of America 
had passed legislation promoting international human rights.
203
  It was a significant 
milestone.  However, the Soviets were unimpressed.  On January 10 Dobrynin delivered 
a private statement to Kissinger explaining that Moscow was rejecting Congress’s 
conditions and cancelling the trade agreement altogether.
204
   
 Kissinger was confused by Dobrynin’s statement.  It sounded to him as if the 
Soviets were not merely repudiating the trade agreement, but also détente and everything 
for which he and Dobrynin had been working.  On January 13, Kissinger sought a 
clarification, but Dobrynin’s response only added to his fears:  
K: The one thing that concerns me is that you keep making references to - 
- that you are freed of your obligations in 1972.  I don’t know what 
obligations you are talking about. 
 
D: There are several things there…they consider as it was for three years - 
- unconditional so they consider to terminate it as it is.  So it is probably 
needed to be discussed at a later date of course between our agencies who 
deal with the trade one-by-one.  We didn’t go into the details because you 
know under the ’72 as you remember - - it’s for three years. 
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K: But only those items that were covered in the trade agreement.  I mean 
you don’t mean for example the maritime agreement. 
 
D: No, no.  Only the trade agreement. 
 
K: Okay. 
 
D: So this is within the….. 
 
K: You are not denouncing the SALT agreement? 
 
D: Well, well, I think we will come to that one on a later date - - no, no, I 
am joking.
205
 (italics mine) 
 
This was a most curious exchange.  Kissinger was unclear where the Soviets now stood 
on détente.  Inexplicably, Dobrynin at first saw fit to make a joke and let Kissinger 
believe the worst.  Could this have been a Freudian slip, revealing such disgust amongst 
the Soviet leadership that they had considered abandoning détente?  Moscow must have 
been thoroughly fed up with the American legislative process by this point.  The delay in 
getting SALT I ratified had been bad enough, but this time the Kremlin found Jackson’s 
interference in its internal affairs to be intolerable. 
Dobrynin quickly changed the subject to whether or not President Ford would 
publicly condemn Congress’s action: 
D: Will the President [lead?] with this in general in his own statement or 
he will just only give domestic affairs mostly, I mean on Wednesday. 
 
K: I think the President will not mention it specifically but I will give a 
speech next week in which I will hit it very hard. 
 
D: Where are you going to make it? 
 
K: In Los Angeles. 
 
D: Oh, in Los Angeles. 
 
K: Assuming you don’t keep attacking me in Pravda. 
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D: On the contrary.  A special concession after which everybody will 
listen with special care. 
 
K: Okay, Anatol.
206
 
 
Kissinger’s speech would not criticize the Soviets for disavowing the trade agreement, 
but attack Congress for its actions, which he believed had prompted a diplomatic 
catastrophe.  Dobrynin seemed somewhat disappointed that Kissinger would not be 
condemning the bill from Washington, thereby denying the speech an official 
imprimatur.  Nevertheless, he seemed satisfied with Kissinger’s reaction.  As usual, 
Kissinger told Dobrynin that he could review the official State Department response to 
the Soviet withdrawal before anything was said publicly.
207
  Despite a massive setback 
for détente, both men sought to maintain the relationship as before. 
That was not the end of the controversy.  On February 3, 1975, Kissinger phoned 
New York Times publisher Punch Sulzberger to furiously protest a column by William 
Safire.  A former Nixon speechwriter, Safire had left the administration and later 
discovered that he was one of many who had been wiretapped in an effort to uncover 
leaks.
208
  The column alleged that Kissinger and Dobrynin had conspired to cancel the 
trade agreement due to the passage of the Jackson-Vanik and Stevenson amendments.  In 
doing so, the Soviets would avoid capitulating on Jewish emigration while the White 
House could benefit politically by blaming Congress for interfering with foreign policy.  
Unable to reach Sulzberger, Kissinger phoned editor John Oakes, who attempted to calm 
down the still-irate Secretary of State: 
K: …now today Saffire [sic] accuses the Secretary of State of colluding 
with a Soviet Ambassador for domestic political gain on an issue which 
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again I [initiated?] the whole thing of moving emigration before Jackson 
was ever heard of.  It’s unbelievable that this sort of thing can happen. 
 
O: I have to tell you, I think the Saffire thing was really outrageous 
myself…I want you to know the publisher [Sulzberger] came down stairs 
to see me and we talked about it in another office. 
 
Then later… 
 
K: …no [matter how] much I would oppose a Congressional action, the 
idea that the Secretary of State could collude with a Soviet Ambassador is 
unbelievable. 
 
O: I just cannot defend and have no intention of defending the Saffire 
piece.  I just have to say to you what is the absolute truth and what Punch 
has already said.  The columnist[s] are absolutely independent. 
 
K: OK.  I made my protest and there’s nothing you can do about it. 
 
O: I’m really thinking out loud.  Is there anything you would want to state 
for publication. 
 
K: I don’t think the Secretary of State should write a letter saying no, I did 
not collude with the Soviet Ambassador.
209
 (italics mine) 
 
Safire obviously had his own personal reasons for being resentful towards Kissinger.  
Whether or not there was any truth to the allegation, the fact that the former speech writer 
could charge Kissinger and Dobrynin with collusion was revealing.  After six years of 
working together, there may have been the perception in Washington (as well as in 
Moscow) that they had become too close.  Inevitably, this aroused suspicions among 
certain circles on both sides, and combined with Kissinger’s reputation for practicing 
realpolitik, the possibility of a backchannel conspiracy must not have seemed too far-
fetched to Safire.   
 Another incident just prior to the presidential election in 1976 demonstrated the 
depth of Kissinger’s antipathy to publicly flaying the Soviet Union over human rights.  In 
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one of their face-to-face meetings Kissinger had mentioned to Dobrynin that some Jewish 
visitors were harassed during a recent trip to the Soviet Union.  By mutual consent their 
discussions were always private, but on October 29 Dobrynin read an Associated Press 
story stating that Kissinger had publicly criticized Moscow over the incident: 
D: …The Secretary of State Henry Kissinger today protested the 
harassment of Jews. 
 
K: Total, absolute, outrageous! 
 
D: This is what [State Department spokesman Robert] Funseth said. 
 
K: Well, god damn these bastards.  I said… 
 
D: This is record. 
 
K: I haven’t seen the transcript.  What I told him to say was if the question 
was asked was that our position on this issue was known. 
 
D: But I have an AP ticker… 
 
K: Let me first look at what was actually said will you? 
 
D: All right. 
 
K: I can’t believe that Funseth said this. 
 
D: This was on AP. 
 
K: I don’t believe he said that.  It is inconceivable that he said this.  Let 
me find out and I will call you back in five minutes.
210
 
 
After receiving a transcript, Kissinger immediately called Dobrynin back: 
K: Anatol, there was absolutely nothing said about a protest. 
 
D: But… 
 
K: Wait a minute, I am just telling you what the text says.  It did not 
discuss the harassment of Jewish visitors.  The answer is “the situation of 
Jews in the Soviet Union was discussed.”  Then it says can you be more 
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specific.  And the transcript says “I cannot be more specific.”  That is all 
he said.  All he said was the situation of Jews was discussed. 
 
Then later… 
 
D: The whole implication is that it was a protest of the harassment of 
Jews. 
 
K: Did you read the whole text? 
 
D: No, I didn’t. 
 
K: I think if you read the text… 
 
D: It is very clear… 
 
K: Look, I think if you read the whole transcript. 
 
D: You have never published our meetings and why was it necessary to do 
it today.[?]
211
 
 
Although Dobrynin thought Kissinger had violated a confidence by publicly discussing 
the specifics of one of their private meetings, the conversation between Funseth and the 
AP reporter was actually in the context of the 1976 presidential campaign.  As Kissinger 
explained it, a reporter had asked, “Gov. Carter has expressed concern about what is 
going on about Soviet Jews.  Has the US done anything on this?”212  To which Funseth 
replied, “I cannot answer specifically but the Soviet Union is very much aware of our 
position on Soviet Jews.”213  The exchange had been in regard to the already much-
publicized issue of Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union, not about the recent 
harassment of some Jewish visitors to the USSR which Kissinger and Dobrynin had 
discussed privately. “I regret it Anatol, I genuinely regret it,” pleaded Kissinger.214  Once 
Dobrynin had a proper understanding of the context of the conversation, he calmed down 
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considerably.  As they had done so often before, Kissinger and Dobrynin had cleared up a 
major misunderstanding. 
 This entire episode was telling in that Kissinger displayed far more outrage at 
being accused of publicly criticizing the Soviet Union for human rights abuses than he 
ever showed for the actual abuses themselves.  His belief in quiet diplomacy as the proper 
way to handle these matters would never allow him to embarrass Dobrynin or the Soviets 
in such a public way.  Although morally questionable, this shared view of Kissinger and 
Dobrynin on the impropriety of publicly discussing a nation’s internal affairs was one of 
the main reasons why their relationship worked so successfully over the years.  While the 
Carter administration chose to openly stand on principle and make human rights one of 
the focal points of its foreign policy, Kissinger simply avoided discussing the issue 
publicly in favor of making progress in other areas. 
 What was the correct strategy?   Through private diplomacy in the backchannel, 
Jewish emigration rose dramatically.  When the issue surfaced in official channels, 
however, it triggered a strong reaction from the Soviet leadership and the numbers 
plummeted.  From a high of 35,000 in 1973, emigration numbers dropped to 21,000 in 
1974 and to a mere 13,000 in 1975.
215
  Although the total rebounded to 50,000 in 1979 
after President Carter promised to repeal Jackson-Vanik, in the 1980s virtually all 
emigration stopped.
216
  Nevertheless, over thirty years from 1975-2005 approximately 
1,000,000 Jews emigrated from the Soviet Union to Israel with another 573,000 arriving 
in the United States.
217
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Perhaps the most significant effect of Jackson-Vanik may have been the damage 
done to relaxing tensions.  The period from 1975 to 1980 featured renewed 
confrontations between the United States and the Soviet Union around the world through 
various proxies.  Kissinger was unsure if Soviet moves including increased military 
deliveries to Vietnam and arms to communist forces in Angola were signs of Soviet 
disillusionment with détente or part of a larger long-term strategy.
218
  On the other hand, 
it is doubtful whether the economic benefits of increased trade and credits with the 
United States would have been significant enough to dissuade the Politburo from their 
course of action during the succeeding years anyway.
219
   
 
The Helsinki Accords 
In the summer of 1945 as the Second World War came to an end, the American, 
British, and Soviet allies met in Potsdam, Germany where Moscow received a tacit 
acceptance of its occupation of Eastern Europe.
220
  During the Cold War the Soviets 
sought to ensure their security by maintaining communist regimes in the countries along 
their western border.  After Moscow invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968 to halt anti-Soviet 
reforms by Alexander Dubcek’s government, the Kremlin must have concluded that 
additional measures were necessary.  According to Zubok, Brezhnev feared “’falling 
dominoes’” in Central Europe just as Lyndon Johnson had feared them in Southeast 
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Asia.
221
  Consequently, at Warsaw Pact meetings in October and December of 1969 the 
Soviets proposed a European Security Conference to be held the next year.
222
   
Initially, Moscow hoped to exclude Washington from the meeting.
223
  Kissinger 
speculated that the Soviets may have hoped to split the Western alliance and convince the 
Europeans to abandon NATO in favor of some new security arrangement.
224
  He 
considered this an utter fantasy:  “No NATO country was waiting to substitute the 
declaratory bureaucratic paraphernalia of a European Security Conference for the military 
reality of NATO or the presence of American military forces on the Continent.”225  Since 
Washington’s participation was a sine qua non for any security conference, the Nixon 
administration used it as another carrot of détente.
226
  The United States made Soviet 
restraint in the developing world, Western access to Berlin, and mutual reduction of 
armed forces in Europe conditions for its participation.
227
   
In addition to covering security and trade, the conference would also address 
human rights in part to prevent repeats of Soviet crackdowns on dissenters in East 
Germany (1953), Hungary (1956), and Czechoslovakia (1968).
228
  However, during an 
address to the Soviet people during his first visit to Moscow in 1972 Nixon had said, 
“’We believe in the right of each nation to chart its own course, to choose its own system, 
to go its own way, without interference from other nations.’”229  Reconciling the 
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contradiction between this statement and upholding international human rights norms 
hampered détente throughout the rest of the decade.     
Although many in the West viewed the Kremlin as a violator of human rights, the 
issue had to be considered in the context of Soviet history.  The loss of twenty million 
people during the Second World War undoubtedly influenced the Soviet view that the 
right to life was the greatest human right of all.  Therefore by preserving peace first and 
foremost, you protected human rights.  For example, during his speech at the European 
Security Conference, Brezhnev remarked, “[W]e would like to stress most emphatically 
one of the inherent features of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, of the Leninist 
policy of peace and friendship among nations – its humanism.”230  Gromyko perhaps 
framed the Soviet position most succinctly: “[O]nly if you are alive can you enjoy all the 
other rights – the right to work, to housing, education, medical service, emigration and so 
on.”231 
On March 15, 1973, just months prior to the opening of negotiations, Dobrynin 
inquired about the chance of the US withdrawing its support for a human rights 
commission.  It is not clear if this referred to the inclusion of human rights at the 
European Security Conference itself or more probably to the creation of a group to 
monitor human rights compliance thereafter.  What is certain is that Dobrynin disdained 
any notion of interfering in the Soviet Union’s domestic policies, and Kissinger seemed 
only too happy to oblige: 
D: Have you by chance mention[ed] to your State Department about this 
Human Rights Commission? 
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K: I have talked to [US Ambassador to the Soviet Union Kenneth] Rush.  I 
will have an answer for you within an hour.  He was going to check. 
 
D: Oh, check, yes.  Okay.  Just to know whether he is checking or not on 
stopping all this nonsense.  [italics mine] 
 
K: Right. 
232
 
 
A little over an hour later Kissinger called back: 
 
K: On the Human Rights thing, we cancelled the instructions. 
 
D: They cancelled? 
 
K: Yes. 
 
D: I think this is a very good idea and I will send a telegram to Gromyko 
right away.
233
 
 
Despite Kissinger’s efforts, however, the US government would eventually establish a 
commission to monitor compliance with Helsinki’s human rights provisions.     
In May, diplomats from thirty-three European countries, the United States, and 
Canada commenced negotiations in Geneva, Switzerland for the Conference on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).  By the following year, negotiations had advanced 
sufficiently to consider holding a summit to sign the conference’s concluding 
document.
234
  However, in a conversation with Dobrynin on July 12, 1974, Kissinger 
asked for help on “basket III” – human rights, and downplayed the notion of holding a 
formal summit meeting: 
K: …I want to tell you what we have done on the European Security 
Conference, because I think we have got it in a very positive direction 
now, if you cooperate a little bit on Basket III. 
 
D: Well, do you have any concrete suggestions.?  This is important. 
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K: I think we have broken the back on the Summit idea. 
 
D: Already. 
 
K: I think we are well on the way.  But don’t go around saying this. 
 
D: No.  no, no. 
 
K: No, you won’t, but sometimes your people in the lower regions are not 
as subtle as you are. 
 
D: On this only Gromyko and myself are looking, otherwise he will keep 
this close to his heart.  It is a project he likes very much.
235
 
 
The last thing Dobrynin or Kissinger wanted was to have a summit-level meeting calling 
attention to human rights – an issue they both preferred to handle privately.  In addition, 
Kissinger probably opposed a summit for domestic political reasons.  In May, 1975, as 
the summit approached, he warned Ford that Jackson and others would claim the 
conference was a fraud and a sellout of Eastern Europe.
236
  This would undoubtedly 
agitate Eastern European immigrants, as well as those from the Baltic nations of Latvia, 
Lithuania, and Estonia which could not participate because they had been incorporated 
into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
237
  Ford admitted that a sampling of his mail 
from Eastern European émigrés showed 558 opposed to only 32 in favor of the Helsinki 
Accords.
238
  Nevertheless, when the conference was held Kissinger believed Ford felt 
compelled to attend in order to maintain momentum on détente and avoid returning to a 
state of “Cold War.”239     
 While Ford sought to preserve détente, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn endeavored to 
destroy it.  On June 30, George Meany and the AFL-CIO invited the Soviet exile to speak 
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at a Washington dinner.
240
  Kissinger alleged that Solzhenitsyn had been chosen to speak 
by the staunchly anti-communist Meany in order to provide ammunition to opponents of 
the European Security Conference scheduled for the following month.
241
  Speaking of the 
impending Helsinki Final Act, Solzhenitsyn asked: 
What sort of an agreement would this be?  The proposed agreement is the 
funeral of eastern Europe.  It means that western Europe would finally, 
once and for all, sign away eastern Europe, stating that it is perfectly 
willing to see eastern Europe be crushed and overwhelmed once and for 
all, but please don’t bother us.242 
 
Then a few days later controversy exploded when Ford had an opportunity to meet with 
Solzhenitsyn.  Kissinger, who professed a deep personal admiration for the Soviet writer, 
claimed that the meeting never took place due to a scheduling conflict, but also argued 
that it would have been a mistake for reasons of policy as well.
243
  Ford noted that both 
Kissinger and Deputy National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft had recommended 
against a meeting.
244
  Kissinger’s reasoning was that since White House requests 
contributed to Solzhenitsyn’s recent release, if Ford met with him it could appear as 
gloating, particularly just prior to meeting Brezhnev in Helsinki.
245
  Jackson, The Wall 
Street Journal, The New York Times, and many others vociferously disagreed.
246
  
On July 30 and August 1, 1975, representatives of thirty-five countries met in 
Helsinki to sign the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE).
247
  Also known as the Helsinki Accords, the CSCE’s Final Act was intended to 
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improve East-West relations on multiple levels.  Basket I dealt with security, which for 
the Soviets chiefly meant Western acceptance of the communist regimes established in 
Eastern Europe after the Second World War.  Basket II covered economics, science, 
technology, and the environment.
248
  The most controversial issue – human rights – was 
reserved for basket III.  The act obligated countries to: 
…promote and encourage the effective exercise of civil, political, 
economic, social, cultural and other rights and freedoms all of which 
derive from the inherent dignity of the human person…249 
 
Finally, a fourth basket outlined procedures to follow up on the first three.
250
   
Dobrynin admitted that for the Soviet Union basket III was a mere formality.  He 
claimed that the prime interests of his government were security and trade and that 
Moscow “did all it could to diminish the significance of the third basket, for it still 
believed humanitarian issues to be domestic matters.”251  When Gromyko reported on the 
final document to the Politburo, “they were stunned.”252  Chairman of the Supreme 
Soviet Nikolai Podgorny, Chief Ideologist Mikhail Suslov, Prime Minister Alexei 
Kosygin, and KGB leader Yuri Andropov were among those most opposed to the human 
rights provisions, but Brezhnev clamored for the  prestige he would garner back home 
from signing an international agreement ratifying the post-WWII borders of Europe.
253
  
Gromyko alleviated the Politburo’s fears when he explained, “We are masters in our own 
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house,” suggesting that the Soviet leadership retained the right to determine what 
amounted to interference in internal affairs.
254
   
While basket III caused controversy in the Soviet Union, elsewhere the security 
provisions of basket I provoked outrage.  Brezhnev referred to these provisions as “a 
necessary summing up of the political results of World War II.”255  The Soviet effort to 
legitimize the boundaries of Eastern Europe dated back to the 1950s.
256
  For Moscow, 
permanent boundaries not only signified security, but also the acceptance of communism 
across half a continent.
257
  Nelson called the Helsinki conference “an East-West 
compromise in the best sense of the word.”258  However, David Pryce-Jones charged that 
it had “confirmed the Soviet Union in its invasion and occupation of Eastern and Central 
Europe.”259  He likened it to the 1938 Munich Agreement between Britain and Nazi 
Germany which Hitler violated shortly thereafter, prompting World War II: “In effect, the 
Soviet Union had won that stage of the Cold War, and was poised to move to complete 
supremacy over the remaining European democracies.”260  East Germany’s Erich 
Honecker believed that his nation had finally achieved legitimacy, and therefore any 
reunification with West Germany “could now only be on Soviet terms.”261  Similarly, 
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Poland’s General Wojciech Jaruzelski was convinced that the Communist bloc had never 
been stronger.
262
 
Kissinger viewed Western acknowledgement of the permanency of Europe’s 
borders as a harmless token thrown to the Soviets in order to enhance their sense of 
security.  He argued that the American delegation only conceded that borders could not 
be changed by force, merely echoing the UN Charter.
263
  Not only did this repudiate the 
Brezhnev Doctrine (justifying Soviet military action in order to preserve socialist unity), 
Kissinger believed it helped lead to eventual German reunification in 1990.
264
 
Dissidents behind the Iron Curtain were not as patient as Kissinger.  For them the 
Final Act was much more than a piece of paper.  It signified that human rights had 
become part of international law.
265
  Many viewed it as either a tool for reform in the 
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe or at least a means of escape.
266
  On April 12, 1976, 
eleven Soviet dissidents including Yuri Orlov, Anatoly Sharansky, Ludmilla Alexeeva, 
and Elena Bonner founded a Moscow “Helsinki Watch” group to monitor compliance 
with the accords and report violations.
267
  Orlov explained that although they could not 
directly petition their own government, the Helsinki Final Act would allow them to reach 
the Soviets “’through the governments of other countries.’”268  Additional monitoring 
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groups quickly appeared in nearly all of the communist nations.
269
  In theory at least, the 
means were in place to hold all thirty-five signatories accountable for human rights.
270
 
However, the years following the signing of the Helsinki Accords were marked 
by poor follow-up and compliance.  A provision in the Final Act prohibiting interference 
in a country’s internal affairs proved problematic.271  Furthermore, because the accords 
emboldened dissenters to go public, this led to more intense persecution.
272
  The seventy-
five open members of monitoring groups in Armenia, Georgia, Lithuania, and other 
countries in addition to Russia and Ukraine either ended up in prison, work camps, 
psychiatric hospitals, or exile.
273
  The Moscow Helsinki Watch group was out of business 
by 1982, and other monitoring groups like the Working Commission to Investigate the 
Abuse of Psychiatry for Political Purposes and the Christian Committee to Defend 
Believers Rights in the USSR faced persecution.
274
  In 1983, the Soviet Union left the 
World Psychiatry Association (WPA) prior to a final judgment on its continued 
membership.
275
  The USSR’s expulsion from the WPA was probably imminent because 
the Soviet state had viewed political opponents as mentally ill ever since Lenin.
276
  
Furthermore, Soviet psychiatric hospitals were under the Ministry of the Interior, not 
Health, and were run like prisons by military officers.
277
   
Numerous reports of the United States Commission on Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (US CSCE or US Helsinki Watch) noted that Warsaw Pact countries had not 
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met the human rights standards agreed to at Helsinki.
278
  For example, in 1985 the 
commission reported: 
Ten years after Helsinki, the Helsinki groups that formed in the USSR 
have virtually disbanded, with more than fifty Helsinki monitors presently 
in prison or exile.  In Czechoslovakia, Charter 77 signatories and their 
families continue to be persecuted…The Polish Helsinki Committee that 
flourished openly during the days when Solidarity was legal has been 
forced underground.
 279 
 
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Turkey, the USSR 
and Yugoslavia were listed as the nine worst violators of freedom of speech, the press, 
movement, association, religion, and freedom from political imprisonment and torture.
280
  
The lack of compliance illustrated the great chasm between the American and Soviet 
conceptions of human rights and détente.  Although Kissinger and Dobrynin understood 
this better than anyone else, as the issue became public there was less they could do in the 
backchannel to manage its effects on relaxing tensions.   
 
A Few “Hardship Cases” 
 In addition to the broader topics of Jewish emigration and international human 
rights, Kissinger and Dobrynin handled numerous cases involving individual Soviet and 
American citizens.  Kissinger described “a list of hardship cases” which the White House 
occasionally provided to the Kremlin involving people who had been denied exit visas, 
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separated from their families, or imprisoned – often for political reasons.281  He claimed 
that many of the requests were successful, including 550 out of 800 in 1973.
282
   
For example, on June 6, 1972, Kissinger inquired about a Soviet citizen who was 
married to an American.  The conversation did not emphasize humanitarian interests or 
principles, but simply addressed the case in terms of political pressure and its potential 
effects upon detente: 
K: Now let me raise an issue with you.  It has to do with Shapiro.  We are 
not taking an official position.  We’re being deluged with phone calls from 
senators and Senator Jackson called yesterday and he was going to make a 
public statement and I urged him to keep quiet and I just wanted to express 
the view that if this thing could be diffused.  I don’t know a damn thing 
about it.  I don’t know what the fellow did.  I think he’s the fellow who 
married this American girl. 
 
D: But the question was he was subject to the military draft.  He evaded it 
and then he met this American girl and married.  So… 
 
K: He’s not American.  We can’t get into the Soviet side of it.  It’s merely 
a case where we are under a lot of pressure.  This is not going to be made 
a matter of record and we will never even acknowledge that I have even 
talked to you about it. 
 
D: The difficulty is he evaded the military draft.  Well, I will mention to 
my people about what you mentioned. 
 
K: Just mention really we are under terrific Senatorial pressure and we are 
not making an official reference to it.
283
 
 
While Dobrynin could not guarantee anything, he was willing to take the Shapiro case to 
his superiors because he understood the political pressure Kissinger was facing.  
Likewise, Kissinger acknowledged that this was not an ordinary case of a citizen seeking 
to emigrate.  Shapiro had violated Soviet law, thereby complicating the situation further. 
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 Two months later on August 2, Kissinger returned the favor.  The Chairman of the 
Evangelical Baptist Church of the Soviet Union, Alexi Eychkov, was visiting the United 
States and requested to meet with President Nixon.  When Dobrynin expressed his 
concerns, Kissinger did not hesitate: 
K: …we have a request here that the Chairman of the Evangelical Baptist 
Church of the Soviet Union. 
 
D: What’s his name? 
 
K: Schweitkof (sp.?) 
 
D: He is the Chairman of the Baptist Church? 
 
K: In the Soviet Union.  The General Secretary of the Church, Alexi 
Eychkov and two others want to call on the President.  They are traveling 
in this country and the reason for doing it is because the President attended 
his church in Moscow.  Now this is of course an informal request.  Can 
you give me an… 
 
D: When will it be? 
 
K: I think tomorrow or the day after. 
 
D: Tomorrow.  I don’t think it is in general a good idea.  That’s my 
impression. 
 
K: OK, well I’ll stop it.  It’s easy to stop.  I see no reason to do it to tell 
you the truth. 
 
D: Yeh, I think it is not a good idea. 
 
K: No, we just won’t do it.284 
 
What did Eychkov want to say to the President?  Was it simply a friendly visit or did he 
seek to lodge a complaint against the Soviet government – perhaps relating to the denial 
of exit visas to Soviet Jews or about the issue of religious freedom in the Soviet Union?  
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Whatever the reason may have been, Dobrynin was opposed to it and that was all that 
mattered to Kissinger. 
A much more prominent case involved a Lithuanian sailor named Simas Kudirka.  
In November, 1970, Kudirka attempted to defect from the Soviet Union by boarding a US 
Coast Guard vessel off of Massachusetts.
285
  Although he sought asylum, the American 
crew permitted Soviet sailors to forcibly retrieve the would-be defector.
286
  The 
Lithuanian was then promptly placed in prison where he had remained for four years.   
The United States government later discovered that Kudirka’s mother had been 
born in the United States, suggesting the possibility of American citizenship.  On August 
14, 1974, President Ford met with Kissinger and Dobrynin in the Oval Office.
287
  Calling 
it “a personal favor,” Ford requested that the Soviets release Kudirka.288  Dobrynin said 
he would pass it along to his government.
289
  Over the next two weeks Ford and 
Brezhnev negotiated Kudirka’s release and later his emigration to the United States.290  
On August 29, Kissinger thanked his counterpart for his assistance: 
K: I called you because of the Kidirka [sic] case.  We have been informed 
that he [has] been released and the President [wanted] to express his 
appreciation but he didn’t know how to do it. - - in a way that wouldn’t be 
difficult for you. 
 
D: No, no.  Let me make it - - I will give you tomorrow something and we 
can discuss this then.  No appreciation is necessary.  We will talk 
tomorrow about it.  I am expecting a message from Brezhnev. 
 
K: I will tell you what he [Ford] said….they should not make a big fuss 
over it but he wants them to know this was a result of peaceful 
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relations…and this is an example of what can be done without pressure 
but in a ….relationship. 
 
D: I understand.  I understand. 
 
K: He is going to tell some people on the Hill about this…291 
 
Once again, quiet diplomacy had come through, and the White House would make sure 
Congress knew it. 
 The Soviets often denied exit visas for security reasons.  These claims could seem 
arbitrary and certainly aroused suspicions in the US, but Moscow’s concerns about a 
Russian woman married to an American professor may have been quite genuine.  
Dobrynin’s candid statements from January 21, 1975, suggested that the woman may 
have been involved with Soviet agents: 
K: There is a professor [name expunged] 
 
D: A difficult case. 
 
K: It is.  Can you tell me personally what the problem is.  He is married to 
a Russian… 
 
D: Yes.  This is the problem.  Only yesterday I received some information 
on this and it is a difficult case.  The [girl] is involved in a certain kind of 
thing dealing with our security.  Don’t mention this please. 
 
K: No, but it will affect my action on this.  He [the American professor] 
has been decent in the manner in which he is pushing it. 
 
D: I know.  There was some White House-State Department influence. 
 
K: I have stayed out of it up to now. 
 
D: One of your assistants mentioned it to me and I checked it with 
Moscow two weeks ago: Just yesterday I received a telegram. 
 
K: I don’t know the [situation?] at all. 
 
                                               
291 Kissinger Transcripts.  U.S. Department of State.   
149 
 
D: It is nothing for herself as such but she was involved in - - nothing 
specifically about her and I know nothing really.  But this is why I am 
prepared to give you an immediate answer.  Only yesterday I received 
information telling me it is a difficult case.  [The Kremlin?] did note your 
views - - in any case they know about the State Department views.  I am 
being honest with you by telling you I received this information just 
yesterday. 
 
K: You know the problems on humanity grounds.  It is a deserving case.  I 
don’t know the security situation. 
 
D: It is in Moscow.  She worked with some of our agenst [sic] - - I should 
not say this. 
 
K: I understand. 
 
D: That is why they don’t want to let her go.  This is very personal 
information I am giving to you.  She is not a professor really and she is not 
a brilliant girl at all but she knows something because of the character of 
her record.  While in Moscow I will mention it again to Gromyko.
292
 
 
Even in a case such as this where Dobrynin doubted that his government would be able to 
grant Kissinger’s request, he felt confident enough about the interpersonal relationship to 
disclose classified information, perhaps even against his better judgment.    
Finally, when an American received a death sentence in Angola, a Soviet ally, 
Kissinger did not hesitate to call Dobrynin among others.  Although the United States 
supported a rival faction during the Angolan Civil War and had not recognized the new 
Marxist regime, on June 29, 1976, Kissinger inquired if Dobrynin could intervene: 
K: …Now Anatol, I am calling you about this death sentence to the 
American in Angola.  I know it isn’t a question of the Soviet Union having 
anything to do with it directly, but we would appreciate it very much since 
we have no diplomatic relations [with Angola] if our concern could be 
conveyed to the Angolan government or if you could use your influence 
on a personal basis.  I think you know what will happen here if this is 
carried out… 
 
D: How many Americans - - one or two? 
 
                                               
292 Ibid. 
150 
 
K: One… 
 
Then later… 
 
D: Well I will send a telegram that you mentioned it… 
 
K: That is right. 
 
D: No specific obligations, but at the same time human concern. 
 
K: O.K. Anatol, thank you very much.
293
 
 
Although Kissinger claimed that he was acting for humanitarian reasons, he also 
intimated that if the American was executed by a Soviet ally, it would further turn 
Congressional and public opinion against détente. 
The telephone transcripts showed that Kissinger and Dobrynin understood the 
domestic political pressure each faced as human rights became an increasingly salient 
issue in US-Soviet relations.  The transcripts also revealed that for the Soviets human 
rights was a domestic affair and therefore out-of-bounds in international diplomacy.  As 
Dobrynin put it in one telephone conversation with Kissinger regarding the European 
Security Conference, the inclusion of human rights was “nonsense.”  This sentiment was 
further demonstrated by the fact that whenever Moscow was accused of transgressing 
human rights norms, its response was not to charge Washington with hypocrisy and cite 
discrimination against African-Americans, women, or the poor in the United States.  
Rather, the Kremlin’s typical answer amounted to: “It’s none of your damn business.”  
 In the short run, the injection of human rights into détente hurt many of the people 
it was meant to protect and strained US-Soviet relations.  Jewish emigration slowed to a 
trickle after Jackson-Vanik.  The Helsinki Accords emboldened many dissidents, but 
brought increased repression as a result.  However, such measures helped to establish a 
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legal and institutional basis for human rights advocates in the East and West to mount a 
successful defense of individual freedoms.  An argument could be made that this not only 
had a positive effect for the state of human rights, but also contributed to delegitimizing 
totalitarian regimes in the Soviet Union and eastern bloc and helped lead to the end of the 
Cold War.  Although Kissinger and Dobrynin had success with their private approach 
while engaging in detente, in the long run publicly standing on principle was the right 
thing to do for reasons of both humanity and policy. 
 
152 
 
CHAPTER 3 
 
Foreign Interventions: Preserving Stability or National Liberation? 
 
“…I believe détente mitigated the succession of crises that differences in ideology and 
geopolitical interest had made nearly inevitable; and I believe we enhanced the national 
interest in the process.” 
-Henry Kissinger
1
 
 
“…the crisis [the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War] demonstrated that tension could be 
localized and prevented from disrupting relations between Washington and Moscow.  
This was the first serious international conflict under the conditions of détente, which was 
strongly affected by it.”  
-Anatoly Dobrynin
2
 
 
During the Cold War the United States and the Soviet Union never fought each 
other directly on the battlefield.  However, they did battle indirectly via proxies in Asia, 
Africa, and Latin America, with the international competition reaching a crescendo in the 
1970s.  These interventions included massive arms sales around the world totaling 
billions of dollars.
3
  When considered alongside cases of direct involvement by one or the 
other superpower as with the Americans in Vietnam or the Soviets in Afghanistan, the 
global extent of the ideological struggle at times resembled a kind of world war.  British 
historian Paul Johnson likened the period to that just preceding World War II: “The 
extension of the Cold War, during the Seventies, to virtually every part of the globe, gave 
the decade the air of chronic insecurity so characteristic of the Thirties – the same 
syndrome of unemployment, economic decay, armaments and aggression.”4  However, 
the deterrent effects of the atomic age prevented a head-to-head hot war which could 
have escalated into nuclear Armageddon. 
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 Although the Cold War never turned hot, the conflicting views of relaxing 
tensions nevertheless extended into the military sphere.  The Americans had an all-
encompassing conception of détente and objected when the Soviets intervened in the 
national liberation movements of former European colonies in the developing world.  The 
US viewed these as destabilizing and not in the spirit of relaxing tensions.  However, the 
Soviets saw no contradiction between conducting razryadka with the Americans while 
also assisting young nations in their efforts to achieve true political and economic 
independence from the West.  For the USSR, one had nothing to do with the other. 
In this chapter I will argue that foreign interventions posed the gravest challenge 
to détente and the Kissinger-Dobrynin relationship.  Due to the possibility of direct 
conflict and even war, conversations dealing with the US-Soviet global competition 
dominated the telephone transcripts.  The transcripts showed that even during détente, 
Moscow’s actions and Washington’s reactions were often driven by ideology.  
The chapter is divided into four sections.  First, I will examine the contrasting 
views of scholars regarding whether Cold War foreign interventions represented a 
traditional great power struggle driven by security and economic interests, or an 
ideological conflict between two nations with irreconcilable philosophies.  Then I will 
provide excerpts of telephone conversation transcripts as Kissinger and Dobrynin worked 
to end the Vietnam conflict, were pushed to the nuclear brink during the October, 1973 
Arab-Israeli War, and attempted to save détente and SALT II during the Angolan Civil 
War of 1975-1976. 
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Foreign Interventions and Détente 
 Initially the scholarship on foreign interventions and détente was mixed.  To some 
observers, the US-Soviet competition in the developing world was just another example 
of the great power rivalries which have punctuated world history.  After all, nations and 
empires have always battled in defense of their security and economic interests.  To 
others, foreign interventions during the Cold War represented something else as well – an 
ideological competition.  That is, in some sense both the Soviets and the Americans were 
nations on a mission to promote their respective belief systems.  As archival documents 
have become more readily available since the end of the Cold War, the second view 
appears to have taken hold and formed a consensus amongst scholars. 
 
A Traditional Great Power Rivalry? 
Ever since Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels wrote that communists “openly 
declare that their ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social 
conditions…they have a world to win,” 5 there had been some who feared a radical 
communist conspiracy to take over the globe.  Adding to these concerns was the phrase 
“world revolution” which appeared frequently in the writings and speeches of various 
Soviet leaders over the years.   
 
However, George F. Kennan, considered the father of containment, wrote in 1977 
that such language simply functioned as part of “the millennial hope” of a “secular 
religion” he called “Russian communism.”6  The security of the Russian state and the 
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survival of the regime were the paramount concerns for Moscow, asserted Kennan.
7
  
Nevertheless, he added that China’s badgering about “betraying true Communist 
principles” occasionally drove the Soviet Union to make provocative declarations and 
take international actions in order to re-establish its revolutionary Marxist credentials.
8
 
In 1980 Henry Bienen argued that for the Americans the decision to intervene in 
the developing world was based upon whether a policymaker viewed a conflict from a 
globalist or a regionalist perspective.  Bienen explained that globalists focused upon 
“behaviors, motivations, and threats of the Soviet Union or other large powers.”9  They 
tended to emphasize security concerns over economic interests.
10
  Meanwhile, 
regionalists sought to understand a local conflict apart from a Cold War or global context, 
and then determine if US interests were at stake.
11
  In their view, American economic 
influence in terms of trade, foreign aid, and corporate investment was so great that it 
could withstand local political changes.
12
 
Several scholars in the mid-1980s also claimed that security concerns led to 
conflicts between the United States and the Soviet Union in the developing world.  R.P. 
Barston explained that one of Brezhnev’s most pressing goals was solidifying the post-
war boundaries of Eastern Europe, particularly the German Democratic Republic (East 
Germany).
13
  In addition, a continuing deep fear of and antipathy towards the People’s 
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Republic of China drove Soviet efforts to form alliances for its safety and protection.
14
  
Meanwhile, Gelman described the Politburo as “determined to ensure the ‘irreversibility’ 
of its authority,” by maintaining stability “inside the Soviet Union, in Eastern Europe, 
and also in such areas, particularly those adjacent to the USSR, as history and the balance 
of forces may from time to time reveal.”15  Nevertheless, both Barston and Gelman 
conceded that ideology played a role in Soviet foreign policy as well.  Barston wrote that 
finding and exploiting opportunities to continue the class struggle and achieve victories 
for socialism remained an objective at a “formal and operational level.”16  Similarly, 
Gelman said that the Soviets sought American acknowledgment of Moscow’s right “to 
make incremental use of emerging opportunities and capabilities in order to become a 
fully global actor.” 17  
In a similar vein, S. Neil MacFarlane blamed US-Soviet geopolitical conflicts on 
differing conceptions of regional security.
18
  According to MacFarlane, the views of each 
superpower in this regard were “incompatible,” and led to competition in Asia, Africa, 
and Latin America.
19
  He asserted that US foreign policy towards developing nations 
emphasized stability, non-violent reform through “existing political institutions” or 
“orderly constitutional renovation,” and a belief that where instability existed, it was 
caused by external (usually communist) forces and not internal conditions.
20
  In contrast, 
MacFarlane claimed that the Soviet Union viewed instability in under-developed 
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countries as “unavoidable and, in general, desirable,” in order to achieve national 
liberation.
21
   
More recently, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro argued that Cold War foreign interventions 
were nothing new.  He noted that world powers had always undertaken “risky diplomatic 
and military interventions in the periphery,” which he defined as “regions that do not 
directly threaten the security of a great power’s homeland.”22  The reason was “leaders’ 
aversion to losses in their state’s relative power, international status, or prestige.”23  
Furthermore, the fear of such losses was so great that many countries stayed the course 
“even when they incur[red] mounting political, economic, and military costs.”24  The 
American expansion of the Vietnam War into Cambodia and Laos in 1970-1971 to gain 
leverage on North Vietnam, as well as the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to install 
a friendly regime there were two prime examples.
25
   
 
An Ideological Competition? 
Other scholars argued that superpower foreign interventions in the developing 
world were more than mere efforts to protect security and economic interests.  They 
claimed that Marxist-Leninist ideology played a crucial role in Soviet actions.  Observers 
disagreed as to whether the ideological concept of “wars of liberation” started with Lenin, 
Khrushchev, or Brezhnev.  Meanwhile, some suggested that both the United States and 
the Soviet Union were motivated by ideology to become involved in the “Third World.”   
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Writing in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, author, historian, and 
former army lieutenant colonel F. Charles Parker claimed that the nations of the “Third 
World” remained part of a Soviet strategy “fundamentally unchanged since 1920.”26  
Furthermore, Parker argued that the Soviet Union had consistently sought “to create 
tensions and divisions in the non-Communist world, including both the advanced 
capitalist nations and the backward areas of the Third World, in order to achieve strategic 
gains for the Soviet state,” and “Soviet domination of the world.”27  According to this 
line of reasoning, when Vladimir Lenin (r. 1917-1924) realized that the instability 
brought on by World War I had dissipated and his predicted workers’ revolutions in the 
West were not imminent, he proclaimed at the Second Congress of the Communist 
International in July, 1920, that Soviet foreign policy should seek to exploit differences 
among non-communist nations.
28
  By depriving Europe and America of colonies in the 
developing world, the Soviets would ensure that the capitalists had less material wealth 
with which to “bribe” workers into accepting the class-based status quo.29  According to 
Parker, every Soviet leader since the revolution claimed to be both a Leninist and a 
supporter of the same foreign policy objectives.
30
   
More recently, Volkogonov asserted that what became known as the Brezhnev 
Doctrine in the West actually had a much older pedigree and was in fact “Leninist-
Stalinist-Cominternist in origin.”31  He called the 1968 Soviet intervention in 
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Czechoslovakia “a warning to other satellites that their sovereignty was secondary to 
their ‘international duty’” as part of the global socialist movement.32  Volkogonov 
implied that similar reasoning led to the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan.
33
   
Ulam argued that although there had been “precedents” under Lenin, the 
ideological concept of “’wars of liberation’” from capitalist domination actually emerged 
under Nikita Khrushchev (r. 1953-1964).
34
  Tompson agreed, stating that as long as a 
newly independent nation was anti-imperialist in its orientation, Khrushchev offered his 
support and thereby pre-empted indigenous communist parties.
35
  According to 
Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, Khrushchev became convinced by the decline 
of European colonial empires after World War II “to revive the Leninist dream” of world 
socialism.
36
  Furthermore, he believed that the Soviet success with rapid industrialization 
in the 1930s could be replicated in former colonies across the globe.
37
 
Several scholars traced Soviet involvement in the developing world to the era of 
Leonid Brezhnev (r. 1964-1982).  Garthoff wrote, “Detente and peaceful coexistence 
with the United States did not…mean any lessening of the global ‘class struggle’ or of 
Soviet support for progressive historical change.”38  He noted that Moscow made this 
point at the Twenty-fourth Party Congress in 1971 when presenting its conception of 
detente.
39
  The Soviet leadership voiced similar sentiments at summit meetings with the 
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US in 1972 and 1973.
40
  Meanwhile, Daniels claimed that under Brezhnev there was “a 
vigorous political offensive,” as Moscow sought to draw “one developing country after 
another away from dependence on the capitalists and making them allies of the socialist 
camp.”41  Although he believed that the strategy was “probably more opportunistic than 
premeditated,” it nevertheless resulted in “America’s reversion to the worst Cold War 
fears.”42  Likewise, Pryce-Jones argued that in Asia “’proletarian dictatorships’” emerged 
in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.
43
  In Africa, “a historical process of gaining 
independence from the colonial powers was reversed,” and the Congo, Benin, Ethiopia, 
Mozambique, and Angola became “Soviet clients.”44  Finally, Central America became 
“destabilized” after the Soviet-supported Sandinistas took control of Nicaragua.45  He 
added that while other empires made “profit-and-loss calculations” leading to 
decolonization, communism renewed the imperial drive through its fundamental doctrine 
of “’world revolution.’”46   
Zubok claimed that “the majority of the post-Khrushchev leadership shared the 
ideological (revolutionary) component of the international paradigm.”47  However, he 
suggested that rather than being pure ideologues, the détente-era generation of Soviet 
leaders were “prisoners of ideology,” who knew of no other way and therefore were 
unable to change course.
48
  Leffler was blunter.  He argued that Brezhnev “killed détente 
with the United States, the policy he had helped to launch a decade before,” by invading 
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Afghanistan in 1979.
49
  He added that Brezhnev “shamelessly defended Soviet actions” 
and claimed that Moscow was merely “answering the request of the Afghan government” 
for protection.
50
   
Georgi I. Mirski, a chief research fellow at the Institute of World Economy and 
International Relations in Moscow, Russian Academy of Sciences, argued that détente 
ended “mainly, although not exclusively, because of developments in the third world.”51  
Wanting to assert their role as the leader of international communism, the Soviets felt 
compelled to assist national liberation movements before the Chinese took action.
52
  
Furthermore, with nuclear parity and the division of Europe into eastern and western 
halves, the US-Soviet competition was at a relative standstill.
53
  The nations of Asia, 
Africa, and Latin America represented the only remaining potential battlefields.  
Consequently, Mirski concluded: “It was in the shifting sands of the third world, a 
battlefield of maneuver warfare, that new and unforeseen collisions between the 
superpowers could be expected, and they did not take long to materialize.”54 
Other scholars argued that both superpowers took actions in the developing world 
for ideological reasons.  Edward J. Brennan, Ireland’s ambassador to Moscow from 
1974-1980, stated that the United States and the Soviet Union were “by history and 
national character…prone to ideology in the conduct of their foreign relations.”55  For 
example, Thomas Jefferson believed that the United States would serve as a “’standing 
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monument and example for the aim and emulation by the rest of the world.’”56  Brennan 
also pointed to the ideological tenor of American foreign policy under President Ronald 
Reagan, who in a 1982 address before the British Parliament launched a “’crusade for 
freedom’” which would “’leave Marxism-Leninism on the ash-heap of history.’”57  
Likewise, Brennan claimed that two ideological principles drove Soviet foreign policy, 
specifically proletarian internationalism and peaceful coexistence of states with different 
social systems.
58
  The first referred to “the historic mission of the working class to 
establish socialism on a world scale,” while the second applied exclusively to relations 
between states, with the international class struggle continuing.
59
   
Similarly, Nelson claimed that “neither party to détente had promised to stop 
‘assisting’ history or trying to head off what it considered to be unnatural developments 
in the Third World.”60  He suggested that during the 1970s decolonization spread to 
nations which were utterly unprepared for it, causing many countries to be thrown “into 
anarchic independence.”61  Nelson argued that the Soviet Union simply took advantage 
and “project[ed] itself into other countries’ business” just as the US had often done.62   
According to some, the Soviets and Americans felt compelled by domestic 
politics to spread their respective ideologies.  James G. Richter argued that the 
superpowers “relied heavily on universalistic ideas to create a national identity.”63  He 
asserted that they “justified their foreign policies not only as a means to protect the 
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national interest but also to protect and even propagate the way of life (whether Soviet-
style socialism or liberal democracy) these ideas would prescribe.”64  These ideas or 
“myths” became part of each country’s domestic politics and were “difficult to dislodge,” 
he added.
65
  Likewise, Odd Arne Westad wrote that Washington and Moscow “were 
driven to intervene in the Third World by the ideologies inherent in their politics.”66  
Furthermore, Westad explained that the United States and the Soviet Union “needed to 
change the world in order to prove the universal applicability of their ideologies.”67 
Finally, Gaddis asserted that “ideology often determined [italics in original] the 
behavior of Marxist-Leninist regimes: it was not simply a justification for actions already 
decided upon.”68  Consequently, the United States had to choose between upholding its 
own ideological principles – including the right to self-determination – and preserving its 
economic and security interests.
69
  In no case was this paradox more evident than with the 
American intervention in Vietnam – something Gaddis called “the single greatest error 
the United States made in fighting the Cold War.”70 
 
Vietnam 
The roots of the Vietnam War lay in the global movement towards colonial 
independence after World War II.  In September, 1945, Ho Chi Minh declared 
Vietnamese independence from France, even quoting from the American Declaration of 
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Independence.
71
  Ho had worked with the American Office of Strategic Services – 
predecessor to the Central Intelligence Agency – during the war.  However, on February 
14, 1950, he met in Moscow with Mao Zedong and Joseph Stalin to request assistance in 
expelling the French.
72
  Stalin may have preferred to avoid providing direct assistance so 
as to not hurt the electoral chances of the French communists in Paris, and instead 
directed Mao to aid Ho’s forces in Southeast Asia.73  That year Beijing recognized the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam and began sending supplies.
74
  Mao later sent advisers 
to create Chinese-style reeducation camps as well.
75
  Ho also adopted Mao’s tactics of 
terror including executions of land owners, intellectuals, and other “class enemies.”76 
As the French attempted to maintain their empire, they sought support first from 
the British and then the Americans.
77
  Nevertheless, France was defeated in 1954 at Dien 
Bien Phu with Indochina being divided into the three states of Vietnam, Laos, and 
Cambodia.
78
  Vietnam itself was split into a communist north and a non-communist south 
along the seventeenth parallel.
79
   
Depending on one’s point of view, the US began supporting South Vietnam as 
either a bulwark against communism or in order to establish a “satellite regime”80 in the 
                                               
71
 John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War – A New History (New York: The Penguin Press, 2005), 58. 
72 Michael Lind, Vietnam – The Necessary War (New York: The Free Press, 1999), 1, 3. 
73
 Ibid., 8. 
74
 James M. Morris, America’s Armed Forces – A History (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 
1991), 335. 
75
 Jean-Louis Margolin, “Vietnam and Laos: The Impasse of War Communism,” trans. Jonathan Murphy 
and Mark Kramer in The Black Book of Communism, ed. Stephane Courtois, et al. (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1999), 568. 
76 Lind, 10, 11. 
77 Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes – A History of the World, 1914-1991 (New York: Pantheon 
Books, 1994), 217. 
78 Thomas C. Reed, At the Abyss – An Insider’s History of the Cold War (New York: Ballantine Books, 
2004), 144. 
79 Lind, 10. 
80 Hobsbawm, 217. 
165 
 
region.  Many Americans saw communism as an aggressive force opposed to democracy, 
human rights, and free markets, with the last of these being particularly concerning for 
the US as it worked to rebuild Japan after World War II.
81
  Furthermore, America’s 
economically devastated British allies needed access to rubber and tin from their nearby 
Malayan colony.
82
  If communism triumphed in Vietnam, many feared that other 
Southeast Asian countries would fall into line “like dominoes,” thus threatening US and 
Western interests.  It was this “domino theory” which resulted in American military 
involvement, particularly after 1965.  Years of fighting abroad and turmoil at home 
ensued for the United States.  When the Americans finally left in 1973, they had dropped 
a greater amount of high explosives in Vietnam than during the Second World War.
83
 
In the North, things were more complicated.  After Stalin’s death in 1953, 
ideological differences drove the Soviet Union and China apart.  According to Arbatov, 
one of these dealt with Chinese accusations of “betraying the revolutionary cause and the 
liberation movements.”84  Then in October, 1964, Beijing exploded its first nuclear 
weapon and Khrushchev was overthrown.
85
  From 1965-68 Hanoi received hundreds of 
thousands of troops from Beijing and thousands of military advisors from Moscow.
86
 
Washington’s intervention in the South may have “forced the Politburo’s hand,”87 but 
China’s increasing influence in the region was another reason why the Soviets became 
involved.
88
   Eventually Moscow’s military buildup allowed them to assume primary 
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responsibility while Beijing withdrew after realizing that it had created a strong, pro-
Soviet ally on its own border.
89
   
 
Prior to the Vietnam War there had been a bi-partisan consensus, both in 
Washington and amongst the American electorate, supporting the Cold War doctrine of 
                                               
89 Lind, 29. 
167 
 
containment.  Many Americans believed that halting the spread of communism around 
the world was the proper role for the United States.  However, as early as 1966 Senator J. 
William Fulbright held several hearings of the Foreign Relations Committee debating the 
value of President Lyndon Johnson’s policies in Vietnam and even containment itself.90  
Then in January, 1968, “the Vietcong’s Tet Offensive exploded in living rooms across 
America.”91  Although the guerilla attack resulted in a communist defeat, the American 
military and people were completely caught off guard and disillusion set in.  By 1974 a 
study reported that public concern in the US over war, communism, the strength of the 
military, and the Soviet Union had dropped significantly over the previous ten years.
92
   
Many intellectuals who had formerly supported containment grew skeptical of the 
policy as well.  Theologian Reinhold Niebuhr, historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., and 
economist John Kenneth Galbraith cited rifts between the Soviet Union and China as well 
as the different agendas of individual communist states as evidence that communism as 
an international conspiracy no longer existed.
93
  Therefore, what sense did it make to 
have one uniform approach everywhere?
94
  While others, including Norman Podhoretz of 
Commentary and William F. Buckley, Jr. of National Review, may have believed that 
America’s exit from Vietnam demonstrated a loss of confidence in its role as leader of 
the free world, others argued that the US should never have aspired to play such a part in 
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the first place.
 95
  Due to the length of the conflict, its location on the other side of the 
globe, as well as the enormous cost in blood and treasure, Americans became divided 
over whether all of the sacrifice had been worth it.
96
   
Thus with the advent of the Nixon Administration the stated goal in Vietnam was 
to attain “peace with honor.”  This referred to an American withdrawal, but not before 
conditions had been achieved that would provide the South Vietnamese with at least a 
chance to survive alongside their communist rivals to the North.  Nixon and Kissinger 
believed that a poorly maneuvered exit would damage American credibility and hamper 
the maintenance of international stability.
97
  Thus they sought to exploit the Soviet-
Chinese rivalry through “triangular diplomacy,” (balancing the interests of China, the 
Soviet Union, and the United States
98
) while also understanding that neither Moscow nor 
Beijing directly controlled Hanoi.
99
  Nixon and Kissinger linked progress in Vietnam to 
areas of Soviet interest, including arms control and trade. According to Kissinger, his first 
overture to Hanoi occurred before Nixon had even been inaugurated.
100
  However, the 
North Vietnamese demanded an unconditional American withdrawal as well as the 
toppling of South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu’s government in Saigon 
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before they would release American prisoners of war.
101
  For the Nixon White House, 
complete capitulation to an enemy and abandonment of an ally would certainly not have 
qualified as “peace with honor.”  Hence, in 1969 Kissinger and North Vietnamese 
Politburo member Le Duc Tho began private peace talks in Paris.
102
  These were in 
addition to the official talks at Paris’s Hotel Majestic, which included South Vietnam and 
the Vietcong.
103
  
Meanwhile in the backchannel, Kissinger sought Dobrynin’s help in getting North 
Vietnam to come to an agreement.  Kissinger said that Dobrynin frequently downplayed 
Moscow’s influence on Hanoi.104 This may have reflected Soviet fears that applying too 
much pressure on the North Vietnamese would drive them towards China, the Soviet 
Union’s rival for the title of “leader” of the communist nations.105  Moscow may have 
also been concerned that Hanoi would resent being asked to make concessions for the 
sake of US-Soviet détente.
106
  Along with North Vietnam’s insistence on an end to 
Thieu’s regime, this could explain why negotiations dragged on for several years.107   
According to Nixon, in early 1972 his administration received intelligence that 
large amounts of Soviet arms were pouring into North Vietnam.
108
  Moscow may have 
been attempting to reassert its influence with Hanoi to spite Beijing after Nixon’s visit 
there in February.
109
 Then on March 30, 1972, North Vietnam initiated a full-scale 
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invasion of the South.
110
  South Vietnamese communist guerillas known as the Vietcong 
were joined by 120,000 troops of the North Vietnamese regular army equipped with 
Soviet tanks and artillery.
111
  With the arrival of troops from Hanoi which were backed 
by Moscow, Kissinger argued that the notion of the Vietnam War as simply a popular 
uprising of guerillas in the South had been destroyed.
112
  Despite a scheduled visit with 
Brezhnev later that month, on May 8 Nixon announced “Linebacker I,” the bombing of 
North Vietnam and mining of Haiphong Harbor.  The purpose was to halt further delivery 
via rail or ship of military supplies from Moscow.
113
  The first American-Soviet summit 
since 1961 was in great jeopardy.
114
   
According to Dobrynin, the Politburo was divided over how to proceed.  Defense 
Minister Marshall Andrei Grechko wanted the meeting cancelled, Foreign Minister 
Andrei Gromyko desired to press forward, and Chief Party Ideologist Mikhail Suslov 
remained undecided.
115
  Arbatov claimed that KGB Chief Yuri Andropov told him 
privately that there had been great pressure on Brezhnev to punish Nixon by 
cancelling.
116
  Some Politburo members were convinced that if the Soviets went ahead 
with the summit, “we would be politically humiliated and would lose our authority in the 
eyes of the world, particularly the Communist world, and with liberation movements,” 
wrote Arbatov.
117
  He believed that in the end Moscow forged ahead because it did not 
want to disrupt several pending agreements with the Federal Republic of (West) 
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Germany, an American ally.
118
  However, Dobrynin claimed that Moscow chose to hold 
the summit because “the alternative would amount to handing Hanoi a veto over our 
relations with America.”119   
The Chinese-Russian rivalry must be factored in as well.  Nixon’s visit to Beijing 
in February may have intensified Soviet fears of a Chinese-American alliance.
120
  Thus 
Moscow, desiring a top-level meeting of its own more than ever, may have been more 
inclined to look the other way on American military activities in Vietnam.
121
   
Kissinger and Dobrynin probably also deserved some credit for the summit 
proceeding as scheduled.  Both well understood the complexity of conducting 
superpower diplomacy while simultaneously supporting one’s allies.  Just prior to 
Nixon’s bombing announcement, Kissinger asked to see Dobrynin.122  (Dobrynin noted 
that whenever Kissinger asked to see him before Nixon was going to make a speech he 
knew bad news was coming!
123
)  Upon hearing of Nixon’s plans the Soviet ambassador 
was clearly disappointed.
124
  Two days later when Dobrynin arrived at the Map Room of 
the White House, Kissinger held his breath out of fear that Moscow might cancel the 
summit.
125
  Instead, Dobrynin merely read a note from his government registering what 
Nixon called “a relatively mild and private protest,” with no mention of cancelling.126  
The next day over lunch Dobrynin told Kissinger, “You have handled a difficult situation 
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uncommonly well.”127  He also credited Kissinger with understanding how difficult it 
was for the Soviets to proceed while their allies were being bombed by the Americans.
128
 
 Following the successful summit in May, on June 30th Kissinger spoke to 
Dobrynin from California to explain that Hanoi was attempting to gain leverage by 
injecting American domestic politics into the peace process: 
K: Okay.  Two things - - One, about the Vietnam talks.  I wanted to say 
one thing about your friends there. 
 
D: Where? 
 
K:  Hanoi.  And I must say it very seriously to your leadership.  One is 
they’re already starting again what we told you at great length we would 
never tolerate. 
 
D: What namely? 
 
K: Well, now they’ve made a statement today saying they have forced us 
back to the conference table. 
 
D: Henry, you know I mentioned to you the other day when we went over 
this, some kind of statement they will do it.  They didn’t specifically tell 
us what kind of statement. 
 
K: Now they’ve invited Joe Kraft and some Labor leaders to Hanoi. 
 
D: Joe Kraft? 
 
K: Yeah.  And you know what the purpose of this is. 
 
D: No. 
 
K: You know, they are going to float whatever proposals they’re going to 
make publicly before they speak with us. 
 
Then later… 
 
K: If they play domestic politics here, we will do what we did in May.  We 
will break off and escalate because we have nothing to lose that way.  
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Then we will have to try to force them to their knees…I mean, I am telling 
you frankly.  This is not to be transmitted in quite this brutal language. 
 
D: Yeah, I understand.  Well, the only thing we should really put in the 
promise is what you said in the middle.  I mean, if they are really going to 
tell everything to all the people who come to them having nothing to do 
with the Administration and just give out publicly, then there is no sense 
to negotiate.  …Yeah, this I am prepared to ask on your behalf of my 
people in Moscow to tender to Hanoi.  This I could do.
129
 
 
Kissinger believed that Hanoi was not negotiating honestly.  If this continued, he 
threatened that the US might intensify its aerial strikes.  Dobrynin said that he understood 
and would relay the message to Moscow, but also politely explained that he would omit 
the part where Kissinger pledged to “force them to their knees.”130 
 On July 6 Kissinger again phoned Dobrynin from the West coast.  Hanoi had 
extended an invitation to yet another American from outside of the administration – 
Labor leader James Hoffa.
131
  “…sometimes Hanoi is beyond my comprehension,” said 
Kissinger, adding “…it isn’t even dangerous to us except that it’s awfully hard to see how 
they can be serious if they keep doing idiotic things like this.”132  “No, I understand this, 
but sometimes in their own way of thinking this is very difficult to…Do you 
understand?” asked Dobrynin.133  “Yeh, well, it’s not a major thing,” said Kissinger, who 
later expressed a greater concern: 
K: …Look, we’re not going to bring a new negotiator in now – they’re 
stuck with me.  Because I’m afraid if I let them get away with it you’ll ask 
me for a new negotiator. 
 
D: I don’t want a new negotiator except for you. 
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K: OK.  Thank you.
134
 
 
Although Kissinger had previously stated that the White House would “break off and 
escalate,”135 in response to Hanoi’s latest tactics, now he said “it’s not a major thing.”136 
Dobrynin, who often seemed to have a calming effect on the more animated Kissinger, 
had successfully made the case that this was just the way the North Vietnamese 
negotiated.  By this time, Kissinger seemed much more concerned that negotiations 
between him and Dobrynin would continue as before. 
 As the presidential campaign of 1972 played out through the summer and into the 
fall, Nixon looked to be in an excellent position for re-election.  The bombing and mining 
campaign in North Vietnam as well as triangular diplomacy appeared to be paying off.  
The last American combat troops were withdrawn from the North on August 12 as part of 
Nixon’s Vietnamization policy (reducing the American role while increasing that of the 
South Vietnamese).
137
  Later that month, Nhan Dan, a publication of the North 
Vietnamese Communist party, complained about the effects of the bombing while 
expressing frustration that Moscow and Beijing had abandoned the proletarian cause in 
favor of pursing détente with Washington.
138
 
Consequently, the White House had leverage in its talks with North Vietnam.  In 
early October, Kissinger and Le Duc Tho reached a tentative settlement around four 
agreements: a ceasefire, a return of prisoners-of-war, a total American withdrawal from 
South Vietnam, and the creation of a National Council of Concord and Reconciliation.
139
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The membership of the council would be drawn in three equal parts from the existing 
South Vietnamese government, communists, and neutrals, with the assigned task of 
setting up elections.
140
  Remarkably, Hanoi had dropped their long-standing demand for 
an end to Thieu’s government in Saigon.141  Although there were several remaining 
issues, perhaps the most difficult problem would be getting Thieu to accept an agreement 
which gave the communists a political role and permitted more than 150,000 North 
Vietnamese troops to remain in the South.
142
 
 On the morning of October 15 Kissinger explained to Dobrynin that the White 
House viewed the presence of these North Vietnamese regular army units in the South, as 
well as the flow of Soviet arms to them, as the main obstacles to getting South Vietnam 
to settle.
143
  Since the administration had no interest in a confrontation with Saigon so 
close to the November 7 election, Kissinger inquired if the Soviets could intercede with 
Hanoi to obtain a partial withdrawal.
144
  “We recognize they can’t pull them all out, but if 
there could be at least some token movement and most importantly the question of 
military supplies to them.  And what the President wants to do is write a letter to 
Brezhnev,” said Kissinger.145  “I understand.  This is just for his [Brezhnev’s] 
consideration,” replied Dobrynin.146  Although Dobrynin met with Kissinger later that 
afternoon to receive Nixon’s letter, the Soviet ambassador said that since the ongoing 
negotiations were between Washington and Hanoi it would be “premature” for Moscow 
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to make any promises about reducing weapons shipments to North Vietnam.
147
  However, 
he would pass along the request in regard to North Vietnamese troop withdrawal.   
 This exchange demonstrated how Soviet cooperation was not only essential to get 
the North Vietnamese to negotiate, but also to enable the US to make progress with its 
own ally in the South.  At times, Kissinger seemed to view Saigon as being just as 
intransigent as Hanoi, and claimed that without some North Vietnamese troop withdrawal 
it would take much longer to come to an agreement.   
From May 9 until October 23, 1972, the US made 41,500 aerial attacks on North 
Vietnam,
148
 but on October 24 Kissinger told Dobrynin that the White House would stop 
all bombing north of the 20
th
 parallel as long as negotiations continued.
149
  The following 
day the White House was prepared to go further.  Although Hanoi requested Kissinger to 
visit North Vietnam, he believed that would alienate Saigon.  Instead, he offered a halt to 
all bombing of North Vietnam if Le Duc Tho would meet him in Paris for further 
negotiations.
150
  Kissinger told Dobrynin to inform Moscow that Washington’s offer had 
come as a direct result of a positive message from the Kremlin the day before in regard to 
how “issues of prestige should not stand in the way when peace is so near.”151 
 However, on October 26 North Vietnam publicly announced the tentative 
agreement reached earlier that month between Washington and Hanoi.
152
  This was 
almost certainly a tactic to apply pressure on Saigon and portray Thieu as an 
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obstructionist to peace.
153
  Perhaps against his better judgment, Kissinger felt compelled 
to confirm the story by announcing, “’We believe peace is at hand.’”154   
 Richard Nixon was overwhelmingly re-elected in a 49 state landslide on 
November 7, 1972.  The outcome had implications far beyond the President’s personal 
political fortunes, however.  It ensured that Soviet-American relations would continue 
with the Kissinger-Dobrynin backchannel as the main point of contact.  The next day, 
Dobrynin relayed the congratulations of the Soviet government.  Although it is tempting 
to dismiss this as just polite diplomacy, it is highly probable that the Soviets were 
genuinely pleased by the result of the contest between Nixon and South Dakota Senator 
George McGovern, for it guaranteed that they would be dealing with the same 
administration – at least for a while.  As usual, Kissinger found it hard to be humble:  
D: Good morning, Henry. 
 
K: We didn’t carry Siberia. 
 
D: Oh.  My impression on the contrary, [you] carried all my country 
because even now in my Embassy I am listening “Four more years, four 
more years.” 
 
K: Is that what you’re saying? 
 
D: Exactly.  In my Embassy everybody is shouting with beginning four 
years this 12 o’clock at night.  So I hear even from Moscow the same - - I 
mean, the same sounds…   
 
Then later… 
 
D: Well, once again, Henry, from deep in my heart I really like this 
development because I really have a very nice relationship - -  
 
K: I don’t know whether one can have a feeling of personal friendship 
with a Communist diplomat but I have it. 
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D: (laughter) So my best personal regards towards you and to the 
President.  Please regard my personal regards too. 
 
K: Thank you.
155
 
  
Just as everything seemed to be progressing more or less smoothly towards an end 
to the war, the North Vietnamese launched a renewed offensive on the South in late 
November.  Hanoi had lost patience with Saigon’s refusal to settle and was outraged that 
Kissinger had recently visited South Vietnam, but skipped the North.  On November 26, 
Kissinger gave Dobrynin the news in his typically colorful way:  
K: Well, your friends have gone crazy. 
 
D: I look at things…and I figure that Thieu – you couldn’t handle him 
from this point of view.  You know from both sides I don’t need to tell 
you because you know them probably the best because you have a chance 
to observe them…from a short distance.  I only from a long distance. 
 
K: Right.  Well, where we are – you know I don’t know what influence 
you have over them [Hanoi].  We will give a rather moderate response… 
 
Then later… 
 
K: It’s very stupid because if they had followed what we told them there 
would certainly have been an agreement in three weeks. 
 
D: Well, you see I think one of the reasons was that they really wanted 
you to come there [to Hanoi]... I still don’t see – well I know your reasons. 
 
K: Because it would have led to an explosion in Saigon.
156
 
 
Dobrynin believed that Kissinger had made a tactical mistake by snubbing the North 
Vietnamese: “They have really high emotions . . . . . in Hanoi.  This I can tell you quite 
frankly.”157  To which Kissinger replied, “I’ve told them again and again that I would 
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have to get the approval of Saigon and elsewhere.  They just always said no…”158  Once 
again, a mutual understanding of the complexity of engaging in superpower détente while 
also seeking to mollify one’s allies was apparent.  Kissinger and Dobrynin had been over 
this before, and though they still disagreed, each was able to appreciate the other’s 
position.     
A couple of days later, Kissinger discovered that the Soviet embassy was asking 
questions about his future.  Although Nixon had just been re-elected, it was not a 
foregone conclusion that all of his various cabinet advisors would be retained.  On 
November 28, 1972, Kissinger assured Dobrynin that he had nothing to worry about: 
K: Well, I read in the papers that you people are inquiring whether I’m on 
the way out. 
 
D: Who inquired? 
 
K: I saw a newspaper article saying officials of the Soviet Embassy made 
inquiries all over town last week. 
 
D: Oh, I think it was just, you know, sometimes the press just try to make 
up things.  It’s important that I know that you are in, no doubt.   
 
K: I’m relaxed. 
 
D: Yes, so there is not any problem.
159
   
 
Although he dismissed the press reports, Dobrynin conceded that it was important to him 
that Kissinger would be around and that the partnership would continue.  This exchange 
and others like it reveal the comfort and even a degree of dependence between Kissinger 
and Dobrynin which developed over time.  Such a relationship helped to promote trust, a 
willingness to give the benefit of the doubt, and forbearance during trying situations. 
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Over the next several weeks, the American and North Vietnamese delegations 
continued negotiations to put the final touches on a settlement.  However, Thieu still 
refused to agree to a ceasefire as long as North Vietnamese troops remained in the 
South.
160
  In early December Kissinger travelled to Paris to convince Le Duc Tho to 
remove the troops, but he refused and the talks once again broke down.
161
  When 
Kissinger returned to Washington on December 13 he explained the situation to the 
White House.
162
  Nixon believed he had to show Saigon that he would come to its rescue 
if Hanoi violated the ceasefire, as well as show Hanoi the price they would pay for such a 
violation.
163
  On December 14 he decided on another round of full-scale bombing.
164
   
 The renewed bombing campaign, “Linebacker II,” targeted shipyards, radio 
transmitters, armaments factories, and military bases.
165
  Hanoi utilized Soviet surface-to-
air missiles (SAMS) in defense.
166
  After 729 flights by B-52 bombers and 1,800 sorties 
overall in eleven days,
167
 (with a thirty-six hour break during Christmas
168
) on December 
29 the North Vietnamese agreed to reopen talks.
169
  Kissinger and Le Duc Tho then met 
in Paris on January 8, 1973, to begin final negotiations to end the Vietnam War.
170
 
 Nixon succeeded where Johnson failed in using air power because the nature of 
the war had changed.
171
  When Johnson personally conducted his “Rolling Thunder” 
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campaign from 1965-68, the US was primarily fighting Vietcong guerillas.
172
  Due to the 
hit and run nature of guerilla warfare in which prolonged engagements are avoided, the 
Vietcong did not require long supply lines which could be destroyed by bombing.
173
  
However, after the American defeat of the Vietcong during the Tet Offensive of 1968, the 
war became a more traditional conflict with Hanoi’s regular army.174  A large army was 
more exposed to the effects of bombing, thus Nixon’s “Linebacker I” and “Linebacker II” 
campaigns of 1972 had greater impact.
175
 
 According to a discussion between Kissinger and Dobrynin on January 16, 1973, 
one of the sticking points prior to the most recent round of bombings had been Hanoi’s 
insistence on linking the release of American prisoners of war to the release of political 
prisoners held by Saigon.
176
  Kissinger rejected the notion that the release of American 
POWs should be contingent on South Vietnam’s actions.  After the “Christmas bombing” 
however, Hanoi agreed to release American POWs within two months of signing a 
treaty.
177
  Meanwhile, the US promised to “use its influence” in getting political prisoners 
released from Saigon.
178
  Remaining issues included Hanoi’s request for $5 billion in 
compensation as a result of the recent bombing and the removal of mines.
179
 
 There had also been progress with South Vietnam.  Thieu finally gave his assent 
to the agreement even though it permitted North Vietnamese troops to remain in the 
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South.
180
  In several letters, Nixon assured Thieu that aid would be resumed if needed, 
but also threatened to abandon the South Vietnamese President if he did not settle.
181
   
 On January 22, 1973, Kissinger spoke with Dobrynin just before embarking for 
Paris to sign a peace accord ending the Vietnam War.
182
  The conversation revealed a 
sense of anticipation, but also uneasiness due to so many past disappointments: 
AD: Talk about protocols - - does - - is it all right everything in Paris? 
 
HK: We have a few minor problems, but it’s inconceivable they’ll hold us 
up.  We need from them a very, very minor concession as a face-saving 
thing for Thieu - -  
 
AD: On protocol? 
 
HK: On protocols and they are so minor - - they are all crazy - - the 
Vietnamese are crazy so you can’t assume it will be done, but that’s only 
the real problem.  It’s so complex - - you have to be half Vietnamese to 
understand it. 
 
AD: But I gather now you are more than half Vietnamese. . . . 
 
HK: Oh I am.  It is inconceivable that the thing will not succeed now. 
 
AD: They may prolong for two-three days. 
 
HK: An extra day, but 
 
AD: In this case when you are going to initial it should be by this time 
[on] Monday [or] Tuesday - - everything should be initialed by this time? 
 
HK: We would like to initial everything together because once you let 
these maniacs loose, it’s going to start all over. 
 
Then later… 
 
AD: Well, good luck, Henry. 
 
HK: Thank you Anatol and I need not tell you what a joy it has been to 
work with you. . .seriously we have done a lot of good things together. 
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AD: Yes, Right.  Henry. 
 
HK: It took us two and a half years really to get started in the last 
administration - - this one we can start with a running start.
183
 
 
Kissinger and Dobrynin must have felt vindicated when representatives of the US, North 
Vietnam, South Vietnam, and the Vietcong signed the Paris Peace Accords on January 
27, 1973.
184
  They hoped to accomplish even more during Nixon’s second term. 
 However, by the spring of 1973 the accords were already unraveling.  According 
to Kissinger, North Vietnam had maintained forces in Laos and Cambodia, moved eleven 
of its twelve divisions into South Vietnam in early 1975, and obtained military equipment 
well in excess of agreed-upon replacement levels – all violations of the Paris 
agreement.
185
  Indeed, Moscow increased military shipments to Hanoi throughout 1974 
and 1975.
186
  Meanwhile, the US Congress ended funds for any American military 
purposes in Indochina in June, 1973.
187
  US economic aid to Saigon also declined from 
$2.3 billion in 1973, to $1.1 billion in 1974, and to $700 billion in 1975.
188
  It must have 
been a bitter pill for Kissinger after his efforts to obtain “peace with honor.”  A Nobel 
Peace Prize had followed for him and Le Duc Tho in 1973, but it could stop neither the 
North Vietnamese offensive nor the flow of Soviet military equipment in support of it. 
 What of Dobrynin?  What role did he have in Moscow’s actions?  Although he 
may have approved of the developments in Vietnam, it is highly doubtful that he had 
                                               
183
 Ibid. 
184
 John Whiteclay Chambers II, ed.  The Oxford Companion to American Military History (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1999), s.v. “Vietnam War (1960-1975): Military and Diplomatic Course,” by 
David L. Anderson. 
185 Henry Kissinger, Crisis – The Anatomy of Two Major Foreign Policy Crises (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 2003), 422. 
186 Gelman, 164. 
187 H.W. Crocker, III, Don’t Tread On Me – A 400-Year History of America at War, from Indian Fighting 
to Terrorist Hunting (New York: Crown Forum, 2006), 378; Kissinger, Diplomacy, 696. 
188 Morris, 351. 
184 
 
anything to do with effectively sabotaging his work with Kissinger.  The walls between 
the various Soviet government bureaucracies made it unlikely that an ambassador in the 
Foreign Ministry had knowledge of the Defense Ministry’s plans or activities.  
Additionally, Dobrynin often differed with his superiors on matters of policy as in the 
case of emigration restrictions.  It seems probable that he would have preferred for 
Moscow to be less egregious in the way it assisted Hanoi. 
After receiving intelligence that Saigon could only hold on for another three or 
four weeks, President Ford addressed a joint session of Congress on April 10, 1975.
189
  
Although Kissinger advised the President to blame Congress and even wrote a “’go down 
with the flags flying’” speech,190 Ford opted for a more conciliatory approach.  He 
requested $722 million in military aid and $250 million more for economic and 
humanitarian assistance.
191
  However, when he met with the Senate Foreign Relations 
committee on April 14th, Senators Jacob Javits of New York, Frank Church of Idaho, and 
Joseph Biden of Delaware only pledged support for evacuating Americans.
192
 
In a highly redacted conversation from April 18, 1975, Kissinger and Ford 
discussed the possibility of obtaining a ceasefire in order to stage an evacuation.
193
  “I 
called in Dobrynin tomorrow morning.  I want to ask him for a temporary cease-fire to 
permit evacuation of Americans and Vietnamese,” said Kissinger.194  “Do they have 
control or the power to effect a cease-fire?” inquired Ford.195  “No probably not,” replied 
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Kissinger, “but I want to ask him not to ship any military equipment during that time.  I 
am for taking the 2 chances in 20 that they may help…”196   
Ford then implied that congressional limitations on the Central Intelligence 
Agency had helped to precipitate the crisis: “No President including myself, can operate 
with a crippled intelligence community.  It doesn’t make sense to destroy the agency for 
one mistake they made.”197  Of course, it had been more than one mistake.  CIA director 
William E. Colby later handed over to Congress an institutional study revealing hundreds 
of cases of civil liberties abuses at home as well as excesses in covert activities abroad 
over the life of the organization.
198
  CIA personnel referred to the warrantless wiretaps, 
assassination plots and break-ins as the “Family Jewels.”199  Following investigations by 
a presidential commission as well as special committees of both the House and Senate, 
the agency’s reputation became badly tarnished by the end of the 1970s.200   
On April 24, Dobrynin relayed a message from Brezhnev through the 
backchannel: “The position of the Vietnamese side on the question of evacuation of 
American citizens from South Vietnam is definitely positive…they have no intention to 
put any obstacles in the course of military actions to the evacuation of American citizens 
from South Vietnam…”201  Washington had received Moscow’s assistance in obtaining 
time to stage an evacuation.  Hanoi had said that it would not interfere.
202
  Nevertheless, 
two days later Dobrynin received a message from Ford stating that the North Vietnamese 
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were bombarding the Saigon airport as well as several buildings in the vicinity of the 
American embassy.
203
  When Kissinger charged Hanoi with seeking to humiliate 
Washington, Dobrynin cited complaints in Congress and the media that the American 
evacuation had taken too long.
204
  As the end drew near, more than 6,000 Americans and 
South Vietnamese escaped from the roof of the embassy as helicopters made repeated 
trips to off-shore Navy ships to rescue them.
205
  Saigon fell on April 30, 1975. 
Following the North Vietnamese takeover, thousands of South Vietnamese were 
executed and tens of thousands imprisoned.
206
  Over the next few years, more than one 
million people fled Indochina as South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos all fell to 
communist regimes.
207
  Hundreds of thousands became refugees as “boat people,”208 
risking their lives on barely sea-worthy vessels with many coming to the United States. 
A united Vietnam was just one of ten new communist regimes which emerged 
around the world from 1974-1980.
209
  To what extent was this driven by Moscow?  On 
the other hand, could there have been a “bandwagoning effect” or “’psychological 
domino effect’” leading countries to align with the seemingly ascendant Soviet Union?210  
Certainly for those viewing the Cold War as a global “zero-sum reputational game,” 
Moscow was winning and Washington was losing.
211
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The October 1973 Arab-Israeli War 
Ever since the creation of the modern state of Israel in 1948, war or the threat of 
war between the Jewish nation and its Arab neighbors has been an almost constant 
feature of international headlines.  After the Israeli War of Independence in 1948-49, 
subsequent conflicts occurred during the 1956 Suez Canal Crisis and the 1967 Six Day 
War.  The last of these resulted in Israel obtaining the Golan Heights from Syria, the 
West Bank of the Jordan River from Jordan, and the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip from 
Egypt.  American support for Israel and Soviet backing of Egypt and Syria ensured that 
the Arab-Israeli conflict intersected with détente.  
 
The Soviets established a relationship with the Egyptians as early as 1955 when 
Khrushchev and Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser completed an arms 
agreement.
212
  According to Kissinger, in the 1960s Moscow was the main arms supplier 
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to both Egypt and Syria and provided organization and technical assistance to radical 
Arab groups.
213
  By the 1970s support for national liberation on the one hand and a desire 
to pursue détente with the Americans on the other forced the Soviets to walk a fine line.   
As the foremost ally of Israel (the Americans had been first to recognize the 
Jewish state in 1948 under President Harry S. Truman), the US would oppose efforts to 
re-arm Cairo and Damascus.  Consequently when Nasser’s successor, Anwar Sadat, 
requested new arms shipments, the Soviets insisted on being paid with hard currency 
which they knew the Egyptians did not have – thus preventing a sale in 1972.214  In a 
move to assert his independence, Sadat expelled approximately 20,000 Soviet military 
advisors in July of that year.
215
  This also could have been a shrewd attempt to compel the 
Soviets to come through on the promised deliveries.
216
  When Saudi Arabia provided 
Egypt with five hundred million dollars in January, 1973, Moscow was forced to make 
the weapons transaction.
217
  While the Soviets probably did not want a confrontation with 
the Americans, they did seek the enhanced prestige in the developing world which a 
successful Arab war to reclaim lost territories would bring.
218
   
 
Saturday, October 6 
On October 6, 1973 – the Jewish holy day of Yom Kippur – Sadat and Syria’s 
Hafiz Al-Assad initiated a coordinated attack on two fronts.  The Egyptians used 
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makeshift pontoon bridges to send 70,000 troops and 800 tanks across the Suez Canal 
into the Israeli-occupied Sinai Peninsula.
219
  Meanwhile, the Syrians invaded the Golan 
Heights.
220
  At 9:20 a.m. Kissinger explained the situation on the ground to Dobrynin: 
K: Our information is that the Egyptians and Syrians have attacked all 
along their [fronts] and also. . .  
 
D: Is it the canal. 
 
K: The Canal and the Golan Heights.  [Egyptian Foreign Minister] Zayyat  
is claiming the Israelis launched a naval attack on some isolated spot in 
the Gulf of Suez and that triggered the whole thing. 
 
D: I saw on a ticker they claim that Israel began attack.  Zayyat told you. 
 
K: He told me not along the Canal but in the Gulf of Suez.  We are all 
going to have to be taking formal positions.  You and I know that is 
baloney if they [the Israelis] are going to attack they will not launch an 
attack in the Gulf of Suez and at the key points.  Not their style. 
 
D: I understand. 
 
K: How is it that the Syrians and Egyptians are starting at the same minute 
- - all along the front.  If it started with an Israel naval attack, you and I are 
having a problem in how to get this stopped.  We are using our maximum 
influence with the Israelis to show restraint… 
 
D: O.K.  I will send additional message to Moscow.  Really madness. 
 
K: Total madness…We should meet urgently.  We should, I think use this 
occasion to first not to have everything we have achieved destroyed by 
maniacs on [either] side and after quieting it down to see what can be done 
constructively.   
 
D: All right.  Thank you very much.
221
 
 
It must have been infuriating for Kissinger and Dobrynin to contemplate that all of their 
work in building détente could potentially be undone by the Arab-Israeli dispute.  
However, as events unfolded both would take the opportunity to advance his country’s 
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interests through support of respective allies.  The tension between conducting 
superpower diplomacy and simultaneously pursuing security, economic, and ideological 
goals in the Middle East would test the Kissinger-Dobrynin relationship as never before. 
Kissinger probably believed that going before the entire United Nations General 
Assembly, including numerous Arab and Soviet bloc nations, would be too time 
consuming and result in a less favorable outcome for the United States and Israel.  The 
UN Security Council, which included only the US, Soviet Union, China, France, and 
Great Britain as permanent members, would be a much more hospitable environment.  
Around 7:00 p.m. Kissinger pressed for a Security Council ceasefire resolution, but 
Dobrynin explained why his government was opposed: 
D: …I had rather hear from Moscow but as I understand our position the 
difficulties we are now facing is that the Arabs are trying to regain the 
lands occupied by Israel.  They have been using that argument to us and 
for us to tell them you cannot free your land, it is ridiculous. 
 
K: I recognize the situation.  I am not saying it is all easy.  We have a 
different situation.  There have not been any raids on Damascus and Cairo 
but I would not bet anything on tomorrow. 
 
D: I understand. 
 
K: Is [it] possible for the Politburo to imagine a complete course of action 
which we agree on privately. 
 
D: What course of action do you propose besides SC [Security Council]. 
 
K: A defacto return to the status quo ante a defacto return of the 
ceasefire... 
 
D: I understand. 
 
K: We have a framework out of which we could crystallize.  The Arabs 
have now proved their point. 
 
D: Henry, how could they? 
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K: You see they are going to lose.  It is not a case where we are asking.  
Not like [the 1971 war between] India and Pakistan. 
 
D: I understand.  The military point of view.  I cannot argue with you.  
You know the situation better.  I am trying to understand the situation 
better politically.
222
 
 
Both diplomats seemed convinced that it was just a matter of time until the Israelis 
repelled the Egyptians and Syrians.  For this reason, Kissinger explained that there was 
no point in the Arabs continuing their offensive.  In fact, he intimated that if a ceasefire 
did not come soon Cairo and Damascus might become vulnerable.   
 Kissinger and Dobrynin knew that the way they handled the situation would have 
repercussions beyond the Middle East.  Détente had opponents in both of their countries, 
and a poor outcome would play right into the hands of their critics.  “If you and we could 
find a way of settling this now then it would be an overwhelming argument in all of the 
things we have been going through as to what the practical consequences have been of 
our relationship,” said Kissinger.223  “I understand,” said Dobrynin, but since the Soviets 
had proclaimed their support for national liberation they felt constrained in what they 
could do:  “They [the Arabs] would say you have spoken of liberating.  It is impossible 
for us.”224   
 
Monday, October 8 
 At 8:30 a.m. Israel launched a counterattack.
225
  The prospect of the superior 
Israeli military pushing back the Arab gains must have induced a change of heart in 
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Moscow.  At 9:54 a.m. Dobrynin told Kissinger, “We have contacted the leaders of the 
Arab states on the question of ceasefire.  We hope to get a reply shortly.”226  Kissinger 
replied that the White House would hold off submitting a resolution before the Security 
Council for the time being and settle for “a general discussion” instead.227   
 
Tuesday, October 9 
 Thus far the only Arab nations involved in the conflict were Egypt and Syria.  
However, Dobrynin seemed genuinely shocked when Kissinger told him at 11:29 a.m. 
about a message the White House had just received from the Kingdom of Jordan: 
K: “The Soviet Charge [d’Affaires] asked to see King [Hussein] and was 
received this morning.  Charge said Soviets fully support Arabs in conflict 
with Israel.  He said Soviet Union thought all Arab States should enter 
battle now.” 
 
D: Soviet, what? 
 
K: “Soviet Union thought all Arab . . .” 
 
D: Soviet Union? 
 
K: Yes. 
 
D: Thought or fought? 
 
K: Recommending to the King. 
 
D: Un-huh. 
 
K: “King considers this a Soviet request for him to send his army into 
action..” 
 
D: We asked King to go into action? 
 
K: Yeah.
228
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“Unbelievable story,” replied Dobrynin.229  And truly it was.  If the Soviets had 
encouraged other Arab countries to join the fighting rather than pressuring Egypt and 
Syria to agree to a ceasefire as they had claimed, it could have meant the death-knell for 
détente.  Dobrynin desperately sought a clarification: “Was it ours . .?  I don’t have any 
information at all…our support of Arab countries is nothing new.  But as you said we 
asked King to send………yes?”230  After Kissinger told him that he had heard correctly, 
the bewildered Dobrynin said he would check with Moscow immediately.
231
  
Brezhnev had indeed sent a message to the other Arab nations.  But why take such 
a chance of damaging détente?  The answer lies in the fact that two separate Soviet 
foreign policy goals came into conflict with the outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East.  
To the Arab world, Israel represented a Western implant and the latest incarnation of 
European colonialism, somewhat similar to South Africa.
232
  The past partnership of Tel 
Aviv and Johannesburg in some military matters and even the production of nuclear 
weapons only added to this perception.
233
  The USSR had to demonstrate its commitment 
to national liberation and preserve its influence in the region by assisting the Arabs.
234
  
However, if it appeared that the Israelis faced destruction, the US would intervene and 
Moscow wanted to avoid a confrontation with Washington which could jeopardize 
détente.
235
  Consequently, on October 9 the Soviets initiated an arms airlift to Egypt and 
Syria.
236
  But in order to limit the Soviet role, Brezhnev also sent a letter to President 
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Boumedienne of Algeria exhorting all of the Arab nations to join the fight.
237
  The 
Soviets sought to provide enough help to prevent an Arab defeat, but not so much that 
Egypt and Syria would achieve an overwhelming victory over Israel.
238
   
 
Wednesday, October 10 
 At 8:13 a.m. the next morning, Dobrynin had an update from Moscow on the 
ceasefire question.
239
  The Soviets decided that their relationship with their allies 
prohibited them from supporting such a measure, however, they would not oppose one 
either – the Soviet representative on the Security Council would abstain during voting.240  
This was a logical position for the Soviets to take as they sought a middle ground 
between preserving détente and upholding the principle of national liberation.  Kissinger 
said he would need time to discuss it with Nixon, but gave Dobrynin permission to tell 
the Kremlin that it had been “a constructive message.”241  
 Later that morning domestic politics put the Middle East on hold.  Vice-President 
Spiro Agnew had been investigated for months by the Justice Department on charges of 
bribery, extortion, and tax fraud dating from his time as Governor of Maryland.
242
  He 
eventually pled no contest to a single count of tax evasion, and was about to resign.
243
  
Therefore the White House was unable for the time being to respond to the Soviet 
abstention proposal.  At 11:45 a.m. Kissinger confided in Dobrynin: 
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K: Anatol, I just wanted to tell you something.  We are having a major 
domestic problem, which as you will see, even you will recognize it’s 
major, which is coming to a head early this afternoon. 
 
D: Yeah. 
 
K: And so there will be decisional delay until I can get you - - But you 
will get your formal answer. 
 
D: You mean it happens today or tomorrow? 
 
K: By the end of the day I will give you an answer. 
 
D: By the end of the day. 
 
K: I just want you to know.  You will see that this is not a delaying tactic. 
 
D: Yeah.  But what is the crisis?  Could you tell me that? 
 
K: Well, it concerns the Vice President. 
 
D: Oh, I see. 
 
K: So I wanted you to know that and I’ll be in touch with you around 4:00 
or 5:00 o’clock this afternoon.244 
 
Now it was Dobrynin’s turn to be patient.  Kissinger closed by saying, “Now what I’ve 
told you about this domestic situation, Anatol, is a sign of my great confidence in you.”245  
“No, no, no.  I understand,” replied Dobrynin.246 
 But by 5:40 p.m. the White House had still not replied.
247
  “We consider it a 
serious proposal and we have to think this thing through to think how to answer,” 
explained Kissinger.
248
  Dobrynin seemed more concerned about a potential American 
airlift to Israel: “Henry, I see in the news media…build-up.”249  To which Kissinger 
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answered, “For your information, we are doing next to nothing.”250  Kissinger then 
appealed to Dobrynin on a personal level: “Anatoly, you have gone through too many 
crises with me.  We are trying to get this thing settled.  You are going to hear from us 
during the course of the evening.”251  He also explained that as Secretary of State he had 
to sign all government commissions as well as receive all resignations.
252
  Dobrynin 
seemed to understand the need for Kissinger’s involvement in Agnew’s departure. 
 At 9:45 p.m. Kissinger told a disappointed Dobrynin that there had been too much 
happening during the day for the White House to respond to the Soviet proposal to 
abstain.
253
  Dobrynin could be forgiven for thinking that he was now the one being strung 
along.  Then the truth came out.  The Soviet decision to abstain from the ceasefire vote 
“did not fill us with ecstasy,” admitted Kissinger.254  “Well, nothing really…nothing 
followed after this,” Dobrynin replied.255  Support for rival Middle Eastern nations was 
straining détente as well as the Kissinger-Dobrynin relationship.   
 
Saturday, October 13 
 At 7:55 p.m. Kissinger confronted Dobrynin about a Soviet airlift: “…we cannot 
not supply our friends while you are supplying yours.”256  He claimed that up to that 
point no American planes had landed in Israel.
257
  (According to Thornton, Kissinger was 
telling the truth; although the Israelis had been asking for help for three days, the White 
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House had resisted out of fear that an airlift would lead to an overwhelming Israeli 
victory and thereby destroy Washington’s role as an international peacemaker.258  Benny 
Morris speculated that Tel Aviv may have applied pressure by threatening to resort to 
nuclear weapons if they ran out of conventional arms.
259
)  Then on an ominous note for 
détente, a frustrated Kissinger asked:  “Why do we have to deal with you,…why not deal 
with Sadat directly[?]”260  Dobrynin answered that it was “Up to you and the President to 
decide,” but that it could have “disastrous results.”261   
 
Sunday, October 14 
 The following afternoon at 12:36 p.m., Kissinger told Dobrynin that the US had 
started airlifting supplies to the Israelis.
262
  It would stop as soon as a ceasefire was 
declared if the Soviets would also halt their airlift to the Arabs.
263
  Kissinger also 
reiterated the dangers to détente posed by the ongoing situation, and Dobrynin likewise 
had a warning in regard to their conversation the previous evening: 
K: You know, Anatol, we all know now what is at stake because if this 
goes on much longer, … 
 
D: Well, __________ if you had a chance to read my telegram [to 
Moscow] what I sent yesterday it was exactly what I am told. [by 
Kissinger] 
 
K: No, no I…. 
 
D: I make my own reservations of course, but it was a direct quotation 
everything you said.  It is not only fair, but it is important for them to 
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know the mood.  At a certain point of our usual thing, I don’t do direct 
quotations, but a summary, I make it.  But yesterday I was rather in a 
detail of what you said because this is what I feel…264 
 
Normally Dobrynin simply summarized his discussions with Kissinger when he reported 
to Moscow.  Indeed Kissinger probably owed Dobrynin a debt of gratitude for censoring 
some of the Secretary of State’s more bombastic rhetoric over the years.   However, 
Dobrynin deemed Kissinger’s threat to deal directly with Sadat and thereby cut Moscow 
entirely out of the peace process as serious enough to merit a direct quote to the Kremlin.   
 
Tuesday, October 16 
 As tensions neared the breaking point, word came from Oslo that Kissinger and 
Le Duc Tho had been honored with the Nobel Peace Prize for their efforts at ending the 
Vietnam War.  At 11:42 a.m. Dobrynin offered his congratulations: 
D: I hope I will be invited to the party. 
 
K: What party? 
 
D: Which you are going to give in connection with the award of the Nobel 
Prize. 
 
K: I figure it like Groucho Marx said, “Any club that took him in, he does 
not want to join.”  I would say anything that Le Duc Tho is eligible for 
there must be something wrong with it. 
 
Then later… 
 
D: It does not matter about the present difficulties.  I am sure we will 
come out of this - - both of our countries… 
 
K: …I don’t see what you and I, our countries, can gain in the Middle East 
compared to what we can lose and therefore we cannot let these maniacal 
parties drive us into confrontation. 
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D: This is the reason I am calling you.  To congratulate you.  This is for 
the second prize. 
 
K: Right. 
 
D: For the second Nobel Prize for you next year. 
 
K: Good.  We will aim for that.
265
  (italics mine) 
 
The effect of past diplomatic successes on Kissinger and Dobrynin should not be 
underestimated.  Their shared experiences with SALT, Vietnam, and elsewhere provided 
reassurance that they would overcome the current crisis in the Middle East as well.  
 
Friday, October 19 
 During an epic tank battle on the Sinai Peninsula, the Israelis drove between the 
Egyptian Second Army in the north and the Third Army in the south, eventually reaching 
the western side of the Suez Canal.
266
  The Third army was in danger of being completely 
surrounded and annihilated.
267
  Only the depleted First Army remained to protect 
Cairo.
268
  If the Israelis scored another overwhelming victory as in 1967, Soviet influence 
in the Middle East could be destroyed.
269
  For a change, Kissinger let Dobrynin do most 
of the talking as the latter read a message from Brezhnev to Nixon at 11:04 a.m.: 
D: “Dear Mr. President: 
  The events in the Middle East become more and more 
dangerous.  Our two powers, as we have both agreed, must do the utmost 
in order to keep the events from going beyond the limits, when they could 
take even more dangerous turn.” 
 
K: Right. 
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D:  “If they develop along this way there is a danger that harm could be 
done even to the immediate relations between the Soviet Union and the 
United States.  We believe that neither you, nor we want to see it…” 
 
K: Right. 
 
D: “Since time is essential and now not only every day but every hour 
counts,” 
 
K: Right. 
 
D: “my colleagues and I suggest that the US Secretary of State and your 
closest associate Dr. Kissinger comes in an urgent manner to Moscow to 
conduct appropriate negotiations with him as with your authorized 
personal representative.  It would be good if he could come tomorrow, 
October 20.  I will appreciate your speedy reply. 
  Sincerely, L. Brezhnev, October 19, 1973” 
 
K: You are friendly, aren’t you? 
 
D: Hum? 
 
K: That’s a friendly suggestion. 
 
D: Of course it is.
270
 
 
The more easy-going Kissinger obviously enjoyed teasing Dobrynin about the formal 
manner in which he sometimes conducted himself.  Half an hour later after conferring 
with Nixon, Kissinger said that the White House had agreed “in principle” to accept the 
Soviet invitation.
271
  “Will you come back there [to Moscow] with me,” asked 
Kissinger.
272
  “Yes, if you don’t mind I would like to go both ways,” Dobrynin replied.273  
“Well, as long as you sit in the front compartment,” joked Kissinger.274  “All right.  I 
would rather sit in the tail but nevertheless,” laughed Dobrynin.275   
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The ongoing international crisis was occurring simultaneously with a domestic 
constitutional crisis,
276
 further demonstrating the importance of the backchannel.  The 
day after the above conversation was October 20, 1973 – date of the so-called “Saturday 
Night Massacre.”  Watergate Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox had demanded the full 
release of the White House tapes concerning the Watergate break-in.
277
  Nixon offered to 
provide summaries of the tapes instead of transcripts, but Cox refused.
278
  When Nixon 
ordered Attorney General Elliot Richardson to fire Cox, Richardson refused and 
resigned.
279
  When Deputy Attorney General William Ruckelshaus also refused to fire 
Cox, he was fired.
280
  Finally, Solicitor General Robert Bork agreed to remove Cox.
281
  
Nixon had acted decisively in coming to the aid of the Israelis, but he was no longer in 
any position to handle international affairs.   
 Kissinger’s visit to Moscow was successful.  On Sunday, October 21, he and 
Brezhnev drafted a cease-fire proposal.
282
  At 12:52 a.m.
283
 (Washington time) on 
Monday, October 22, the UN Security Council passed resolution #338 sponsored by both 
the US and USSR calling for a ceasefire.
284
  But before returning to Washington, 
Kissinger accepted the request of Prime Minister Golda Meir to first stop in Israel.
285
  
While there he intimated that the Israelis need not comply with the ceasefire at the exact 
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time that it was supposed to go into effect, twelve hours after adoption.
286
  He had given 
tacit permission for Israel to continue fighting, a move which would have grave 
consequences shortly thereafter.
287
   
 
Wednesday, October 24 
 “Anatol, the madmen in the Middle East seem to be at it again,” Kissinger 
lamented at 9:45 a.m.
288
  Israeli activity had supposedly ceased on the west bank of the 
Suez canal, but now Israel was claiming that the Egyptians were attacking them on the 
east bank.
289
  Kissinger told Dobrynin that the US had warned both sides to stop any 
offensive actions.
290
  Then at ten after ten in the morning, Kissinger said that the US was 
sending in its military observers from Tel Aviv to verify that the Israelis were only 
making defensive moves.
291
  Perhaps sensing Dobrynin’s concern, Kissinger reminded 
his colleague of what was at stake: “Now the important thing is for you and us to stay 
together having made this historic achievement [the ceasefire].”292  “Now this is the 
point,” replied Dobrynin.293  Five minutes later Kissinger reported that according to the 
Israelis all fighting had ceased.
294
  He added that the US would send ten military 
observers to the battle zone for about forty-eight hours until the UN observers arrived.
295
   
What transpired over the next several hours would draw the United States and the 
Soviet Union closer to war than at any time since the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.  
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Around 1:00 p.m. Sadat sent Nixon a message accusing the Israelis of violating the cease-
fire.
296
  Shortly thereafter, the Egyptian government announced that it was seeking a 
Security Council meeting to request US and Soviet troops be sent to the Middle East.
297
  
This was the last thing Kissinger wanted, particularly in such a potentially explosive 
region.  In his words, “The makings of a crisis were appearing.”298 
At 3:35 p.m. that afternoon, Dobrynin read a telegram from Soviet Foreign 
Minister Andrei Gromyko.
299
  Egyptian and Soviet sources were claiming that fighting 
was continuing on the Israeli side: “Therefore, information given by Israel to the White 
House is Israel stop fighting is false,” read Dobrynin.300  “Please immediately inform Dr. 
Kissinger of the false information and put information before the President,” he added.301   
By 7:00 p.m. Washington time, the Soviet leadership decided that more extreme 
measures were warranted.
302
  The Israelis had completely surrounded the Egyptian Third 
Army on the Sinai Peninsula, leaving little in the way of a direct assault on Cairo.
303
  
Likewise, Damascus was threatened on the eastern front.
304
  Moscow could not allow 
their Arab clients to be defeated again, consequently the Soviets instructed their UN 
representative to support a resolution directing American and Soviet troops to the war 
zone, provided someone else (presumably Egypt) introduced it.
305
  At 7:25 p.m. Kissinger 
spoke to Dobrynin and the day’s tensions boiled over:    
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K: I have been talking to the President and we really want to urge you not 
to push matters to an extreme because we will veto any resolution that 
calls for sending over any military forces.  What we need is more 
observers. 
 
D: …I mentioned to you when I was in Moscow it was completely out of 
the question to send any troops.  Now they have become so angry they 
want troops. 
 
K: Why through us.  What was achieved? 
 
D: You allowed the Israelis to do what they wanted. 
 
K: When this operation started I pleaded with you to get people to return 
from the lines and it took a week.  
 
D: It [the ceasefire] was already agreed upon by you and Brezhnev.... 
 
K: Be that as it may, if you want confrontation we will have to have one...   
 
D: You know we don’t want to have a confrontation.  
 
K: It is inevitable that there will be mutual charges in the first 24 hours of 
a ceasefire.  We introduced two joint resolutions….306 (italics mine) 
 
Kissinger correctly stated that the US sought a ceasefire as soon as hostilities had broken 
out and while Israel was on the defensive.  He was also probably correct that there would 
be a few residual skirmishes after a ceasefire went into effect (leaving out that he may 
have encouraged such activities).  Nevertheless, although the Soviets initially had resisted 
a ceasefire, now that the Arabs were on the defensive Moscow wanted it enforced. 
 The Soviets sent another letter to Washington at 9:35 p.m.
307
  “Kissinger sounded 
nervous as I read to him Brezhnev’s message over our confidential telephone line,” wrote 
Dobrynin.
308
  The Soviets were threatening to act even if the US did not join them in 
                                               
306 Kissinger Transcripts.  Department of State. 
307 Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 376. 
308 Dobrynin, In Confidence, 301. 
205 
 
enforcing the ceasefire.
309
  Kissinger proceeded to call an emergency meeting of the 
Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG) for 10:30 p.m.
310
  At 10:15 p.m. he told 
Dobrynin that the White House was reviewing the latest Soviet offer: 
K: We are assembling our people to consider your letter.  I just wanted 
you to know if any unilateral action is taken before we have had a chance 
to reply that will be very serious. 
 
D: Yes, all right. 
 
K: This is a matter of great concern.  Don’t you pressure us.  I want to 
repeat again, don’t pressure us! 
 
D: All right.
311
 
 
The discovery by U.S. intelligence that the Soviets had mobilized and put seven airborne 
divisions on alert further indicated that the situation had truly reached a crisis point.
312
 
Fearing imminent, unilateral military action by the Soviets to enforce the 
ceasefire, the US put its forces on a DefCon3 or “Defense Condition” world-wide nuclear 
alert at 11:41 p.m.
313
  Some alleged that Nixon made the move to distract attention from 
his ongoing tug-of-war with Congress over the White House tapes.
314
  However, due to 
the President’s distraction with Watergate, it was Kissinger who led the White House 
meeting, issued the alert, and generally handled the crisis in the Middle East.
315
   
The Soviet threat to intervene drove the Americans to pressure Israel to stop its 
advance and allow the Third Egyptian Army to be resupplied.
316
  Concerned that if the 
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Israelis achieved a total victory they would refuse to return any of the occupied 
territories, Kissinger threatened to cut off military aid unless they accepted a ceasefire.
317
 
 
Thursday, October 25 
 Cooler heads eventually prevailed.  The next morning at 5:40 a.m., the White 
House sent a letter to Brezhnev with an offer to send US and Soviet observers as well as 
UN forces.
318
  At 3:40 p.m. Dobrynin called Kissinger with Brezhnev’s reply: 
K: Anatoly? 
 
D: Hello Henry.  I would like to read to you a letter from Brezhnev to the 
President and then I will send you… 
 
K: Is it going to calm me down or make me go into orbit again? 
 
D: No, not orbit…Prefer to stay in orbit quietly…[reading Brezhnev’s 
letter] Since you are ready now, as we understand it, now to send to Egypt 
a group of American observers, we agree to it jointly in this question.  
Soviet group of observers instructed to get into contact immediately in a 
businesslike operation with the US group of observers…319   
 
After Dobrynin finished reading the letter Kissinger said, “I thought you were threatening 
us.  Don’t …I take threats very badly.  We will talk about it sometime.”320  Dobrynin 
agreed, “No, [it] isn’t anything to discuss now…”321   
A potential disaster had been narrowly averted.  But what caused this colossal 
misunderstanding?  The success of détente thus far had been in large part due to a sense 
of trust and empathy built up over several years between Kissinger and Dobrynin.  
Established practice had been that nothing was said publicly or even at the traditional 
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diplomatic level without first being discussed in the backchannel.  The last thing 
Dobrynin heard was at 10:15 p.m. on Wednesday the 24
th
 when Kissinger said the White 
House was considering the Soviet offer.  Nothing else had been forthcoming until 4:00 
a.m., and even then no mention was made of putting the country on an alert.
322
  The 
prospect of Soviet ground forces in the Middle East shocked the White House, leading 
Nixon and Kissinger to believe that past diplomatic procedure no longer applied. The 
absence of communication through the backchannel represented a breakdown in the 
process and almost proved fatal for relaxing tensions.   
 
Saturday, October 27 
At 11:24 a.m. Kissinger and Dobrynin finally had an opportunity to discuss at 
greater length the disaster which had almost occurred over the previous couple of days: 
K: We had the impression that you were planning a military move.  We 
did not invent this.  Someday soon we have to discuss this.  We had no 
reason to meet until 4:00 in the morning. 
 
D: …On this, I think, one thing was really a big blunder on your [side], 
maybe it was deliberate.  For six hours you are just telling us every hour to 
wait, there will be a reply.  I am sure if you had just mentioned to me that 
the President feels it was necessary to make an alert…[and] blow up our 
relations… 
 
K: That was a blunder. 
 
D: Seven hours you were telling us [to wait] and then we receive a letter 
that didn’t say a word about the alert.  It was widely publicized.   
 
K: Whether you ever believe it or not it is not important now.  I am telling 
you it was not…we were convinced you were planning something 
unilateral.  We were as [outraged].  We thought the tone in that letter…. 
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D: You were pretty sure we would do it.  If you were so sure, you could 
have waited one hour to get some additional information from Brezhnev.  
But you didn’t want to have it. 
 
K: That isn’t true.  I was very tough.  [I said] Don’t pressure us.  I sent you 
two or three messages to please don’t do anything unilateral. 
 
D: Exactly. 
 
K: You could have said what makes you think we will do anything 
unilateral.  We have no intention of taking action. 
 
D: What you said was to wait for a reply.  I sent four telegrams to Moscow 
-- this was a unique situation -- to wait for a reply from the President.  
What did they receive...Someday in Moscow…much more easy to discuss. 
 
K: We very truly thought you were threatening us out of the…. 
 
D: Exactly, you have it with us.  Wait for the reply.  By the way nothing 
was said…323 
 
Kissinger seemed regretful for what he admitted had been “a horrible 
misunderstanding.”324  He also sought to repair the personal relationship: “Too much is at 
stake for us to be angry with each other.”325  Dobrynin said that he had only been angry 
“for two days,” but that anger in Moscow was “still very high.”326  He claimed that 
Kissinger later admitted that calling the alert had been a mistake.
327
 
 The October 1973 Arab-Israeli War had several long-term effects.  First, the 
Soviets removed any doubt that they could deliver arms and supplies around the world in 
a relatively short time.
328
  This had implications for further interventions throughout the 
1970s.  Second, in 1973 eleven of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) instituted an oil embargo on nations deemed too friendly to Israel, including the 
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US.
329
  When the embargo ended the next year, OPEC had increased oil prices by three 
hundred percent, contributing to inflation throughout the decade.
330
  As a leading oil-
exporting nation, the Soviet Union benefitted from the higher petroleum prices, allowing 
Moscow to increase military spending at the same time that Washington was reducing its 
by about fifty percent.
331
  However, the amount of wealth that the Soviets obtained from 
petroleum and natural gas also served as a disincentive to developing other sources of 
economic vitality through science and technology.
332
 
Were détente and the Kissinger-Dobrynin relationship vindicated during the 
October War?  Both had complicated matters by prolonging the fighting when their 
respective allies appeared to have the upper hand.
333
  Kissinger admitted that détente “had 
not prevented a crisis,” and that both Washington and Moscow attempted to “reduce the 
role and influence” of the other.334  However, he also explained that détente “defined not 
friendship but a strategy for a relationship between adversaries.”335  Dobrynin argued that 
the Soviet Union and the United States “cooperated in bringing the war to an end,” but 
likewise conceded that they “sought to manipulate events to serve their own ends and to 
extend their own influence in the Middle East.”336  Although he believed that both 
nations wanted to prevent the war from affecting their relationship, he suggested that 
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Kissinger was “prepared to use and even sacrifice this relationship to reduce and if 
possible eliminate Soviet influence in the Middle East under the cover of détente.”337   
To some extent Kissinger was successful.  By forcing Israel to retreat when Cairo 
appeared about to fall, the US showed Sadat that it could apply pressure on its ally.
338
 
Thereafter the US and Egypt resumed diplomatic relations on November 7 after a six-
year hiatus.
339
  Kissinger’s “shuttle diplomacy” then resulted in the Egyptians and Israelis 
signing a cease-fire agreement on November 11 and returning to the positions they had 
occupied on October 22.
340
  Subsequent agreements in January, 1974, and September, 
1975, resulted in partial Israeli withdrawals from the Sinai.
341
  Kissinger also oversaw an 
agreement in May, 1974, whereby the Israelis partially withdrew from the Golan Heights 
in Syria.
342
   
Eventually it was President Carter who helped to engineer a long-term Egyptian-
Israeli peace at Camp David in September, 1978.
343
  By signing the Camp David Accords 
in 1979 and acknowledging Israel’s right to exist, Sadat regained the rest of the Sinai as 
well as earned a Nobel Peace Prize (with Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin.)
344
 
 
Angola 
The US-Soviet proxy war in Angola marked a crucial turning point for détente.  
After acquiring naval and air bases in South Yemen, Moscow enhanced its ability to 
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intervene in Africa, which then emerged as a new battlefield in the Cold War.
345
 As in 
Vietnam, Soviet actions were driven in part by competition with the Chinese, who by 
1975 had established relationships with Zambia, Tanzania, Zaire, and Mozambique.
346
   
Oil-rich Angola, a former Portuguese colony for 500 years,
347
 represented another 
of the revolutionary movements on the continent which were either communist or 
nationalist and shared Moscow’s disdain for Western imperialism.348  Soviet economic 
and military aid, protection, and “political models” were some of the benefits of this 
common outlook.
349
  Arbatov classified such direct military assistance to liberation 
movements as an example of Soviet “errors and political miscalculations, which were 
strongly in evidence from the mid-1970s on.”350  He also described the policy as “loaded 
with revolutionary jargon and closely intertwined with imperial ambitions.”351  Soviet 
foreign policy specialist Andrei M. Alexandrov even likened Angola to the Spanish Civil 
War of the 1930s, and believed intervening represented “our internationalist duty.”352 
Dobrynin suggested that Angola “raised the question of whether détente had any 
general rules outside our mutual behavior toward each other, and if so, what they 
were.”353  For Kissinger the issue was not Marxism.354  He claimed that when 
Mozambique gained independence from Portugal under the Marxist Front for the 
Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO), Washington extended recognition and 
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established diplomatic relations.
355
  However, he viewed Angola as problematic because 
it represented “the projection of Soviet military power into Africa.”356  
 
According to Dobrynin, the International Department of the Communist Party of 
the Soviet Union (CPSU) used the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) to first establish 
contact with and then provide support to the Angolan liberation movement.
357
  One of the 
most reliably obedient parties to Moscow, the PCP had even backed Soviet actions 
against Finland in 1939 and the invasion of Hungary in 1956.
358
  In the 1950s the PCP 
created the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA).
359
  Thus it is 
possible that the Angolan revolution in 1959 was initiated by Moscow and carried out at 
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least in part by the PCP.
360
  Alongside the rebellion against colonial rule, the pro-
communist MPLA and the anti-communist National Union for the Total Liberation of 
Angola (UNITA) had fought a civil war since the early 1960s.
361
   
1974 was a pivotal year in the fortunes of Angola.  On April 25, the fascist regime 
of Antonio de Oliveira Salazar was overthrown in a military coup in Portugal.
362
  General 
Antonio Spinola led the new government
363
 which included Alvaro Cunhal, a PCP leader 
who in February had been honored with the Order of the October Revolution while in 
Moscow.
364
  In June, Portugal and the Soviet Union established diplomatic relations.
365
 
The next month the Portuguese army withdrew from Angola.
366
  Finally, in January, 
1975, Angola’s competing factions agreed to form a government and hold elections.367   
However, fighting broke out before any votes could be cast.  Predictably, the 
superpowers backed their respective ideological allies.  The Soviets supported the 
MPLA, led by former medical student and convert to Marxism Agostinho Neto.
368
  
Meanwhile, the Americans adopted UNITA as well as a third group, the National Front 
for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA).
369
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Brezhnev believed that Soviet involvement in Angola was “just,” but it also 
presented an opportunity to show China that the Soviet Union was still the leader of 
international communism.
370
  Meanwhile Ford and Kissinger viewed American 
involvement as critical to re-establish US credibility after the loss of Vietnam.
371
  Once 
again, the United States was being driven by its own ideological impulses to respond to 
what it viewed as the further spread of communism across the globe.  
Several events during 1975 prompted Ford and Kissinger to dramatically increase 
the US role in Angola.  Sometime in the spring, perhaps as early as March, but probably 
no later than May, Cuban advisers arrived to train the MPLA in the use of Soviet tanks 
and weapons.
372
  On April 17, Lon Nol’s US-backed government fell to the communist 
Khmer Rouge in Cambodia.
373
  On April 19, Zambia’s President Kenneth Kaunda 
requested Ford and Kissinger intervene in Angola to counter the Soviet Union and protect 
his and other African nations.
374
  By the end of the month, Vietnam was united under a 
communist regime.
375
  Later that summer, communists took complete control of Laos as 
well.
376
  To some, these events showed that the tide was turning against US interests as 
more countries aligned with the Soviet bloc, particularly in the General Assembly of the 
United Nations.
377
  For Gates, 1975 was “the worst year in CIA’s history.”378    
Cuban involvement clearly affected Kissinger.  He viewed those in the State 
Department and elsewhere who opposed intervention as suffering from “the Vietnam 
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syndrome,” referring to fears that US involvement would lead to a recreation of the long, 
drawn-out struggle in Southeast Asia.
379
  He reasoned that a diplomatic solution would 
not be enough to counter the Soviets and the Cubans.
380
  Consequently Ford and 
Kissinger increased military support to FNLA and UNITA from hundreds of thousands to 
millions of dollars.
381
  Beginning in July, both factions received armored personnel 
carriers, surface-to-air anti-aircraft missiles, mortars, rifles, machine guns and other 
supplies and equipment from the CIA.
382
  By September, the amount of aid had risen 
from an initial $14-$17 million to approximately $25 million.
383
   
The introduction of Cuban combat troops was a crucial turning point in the 
Angolan intervention, détente, and the Cold War.  Although the Cuban military had been 
involved in numerous African nations ever since Fidel Castro’s revolution in 1959, 
previous military contingents usually never exceeded several hundred.
384
  However, by 
the end of September at the latest, the first of thousands of combat troops from Havana 
arrived in Angola.
385
  Moscow had used military force in Eastern Europe, but Angola 
represented the first time Soviet military power had been applied (albeit through a proxy) 
into a civil war on the side of a pro-Soviet faction.
386
   
Despite increased US aid, Jonas Savimbi of UNITA claimed he needed more.  If 
Washington would not help, he threatened to appeal to apartheid South Africa, thus 
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turning Angola into a diplomatic and public relations catastrophe.
387
  Kissinger never 
admitted to working with South Africa, but according to the CIA there was 
communication and sharing of intelligence between Washington and Pretoria (Defense 
Minister P.W. Botha also reported that the US had asked for assistance.)
388
  On October 
14, South Africa invaded Angola in an attack on the Soviet-backed MPLA in the south, 
eventually reaching 500 miles inside of the war-ravaged country.
389
   
For the sake of American credibility around the world, Ford and Kissinger 
believed that they had to press forward.
390
  Since the amount in its contingency fund had 
fallen to a mere seven million dollars, the CIA sought Congressional approval.
391
  
However, agency director William Colby’s testimony on November 6 before the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee revealed that Congress had not been fully informed about 
either the extent or the details of US involvement in Angola.
392
  Senator Dick Clark of 
Iowa, recently returned from a visit to the war-torn nation, declared that the CIA and 
White House had lied about the extent of the American role and charged that US actions 
had drawn Cuba and South Africa into the conflict.
393
  California Senator John Tunney 
later sponsored the Clark Amendment cutting off CIA funding for covert operations in 
Angola,
394
 adding “’I don’t want to see any more money go down this rat hole.’”395   
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By November there were approximately 4,000 Cuban combat troops in Angola.
396
  
Although originally transported on Cuban planes and ships, that month the Soviets began 
providing long-range aircraft.
397
  The MPLA took the capital of Luanda and declared the 
independence of the People’s Republic of Angola on November 12.398   
 Meanwhile, Kissinger and Dobrynin worked in the backchannel, discussing the 
matter several times during October and November.
399
  On December 9, Ford told 
Dobrynin that détente was being jeopardized by Soviet actions in Angola.
400
  The next 
day the Soviets suspended their airlift,
401
 and Kissinger and Dobrynin addressed the 
influx of arms from surrounding nations: 
K: …We cannot think of any other solution except to ask outside countries 
to promise not to send more arms in.  If you are worried about the border 
in Zaire, we are willing to consider a UN force there.  We promise you we 
would exercise restraint on our part and to get all foreign forces out. 
 
D: …The question really is in this case not very easy to control.  It is in 
the capital of the country and no one knows where they are. 
 
K: But look it will be easily known if something comes in or not.  If we 
don’t keep our word, that will affect our relationship. 
 
D: Do you have any ideas if Africa could do something?  It is their 
business.  It is not natural for us really. 
 
K: No, but the way we could do it is to have the Organization of African 
Unity ask all outside powers, you see, and then we would both have an 
excuse to do it… 
 
However, there remained one wildcard: 
 
D: Who is going to control South Africa? 
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K: We have nothing to do directly with South Africa, but we would bring 
major pressure on them. 
 
D: But if they continue? 
 
K: Look, we are trying to win.  We are trying to get everybody out of it.
402
 
 
Describing a mutual pullout as a “win” represented quite a lowering of expectations for 
Kissinger.  He may have already given up hope of receiving further funding to displace 
the MPLA, and instead sought a face-saving measure to limit the damage to US prestige.  
Kissinger suggested to Dobrynin that if the US and the USSR would support an appeal 
from the Organization of African Unity to have all three factions begin talks, it could lead 
to a political solution.
403
  Dobrynin seemed hesitant: “The question is themselves.  
Whether they are going to take this from us.”404  “I think if the two of us agree, we can 
get them to agree,” replied Kissinger.405   
A little over a week later, the Clark Amendment passed the Senate by a 54-22 
vote on December 19.
406
  An irate Ford lambasted the upper house: “’This abdication of 
responsibility by a majority of the Senate will have the gravest consequences for the 
long-term position of the United States and for international order in general.’”407  The 
vote and leaked information concerning previous CIA covert activity in Angola may have 
encouraged the Soviets to step up their efforts.
408
  After a brief pause from December 9 to 
25, Moscow resumed its transport of Cuban arms and troops.
409
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 With the arrival of the election year 1976, a favorable outcome in Angola took on 
an even greater importance for the White House.  On January 3, Ford stated in an 
interview with NBC that Soviet actions in Angola violated the principles of détente.
410
  
On the 9
th
, Kissinger told Dobrynin that the lack of progress in Angola would force him 
to “make some bloody statements about the conditions…which can not be in your 
interest.”411  Kissinger seemed to be implying that the situation could affect his planned 
visit to Moscow to discuss the SALT II treaty as well as its chances for ratification 
thereafter.  Dobrynin appeared threatened and the conversation grew tense: 
D: We are not…we have never considered it [Angola] a test of strength or 
will but you… 
 
K: No, it is on the part of Congress. 
 
D: It has nothing to do with Congress…you are forcing this issue…We 
have to make a test of will between you and the Secretary General whether 
you will come if something happens in Angola?...Either Brezhnev has to 
agree to what Henry wants or the whole SALT issue is in the air.  
 
Then later… 
 
K: I was hoping we could settle this thing quietly since neither of us have 
an overwhelming interest in Angola.  
 
D: Exactly.  But you are forcing the point.
412
 (italics mine) 
 
Perhaps no other conversation in the telcons better demonstrated the divergent views of 
the United States and the Soviet Union on détente.  Kissinger insisted that the Soviets end 
their support for the MPLA, even after saying that Angola was of little strategic interest 
to the US.  However, the White House believed Soviet and Cuban intent on aiding the 
MPLA made the country strategic.  This exchange demonstrated how both superpowers 
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viewed the outcomes of various conflicts in the developing world as indications of whose 
ideology was “winning.”  Ford and Kissinger were determined that Moscow would not 
“win” in Angola – not after Vietnam and especially not in an election year.   
An increasingly frustrated Dobrynin then challenged Kissinger: “OK.  You do it.  
You make a test.  If you equate Angola to détente that is your business.  If you feel it is 
that important, ok.  We don’t think it is...I will send to Brezhnev that you will have to 
take into consideration that you may not come because of Angola.”413  To which 
Kissinger responded, “No, I said that the conditions that are being created are not helpful 
ones,” and “we trust that you are not working in a direction that during my visit things 
will happen that will be humiliating to the United States.”414  Although Kissinger 
eventually did travel to Moscow on January 20, 1976, there was no long-term agreement 
on Angola or SALT II.
415
   
As expected, the House approved the Clark Amendment to the defense spending 
bill 323-99 on January 27, cutting off all CIA funding for Angola.
416
  Although Ford 
supported the CIA’s actions in Africa, he reluctantly signed the legislation in February 
because it also funded the B-1 bomber, the Trident missile, and the cruise missile.
417
  The 
Clark Amendment was later repealed during the Reagan administration.
418
 
 By March of 1976 the MPLA emerged victorious.
 419
  At the end of 1977 there 
were 20,000 Cuban soldiers in Angola.
420
  A conservative estimate of the cost of the 
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Soviet intervention was $300 million, about ten times what the Americans spent, and this 
only included the cost of equipment – not troops.421  The ability to fund such an operation 
indicated that the Soviet economy, while perhaps only 50-60% as large as that of the US, 
nevertheless could provide Moscow with numerous international opportunities.  The 
Soviet Union had demonstrated to other liberation movements, the Chinese, and the 
Americans that it could intervene in support of its interests anywhere around the world.
422
   
 However, as Dobrynin explained the price for this victory was high because 
Angola “soured Americans on détente.”423  He claimed that the Soviet embassy attempted 
to tell Moscow that Washington viewed Angola as “a test of détente,” but that these 
warnings went unheeded by “the morally self-righteous” in the Kremlin.424 
 Foreign interventions were the coup de grace for détente.  Although the policy 
limped on for another few years into the Carter Administration, the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan in 1979 was the last straw.  Through the backchannel, Kissinger and 
Dobrynin had established empathy and achieved numerous diplomatic successes.  
However, the telephone transcripts show that even at a détente, both the United States 
and the Soviet Union continued to view themselves as a nation and a cause, complicating 
the work of diplomacy.  Ultimately, Kissinger and Dobrynin were unable to reconcile the 
conflicts between their respective national ideologies, and détente became little more than 
a short respite from the Cold War. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Role of Relationships 
“He understood that a reputation for reliability is an important asset in foreign policy.  
Subtle and disciplined, warm in his demeanor while wary in his conduct, Dobrynin 
moved through the upper echelons of Washington with consummate skill.”1 
-Henry Kissinger 
 
“To Henry, opponent, partner, friend.”2 
-Anatoly Dobrynin’s inscription on a copy of his memoirs presented to Kissinger.  
 
When détente ended along with the 1970s, the chances of a return to relaxing 
tensions appeared remote.  No one seemed less likely to resume détente with the Soviet 
Union than Ronald Reagan, who was elected President of the United States in 1980.  At 
his first presidential press conference Reagan called détente “a one-way street”3 which he 
believed the Soviet Union had exploited to acquire a strategic and geopolitical advantage 
over the United States.   
Supporters of this view would argue that in addition to maintaining superiority in 
ICBMs and SLBMs (but not bombers) throughout the 1970s, in 1977 the Soviets had 
deployed new tactical nuclear missiles in Eastern Europe, the SS-20s.
4
  These 
intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) with multiple warheads were capable of 
hitting Western European capitals, thus enhancing Moscow’s regional nuclear 
advantage.
5
  Left unchecked, such developments presented the theoretical possibility of 
the “Finlandization” of Europe, a reference to Finland’s perceived acquiescence to the 
                                               
1 Henry Kissinger, foreword to Soviet-American Relations: The Détente Years, 1969-1972, (Washington, 
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neighboring Soviet Union on foreign policy in exchange for maintaining some measure 
of domestic sovereignty.  If Europe as a whole felt compelled to take a similar path, it 
could split the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO) and leave the United States 
diplomatically isolated.  Some Western European governments including Great Britain 
and West Germany were so concerned that they requested NATO to respond with a 
similar deployment of its own, which it did in 1983.   
In addition to the changes in the US-Soviet relationship, there were significant 
global developments as well.  The “convergence theory” of liberal economist John 
Kenneth Galbraith postulated that multinational corporations in the West and communist 
state enterprises would become increasingly similar.
6
  Such a view implied that 
communism remained a viable economic system and may have even been superior to 
capitalism in terms of managing industrial development.
7
  Furthermore, around the world 
ten additional countries had adopted communist governments from 1975-1980.  By the 
end of the decade Freedom House, a non-governmental organization (NGO) tracking the 
progress of democracy, noted that autocratic regimes of both the left and the right 
outnumbered democratic ones 2:1.  French conservative scholar Jean-Francois Revel 
even warned of a “totalitarian temptation,” arguing that many had come to believe 
dictatorships might be better suited to provide for people’s needs than liberal democracies 
could.
8
  
President Carter increased US defense spending as well as aid to the Mujahideen 
rebels fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan.  However, Reagan’s first term was marked by 
                                               
6 Galen Mac Caba, review of Strange Rebels: 1979 and the Birth of the 21st Century, by Christian Caryl, in 
National Review, 17 June 2013, 53. 
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still greater increases in both as well as declarations of ideological warfare including 
describing the Soviet Union as an “Evil Empire.”  Nevertheless, beginning in 1985 he 
and new Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev held the first of four summits.  
Two years later they signed the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty whereby 
both the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to eliminate an entire class of nuclear 
weapons.  Additional negotiations commenced to drastically reduce – not simply limit – 
long-range strategic weapons, culminating in the 1991 Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty 
(START I) after Reagan left office. Unlike SALT, the START negotiations also included 
verification measures to ensure compliance with any agreement.  US-Soviet relations 
continued to improve until the Soviet Union dissolved and the Cold War ended. 
What happened?  How did the United States and the Soviet Union go “[f]rom the 
second cold war to the second détente”9 and ultimately to the end of the Cold War?  It is 
one of the most intensely argued questions in the entire historiography of US-Soviet 
relations.  Some scholars credited Mikhail Gorbachev and his policies of glasnost 
(openness) and perestroika (restructuring).  They pointed to reforms granting Soviet 
citizens a greater role in their government as well as the release of Eastern Europe from 
Moscow’s influence.  However, they also acknowledged that Gorbachev lost control of 
the reform process, ultimately leading to the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics.
10
  For many scholars on the left Gorbachev was a great reformer and man of 
peace.  However, observers on the right argued that Gorbachev’s reforms were intended 
                                               
9 Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, third ed., (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 
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to salvage communism and find a way to make it more competitive with the West.  He 
certainly did not plan to abolish the communist party and the Soviet Union itself.  
Furthermore, critics argued that Gorbachev’s military response to independence 
movements in the Baltic States and elsewhere undermined the notion that he was simply 
a man dedicated to peacefully ending the Cold War. 
Gorbachev’s “new political thinking” about foreign policy was another proposed 
explanation for the Cold War’s end.  Advocates of this view contended that American 
fears of Soviet expansion had driven US-Soviet tensions ever since George Kennan’s 
article “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” appeared in Foreign Affairs in 1947.  
Consequently, some cited Gorbachev’s removal of ideological considerations from 
foreign policy such as support for the international “class struggle,” as crucial to ending 
the East-West conflict.
11
  This narrative may have appealed to those on the right who 
considered the Soviet Union to be motivated by Marxist-Leninist ideology to establishing 
global domination.  However, for those on the left who believed such concerns to be 
misguided at best and paranoid at worst, this thesis was probably not as satisfying.     
Others argued that none of Gorbachev’s domestic and foreign policy reforms 
would have taken place without the hard-line policies of the first term Reagan 
administration from 1981-1984.  They suggested that the Soviet Union only changed 
course from its aggressive posture after being confronted by counteroffensive measures 
taken by the United States including dramatic increases in defense spending and support 
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for resistance movements in Eastern Europe and elsewhere.  Furthermore, they pointed to 
Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) as presenting a technological challenge to the 
Soviet offensive nuclear arsenal which Moscow lacked the ability to duplicate.  The 
cumulative effect of these policies was said to have forced Gorbachev to liberalize 
politically and economically, and ultimately led to the dissolution of the Soviet Union 
and the end of the Cold War.
12
  However, some on the left argued that rather than 
bringing about or hastening the Cold War’s end, Reagan’s hard-line stance inflamed 
tensions and dragged the confrontation out longer than it needed to be.  They also pointed 
to the enormous US national debt resulting in part from Reagan’s defense spending.  On 
the other hand, many on the right pointed to several developments in the 1970s including 
the Soviet arms build-up, the use of Cuban surrogates in support of Marxist revolutions in 
the developing world, and the invasion of Afghanistan as evidence that US-Soviet 
relations were already at their nadir by the time Reagan came into office.  Consequently, 
they argued that an aggressive response from the Americans was precisely what was 
required.  Additionally, they contended that the installment of a reformer, Mikhail 
Gorbachev, as General Secretary of the Communist Party demonstrated that Reagan’s 
approach did not result in an equally hard-line response from the Soviets.  
Finally, several observers emphasized the role of personal relationships and trust 
which developed between key American and Soviet officials, somewhat reminiscent of 
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that between Kissinger and Dobrynin via the backchannel over a decade before.  They 
argued that despite Reagan’s reputation as a hard-liner, he was genuinely interested in 
relaxing tensions.  Gaddis claimed that Reagan shocked “his own hard-line supporters” 
when his foreign policy “turned out to be a more solidly based approach to détente than 
anything the Nixon, Ford, or Carter administrations had been able to accomplish.”13  
While some in the administration like Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger viewed 
Reagan’s arms build-up as an effort to “debilitate the other side,” Gaddis explained that 
Reagan eventually sided with pragmatists like Secretary of State George Schultz in using 
it to compel the Soviets to negotiate.
14
  In fact, Kiron K. Skinner, associate professor of 
International Relations at Carnegie Mellon University and research fellow at the 
conservative Hoover Institution at Stanford University, argued that negotiations with 
Moscow were “as important as the military buildup,” for Reagan’s strategy.15   
However, if US-Soviet relations were to improve it required a counterpart on the 
Soviet side.  As Gaddis explained, only when Mikhail Gorbachev became General 
Secretary in 1985 did Reagan have a negotiating partner “imaginative” enough (or who 
lived long enough) with whom to do business.
16
  Jack F. Matlock, Jr., Reagan’s 
ambassador to Moscow, agreed and explained that beginning in 1983 the Reagan 
administration “tried to establish a pattern of discussing new proposals with the Soviet 
Communist Party leader in private before making them public.”17  This included the use 
of letters (many hand-written by Reagan personally) as well as meetings between 
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diplomats.
18
  However, “it took two or three years to catch on and be reciprocated,”19 
suggesting that real progress did not commence until Gorbachev arrived on the scene. 
By the time of the first Reagan-Gorbachev summit in 1985 at Geneva, 
Gorbachev’s chief foreign policy advisor Anatoli Cherniaev observed “some sort of 
human rapport between the two leaders that gave hope for change.”20  Cherniaev added 
that after Reagan’s positive reaction to Gorbachev’s 1986 proposal at Reykjavik to 
eliminate half of all strategic nuclear weapons, “Mutual trust between the two leaders was 
another touchstone of the new political thinking that was crucial in bringing the cold war 
to an end.”21  Ultimately, both Reagan and Gorbachev stopped viewing the Cold War as a 
zero-sum game or in the words of Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. as if “a gain for one side 
was by definition a defeat for the other.”22  The old outlook had led not to “negotiation,” 
but rather “to a demand for capitulation,” said Schlesinger.23   
However, the change in approach was not limited to the two men at the top.  
Citing the memoirs of numerous Soviet officials as well as archival documents, William 
D. Jackson argued “the interest displayed by the second-term Reagan administration in 
improving relations with Moscow and the personal trust [italics mine] that gradually 
developed in high-level contacts between Soviet and U.S. officials” altered U.S.-Soviet 
relations and led to the end of the Cold War.
24
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Like American and Soviet officials during the Reagan-Gorbachev era, the 
telephone transcripts show that Kissinger and Dobrynin developed a relationship while 
developing détente.  The backchannel had four qualities which helped to facilitate this: 
privacy, durability, ease and frequency of communication, and the personalities of its 
participants. 
As the scholarly literature on back channels has argued, privacy allows 
representatives from opposing sides to begin talks when more strident voices on both 
sides may be opposed to any form of negotiations.  This was certainly true during the 
détente era as relaxing US-Soviet tensions faced opposition from hard-liners in Moscow 
and both liberals and conservatives in Washington.  Additionally, Kissinger and 
Dobrynin worked jointly to keep the substance of their face-to-face meetings and 
telephone calls secret, creating a bond while establishing trust.  
Second, the Kissinger-Dobrynin backchannel had durability.  For eight years, 
Kissinger and Dobrynin were the main point of contact for each other when addressing 
US-Soviet relations.  While previous back channels had dealt with a specific issue or 
emergency, as with the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, the Kissinger-Dobrynin 
backchannel was a permanent link between the White House and the Kremlin for all 
aspects of US-Soviet diplomacy.  It lasted through a presidential election in 1972, 
Kissinger’s appointment as Secretary of State in 1973, Nixon’s resignation in 1974, and 
even when Kissinger was stripped of his National Security Advisor duties by President 
Ford in 1975.      
Third, the structure of the backchannel provided an ease and frequency of 
communication unlike any other channel.  Since Dobrynin was stationed at the Soviet 
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embassy in Washington, he could conveniently meet with Kissinger in the Map Room of 
the White House.  Initially they met on a weekly basis, however the frequency increased 
as time went on.  Furthermore, the ease of access provided by the hotline from 
Dobrynin’s office at the Soviet embassy to Kissinger’s office in the White House 
probably encouraged more frequent communication than would have taken place 
otherwise. 
Finally, the backchannel was effective due to the personal chemistry of its 
participants.  This was its most intangible quality, but nevertheless a significant one.  To 
put it simply, Kissinger and Dobrynin “hit it off.”  Dobrynin in particular appreciated 
their shared sense of humor, which he said “helps to reach the heart as well as the mind 
of your partner.”25  Indeed, their banter was often comical, occasionally bordering on 
bawdy.  Horne described some of their conversations as more typical of “old college 
roommates” rather than representatives of the superpowers.26 
Through a common purpose and shared experience, Kissinger and Dobrynin built 
a relationship and established empathy.  However, empathy does not equal sympathy.  
Ralph K. White, a political scientist and psychologist at George Washington University, 
wrote that empathy is “’simply understanding the thoughts and feelings of others.  It is 
distinguished from sympathy, which is defined as feeling with others – as being in 
agreement with them.’”27  Consequently, “’even when a conflict is so intense that 
sympathy is out of the question,’” empathy is nevertheless possible.28 
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Recent scholarship about the failure of détente focused on the issue of empathy.   
As James G. Blight and Janet M. Lang explained, “empathy is a central concept in such 
fields as anthropology (especially ethnography), clinical psychology, and conflict 
resolution, among others,” but not in Cold War historiography.29  Nevertheless, they 
contended that the initial March 1977 arms control meeting in Moscow between the new 
Carter administration and the Kremlin was a turning point in US-Soviet relations due to a 
lack of empathy on both sides.  According to Blight and Lang, both the Americans and 
the Soviets agreed that this was the beginning of the mistrust which eventually ended 
détente.
30
   
The authors examined the published proceedings of the Carter-Brezhnev Project, 
part of the Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University.  A May, 1994, 
conference in Musgrove, Georgia entitled “SALT II and the Growth of Mistrust,” 
featured many of the most significant players from 1977 including President Carter’s 
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, 
Dobrynin, and Russian translator Viktor Sukhodrev.  The goals of the conference were to 
identify mistakes, look for missed opportunities, and draw lessons from the 1977 
Moscow summit.
31
  Blight and Lang explained that by using critical oral history, a 
process “combining, in structured conferences, decision-makers, scholars, and 
declassified documents (which provide added accuracy and authenticity to the 
conversation),” the participants were able to establish empathy and “begin to develop the 
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capacity to see pivotal events more or less the way their former adversaries saw them at 
the time.”32  Blight and Lang explained that this method “often yields rich and surprising 
insights into what it was really like for decision-makers, then and there, thus yielding 
more accurate analyses and applicable lessons for decision-making, here and now.”33  
The inclusion of testimony from both sides, plus questions from scholars “armed with 
declassified documents,” helps to provide greater certainty of what happened, as much as 
this is possible in the search for historical truth.
34
   
The 1994 conference revealed that the Soviets had taken offense at the 1977 
summit when the Americans proposed a much more radical arms limitation agreement 
than the one agreed upon between President Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev at 
Vladivostok in 1974.
35
  The Soviets viewed this as a unilateral change, while the 
Americans were offended at the lack of any counterproposal.
36
  The use of critical oral 
history enabled both sides to understand what the other thought at the time.  Blight and 
Lang concluded that the history of détente could have been more successful if only the 
two sides had been able to see the other’s point of view.37 
While at the conference Dobrynin reflected on his experience negotiating in the 
backchannel.  He explained that while it was not a panacea for successful diplomacy, it 
did allow both sides to make proposals in an informal way, and thereby gauge the other’s 
reaction as well as the chances for success: 
I don’t say that it is something of overriding importance, but it has some 
importance.  Specifically in one sense: it gives you a chance to explain 
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things.  It helps provide preliminary explanation of the position of the 
other country.  It’s simple. It doesn’t always matter who the channel is; 
things are decided by the president.  But the backchannel helps elaborate 
on your thinking a bit.  Not always.
38
 
 
However, without this line of communication, Dobrynin claimed that the Soviets were 
unsure of what the Carter administration wanted to do and where they wanted to take the 
relationship:   
There was one situation when the secretary of state [Cyrus Vance] brought 
one proposal-drastic reductions-and someone else brought another one.  
And someone would raise human rights.  It was difficult to know how to 
deal with this [the Carter] administration at all.
39
 
 
In short, Dobrynin explained that the backchannel allowed for elaboration and 
clarification of positions.  “It is important not just to have people come with very big 
proposals, accompanied by some other things which were not acceptable.  You need 
contacts to explain things,” he added.40  Although Dobrynin had attempted to initiate 
backchannel negotiations with National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, the new 
president opposed “secret diplomacy” and insisted that all business be done with the State 
Department and its Secretary Cyrus Vance.
41
 
 It is apparent that from Dobrynin’s point of view, the American-Soviet 
relationship no longer possessed empathy by the time of the March, 1977 meeting.  The 
Americans did not understand that the Soviets felt they had neither been consulted nor 
respected when Vance made a new arms control offer.  The agenda and the proposals 
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stemming from that agenda had been created by the US.
42
  As Dobrynin put it, “If we 
want to understand the fight we had for years with your administration, we have to look 
at your agenda.  Wrongly or rightly, that is how we saw things.  That’s why we were so 
angry, and didn’t even want to discuss your proposals.”43 
 However, there was plenty of blame to go around.  At the same 1994 conference, 
former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance expressed his frustration at the unequivocal Soviet 
rejection of the American proposal in 1977:  
The problem that really arose, it seems to me, was that when we put our 
proposals on the table, nobody would listen to them, and contrary to usual 
practice, nobody said, ‘Well, let’s sit down and talk about that and see if 
we can find a way to get around this thing.’  We got a wet rag in the face, 
and were told to go home.
44
 
 
President Carter’s stated goal was to eventually rid the world of all nuclear weapons.45  
Representatives of his administration believed that they had made an honest attempt at a 
first step towards that objective.  It was then immediately rejected.  Vance called the 
rejection a crucial “tactical mistake” and claimed that several years later Soviet Foreign 
Minister Andrei Gromyko agreed with him.
46
 
 As Blight and Lang explained, even though nuclear arms control “was by far the 
top priority on their mutual agenda,” both sides came away from the March, 1977 summit 
believing that the other was “not serious.”47 Regardless of who was to blame, it is 
extremely difficult to imagine such a situation occurring in the days of reliance on the 
backchannel.  The channel was more than a preliminary means of communication.  It 
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facilitated understanding and compromise.  Any new proposal for a radical reduction in 
nuclear arms would have first been discussed between Kissinger and Dobrynin before 
either side presented it at a formal summit meeting.  One of the things which might have 
been discovered was Brezhnev’s strong emotional attachment to the November, 1974, 
Vladivostok Accords.  The Soviet General Secretary believed that the difficulties he 
encountered while getting the Politburo to accept this agreement contributed to the stroke 
he suffered shortly after Vladivostok.
48
  In short, Brezhnev thought he had sacrificed his 
health to forge the deal.
49
  This kind of information could have been shared privately in 
the backchannel before taking any new proposal to either side’s leadership.   
To be very clear, the emphasis in this dissertation on the relationship between 
Kissinger and Dobrynin is not to make a value judgment on them, their politics, or their 
successors.  Nor is it an attempt to blame the collapse of détente entirely on the end of the 
Kissinger-Dobrynin backchannel.  Rather, it is intended to offer a possible explanation 
for the relative success of détente during its early years despite the conflicting American 
and Soviet views of relaxing tensions. 
The concept of empathy in international relations has its critics, however.  After 
all, as Blight and Lang put it, “can anything intelligible and helpful to historians be said 
about a term that means ‘putting yourself in the skin’ of another or ‘putting yourself in 
the shoes of the other?’”50  Mark Garrison, part of Vance’s delegation to Moscow in 
March, 1977 conceded, “Blight and Lang are right to point out the importance of 
empathy in the failures of the Carter-Brezhnev period.  The usefulness of understanding 
where the other side is coming from is widely accepted in principle but not easy to put 
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into practice.”51 On the other hand, even if empathy is employed, it can only go so far.  A 
policy maker may determine that there are irreconcilable differences.  If those differences 
are potentially dangerous, “one must be prepared to deal with them by whatever means 
are appropriate,” explained Garrison.52   
Garthoff, the US ambassador to Bulgaria at the time of the Vance trip, agreed that 
empathy is often overlooked in international relations.  Empathy is necessary “to 
understand why another party holds views or objectives that sharply conflict with one’s 
own.”53  This can empower diplomats to determine how to resolve disputes or if they are 
even solvable.
54
  However, if not just the perceptions but also the objectives of the two 
sides are incompatible then empathy will only confirm this, and not necessarily provide 
any solutions.
55
  Garthoff added that oral history can likewise be useful, but it is not a 
substitute for documents and other written sources.
56
 
As with Garrison and Garthoff, Thomas W. Simons, Jr. was also skeptical about 
the utility of empathy in analyzing international affairs.  Simons, a former Soviet analyst 
in the American embassy in Moscow, noted that there were “third rails” in the U.S.-
Soviet relationship.
57
  For the Soviets it was support for national liberation movements in 
the developing world and for the Americans it was support for human rights.
58
  
Consequently, Simons argued that what happened in March, 1977, was not a failure of 
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empathy, but a failure of policy: “the makings of what it took to understand Soviet 
motives and intentions were present in the U.S. government before the Carter 
administration and throughout the Carter administration, as were the makings in the 
Soviet government of what it took to understand the Carter administration.”59  However, 
neither side used that knowledge to craft workable policies because they were more 
concerned with defeating the other in the negotiating process.
60
  “The leaders on both 
sides did not want [italics in original] to do better.”61 
 Jack F. Matlock, Jr., deputy chief of mission at the U.S. embassy in Moscow in 
1977, was more receptive to applying empathy to diplomacy.  “New U.S. administrations 
often continue campaign rhetoric after taking office and think more about the impact on 
the U.S. public than on the countries with which they have to deal,” he wrote.62  In 
addition, Matlock declared “ignoring the advice of professional diplomats trained to 
understand other societies is folly.”63  According to Matlock, if the American embassy 
had been asked, it would have informed Washington that the new arms proposal carried 
by Vance would have had a better chance of being accepted if it had been privately 
presented to the Soviets before any details were made public.
64
  Although this may not 
have required a “backchannel” as in the Kissinger-Dobrynin era, a private meeting of 
ambassadors beforehand would have been constructive.
65
 
Likewise, Robert Pastor, director of Latin American affairs on the National 
Security Council in 1977, agreed with Blight and Lang: “both sides lacked empathy; both 
                                               
59 Ibid., 100. 
60
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sides missed each other.”66  The Soviets needed to understand that in 1976 Carter had not 
just run against Ford, but also against Kissinger and his “traditional conservative 
realism.”67  For this reason, it was unlikely that Carter would simply pick up where 
Kissinger had left off with the 1974 Vladivostok arms control proposal.
68
  On the other 
hand, Pastor added that Carter did not understand how his pronouncements about human 
rights and eliminating all nuclear weapons caused the Soviets to believe that the new 
president was trying to push them around.
69
 
Even if one does accept the value of relationships and the empathy it helps to 
create, it raises another question.  Does this type of interpretive tool cause the historian to 
focus too heavily on a few individuals, thereby missing the larger picture?  This is a 
possible danger.  After all, not every diplomatic success or failure can be attributed to the 
actions of individuals.  Sometimes, there is simply no common ground between the 
various interests of states.   
Nevertheless, Deborah Welch Larson applied social psychology to make the case 
that sometimes countries fail to reach agreements “even when they have compatible 
preferences.”70  This occurs “because policy-makers make incorrect inferences about the 
opponent’s motives and intentions.”71  However, states and diplomats who establish a 
relationship over an extended period of time may learn to cooperate despite great 
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differences, because they can empathize with each other’s efforts and recognize the 
potential benefits which can accrue to both sides from sticking things out.
72
    
Differences between state systems can impede this process.  For example, a non-
democratic nation may “inspire distrust of their motives,” but a democratic state can 
“elicit doubts of their resolution.”73  In a country with a democratic form of government, 
there is always the possibility of new leadership coming to power at the next election and 
hence a change in policy.
74
  Therefore, the transition from the Nixon/Ford/Kissinger Era 
to the Carter administration may have presented an obstacle to détente not for any 
partisan, personal, or policy reasons, but simply because it represented a break from the 
past where a degree of trust had been established, particularly through the Kissinger-
Dobrynin backchannel.  On the other hand, in a long-term relationship (diplomatically 
speaking) such as the one which occurred between Kissinger and Dobrynin from 1969-
1977, both sides can develop the belief that the other means well, and even “discount or 
overlook the other state’s misdeeds or lies because such evidence is inconsistent with 
[their] image of the state as friendly.”75 
According to Larson, one way a nation can establish trust is though “a 
conciliatory gesture” which does not appear to benefit it in any way, and may even be 
potentially detrimental.
76
  Such an action can enhance a nation’s credibility if it is 
“noncontingent,” “irrevocable,” and increases its “vulnerability.”77   
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The early détente period provided an apt example of such a “conciliatory 
gesture.”  Human rights were not on Moscow’s agenda, and the specific issue of 
emigration from the Soviet Union arguably threatened Soviet security with the possibility 
that the government could lose control over its population.  Furthermore, the notion that 
Soviet citizens might want to leave their country was inherently embarrassing for 
Moscow.  Nevertheless, through the Kissinger-Dobrynin channel and without a great deal 
of attention, beginning around 1970 the Soviets gradually increased the number of exit 
visas granted to Soviet Jews.  Meanwhile, the Americans reciprocated by keeping 
discussions of Jewish emigration in the backchannel and not using the issue for 
propaganda purposes.  These early actions undoubtedly contributed to an improved 
climate in Soviet-American relations and helped lead to some of the greatest 
achievements of the détente period. 
For eight years, Kissinger and Dobrynin discussed numerous topics as they built 
détente.  The subjects ranged from arms control to human rights to foreign interventions 
in the developing world.  With each successive crisis they faced, these representatives of 
the two superpowers built a relationship based upon a mutual commitment to relaxing 
tensions and avoiding nuclear war.  A common purpose and shared experience created 
empathy and enabled both to navigate tumultuous diplomatic waters.  After all, they were 
in it together.  It may not even be an exaggeration to say they became friends – they 
clearly became friendly.   
When détente failed, it was because of fundamental ideological differences 
between the United States and the Soviet Union about relationships between states and 
the relationship between a state and its people.  These differences had long been a part of 
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US-Soviet relations, but détente’s early successes had made them seem less significant.  
The inability or unwillingness of the Americans and Soviets to get at the root causes of 
the Cold War may have made the end of détente inevitable.  However, it also 
demonstrated the challenges with which Kissinger and Dobrynin were forced to contend 
over the years.  In this light, their successful “special relationship” was all the more 
noteworthy and provides a case study of the effectiveness of back channels in 
international diplomacy. 
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